


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THE ESSENTIALS OF AN ENDURING VICTORY

ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME




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**THE ESSENTIALS OF
AN ENDURING VICTORY**

WORKS OF ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME

THE ESSENTIALS OF AN ENDURING VICTORY
THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED
THE UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

L'EUROPE ET LA QUESTION D'AUTRICHE AU
SEUIL DU XX^E SIECLE [1901]
(Czech and Russian translations)

L'ALLEMAGNE, LA FRANCE ET LA QUESTION
D'AUTRICHE [1902]
(An abridgment of the preceding)

LA MACÉDOINE, LE CHEMIN DE FER DE BAG-
DAD [1903]

LA COLONISATION ET LES COLONIES ALLE-
MANDES [1905]

LE MONDE ET LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE
[1906]

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DOUZE ANS DE PROPAGANDE EN FAVEUR DES
PEUPLES BALKANIQUES [1913]

LA PAIX QUE VOUDRAIT L'ALLEMAGNE, 1915
[1915]
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
LE PLAN PANGERMANISTE DÉMASQUÉ [1916]
(English, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Russian,
and Japanese translations)

PAN-GERMANY, THE DISEASE AND THE CURE,
AND A PLAN FOR THE ALLIES [1918]

LES BÉNÉFICES DE GUERRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE
ET LA FORMULE BOCHE "NI ANNEXIONS,
NI INDEMNITÉS" [1918]
(Pamphlet)

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THE ESSENTIALS OF AN ENDURING VICTORY




France
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BY
ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME
AUTHOR OF "THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED"

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1918





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PREFACE

A considerable number of the Allies believe that the conclusion of the armistice with Germany on November 10th, 1918, signified that all was over, that we were assured of absolute victory, and that the general demobilization could be immediately begun.

As this is an erroneous belief, it constitutes a source of immense danger.

The object of this book is to show this danger in the strongest light, and to convince public opinion that it is urgently necessary to guard against it without delay. I shall show that our victory may be very seriously compromised during the armistice preceding peace.

Many of my readers may possibly be surprised by this statement, especially those who as yet know nothing of me; and for this reason I must first explain why I am particularly entitled to be heard by the general public at this crucial moment of the world's history.

During a period of twenty years before

1914, I devoted all my time and all my means to the defense of peace. In order to avoid entirely the horrors of this war, I had carefully studied the conditions which would cause it with the view of showing how it could best be prevented.

Events have shown that the measures I advanced in my books, published from 1901 to 1914, to prevent the German aggression, were right. If, therefore, these measures had been followed, this horrible war would never have taken place, and millions of men would still be living. These things justify me in thinking that I can give some information that will be especially useful to prevent a recurrence of the war.

There are other reasons why confidence may be accorded me:

The two maps given on pages viii and ix demonstrate that already in 1901 I had clearly explained in what the Pangerman plan consisted, exactly as it was realized sixteen years later, in 1917.

In 1912, I declared that the European war would begin by an attack on Serbia (see *La Défense Nationale*, November 30th, 1912), that the German offensive against France which would follow would be "terrific in its na-


ture," and "pushed to the verge of frenzy" (see *La Crise française*, page 507).

As the result of four months' investigation in the Balkans at the beginning of 1914, I published in the *Paris Correspondant* (June, 1914) indications which showed that the government of Vienna "was about to set off an explosion which should destroy the state of things beginning to take shape in the Balkans." In August, 1914, I pointed out that Bulgaria would declare war against the Allies as soon as they met with a military defeat, which came to pass after the affair in the Dardanelles.

In my book, *The Pangerman Plot Unmasked*, published at the beginning of 1916 (see page 73), I denounced in advance the series of German pacifist manœuvres, including the one now in progress—the armistice trick, based on the evacuation of Belgium and France, to be followed by a negotiated peace which finally, in spite of first appearances, would result in a German victory.


This peril still exists in a much greater degree than is believed, but we can completely avert it if the Allies take advantage of the tremendous effect produced by the defeat of Bulgaria and the revolt of the oppressed

CE QUE SERAIT L'ALLEMAGNE AGRANDIE DE L'AUTRICHE



Facsimile of the map at page 353 of André Chéradamé's book, *Europe and the Austrian Question at the Opening of the Twentieth Century*, published in 1901; Plon, Nourrit & Company, publishers, 8 Rue Garancière, Paris.

Note.—The three grays of this facsimile correspond to the red tints of different strengths in the original map.



peoples in Austria-Hungary, who have opened to the Allies a free, triumphal road from Belgrade or Fiume to northern Bohemia; that is, to a point only 250 kilometres south of Berlin. These events, which in the single month of October, 1918, completely transformed the general situation of the Allies, grew out of the application of a political strategy on the principles and methods of which I have not ceased to point out from the beginning of the war. See *L'Illustration*, January 2d, 1915; "How to Destroy Pangermany," *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1917; *Pangermany, the Disease and Cure, and a Plan for the Allies*. On page 211 of this book, published by the *Atlantic Monthly* early in 1918, will be found a formula summarizing the conditions of victory, which, as events have since shown, were amply carried out by the Allies in September-October, 1918.

On page 212 of the same book, I said once more: "In reality it is enough that the Austro-German communications should be seriously disturbed for the situation to become, with extraordinary swiftness, very difficult both morally and materially for the armies concentrated on the western front by the German Staff."

I said at the end of this book: "If we encourage the Slavs, we shall inevitably bring about an internal explosion in Pangermany, and before the close of 1918 complete victory will be ours."

A long series of events sustain my predictions. Not that I am at all a prophet; I am only what may be called a good mechanic-engineer who has studied the very complicated European machine long and deeply, and, as is only natural under such circumstances, I can see much farther into the future than those who have not undergone the same special training.

The service which I may now be able to render lies in pointing out to the general public the great dangers of the period of armistice, and the way to avert them.

* * *

We must first understand that the armistice signed by Germany is not identical with an unconditional surrender. This agreement gives strong guarantees to the Allies, no doubt, but none the less it limits their action, as they are not allowed to occupy the whole territory of Germany. The German army is not demobilized, it is simply to withdraw beyond a

definite zone, and a portion of its material is still in its possession.

The armistice is therefore an agreement which assumes, on the one hand, that the Germans will keep their word, and, on the other, that the Allies will know how to draw the most advantages from the securities which have been given them.

The application of the principle of reparation for damage caused is in particular remarkably elastic. It may be applied in a way so inadequate that—as I shall show later on—the final result would be that France would in reality completely lose the war—a result which would have as its consequence the defeat of all the Allies.

The armistice is, then, a convention, that is, a paper, worth just as much as its application; and while the armistice is in force the Germans and those who take their part in the different Allied countries will surely attempt—

1st. To increase the enormous lessening of morale which the conclusion of the armistice has brought about among the Allied troops by making them think that there can be immediate demobilization.

2d. To modify the conditions of the armistice or to secure their incomplete execution.

3d. To stir up rivalries which may naturally exist between the greater Allies and between the peoples to be set free by the Entente in central and eastern Europe, but which have hitherto been held in check by the restraints of the war.

4th. By means of this situation to reach a negotiated peace.

5th. To obtain much more favorable conditions of peace, on the plea that the Germans are now republicans.

When one is familiar with the persistency and power of German propaganda it is clear that if these modes of action are systematically applied for several months, at the peace the Allied victory will be shorn of much of its greatness.

I state below certain things which have taken place or became known in the space of only seventy-two hours before or after the signature of the armistice by Germany, November 10th, 1918.

The *Evening Post* of November 11th announces that the delegates from the Central Powers will have preparatory conferences with the envoys of the Allies. A negotiated peace in conformity with Boche ideas is, then, in preparation, which is contrary to the wish of the immense majority of the American

public, which has clearly pronounced in favor of a dictated peace.

In New York, on the 10th of November, 4,000 socialists held a meeting at the Star Casino to protest against the occupation of German fortresses by the Allies (*New York Tribune*, November 11th, 1918).

Even before the armistice had been signed, on November 8th, Lord Robert Cecil, British Under-Secretary of State, said: "A genuine democratic German government assuredly would be accorded better peace terms."

On November 11th, Doctor Solf, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, begs President Wilson to persuade the Allies to "mitigate the fearful conditions of the armistice."

However this may be, if these facts and this information can be known in three days, what will be the effect of events of the same sort which cannot fail to increase from now to the conclusion of peace? It is certain that these results would have the effect of making the victory of the Allies "evaporate" to a considerable extent.

This will be better understood if we analyze the constituents of victory, understanding clearly what "virtual" victory means, and what are the conditions to transform it into "real" victory.

The reason which decided Germany to sign the armistice lies in the fact that the Allies, having "virtually" mastered the right to pass through Austria-Hungary, could attack Germany on the south. Under these conditions, being no longer able to prevent a military defeat on her own soil, Germany had no interest in the continuance of the struggle. It is therefore a "virtual" threat of the Allies that has brought about for them a victory which, before the realization of the armistice and of the conditions of peace, is also in a virtual state.

The greater number of the Allies believe that the armistice signed by Germany, being a written acknowledgment of defeat accepted in her name, constitutes victory for the Allies; but this is not true. The armistice in itself is only one of the probabilities of victory, since it is worth no more than the application which is made of its terms and the force which the Allies can derive from this application in imposing conditions of peace which assure them a truly lasting and curative victory. It is of cardinal importance to remember that after four years of an extremely complex struggle, which has overturned Europe in a manner unprecedented in history, *real victory will not result from the signature of a document,*

or even from the recovery of territory once lost, like Alsace-Lorraine for France, but from a difference in the whole situation of the victor by comparison with that of the vanquished.

Two contestants enter a contest, each with 100; when accounts are settled one is found to have 60, the other 80; the latter is clearly the winner. But what may possibly give rise to serious and even fatal mistakes is the fact that the difference in the final state of the two antagonists in this war, resulting from the sum of various factors and from accounts long and very difficult to draw up, will show themselves only when months or even years have elapsed after the conclusion of peace.

This is the reason why it is absolutely necessary to insure ourselves against any risk of error, by means of the most extreme caution in strictly applying the conditions of the armistice, and in definitely imposing conditions of peace which have been studied out with the greatest technical care.

* * *

As an illustration, let us take the example of France to show the imperative nature of these necessities. The permanent character of the victory of France is unquestionably

the very condition of the real and definitive victory of the Allies. It is certain, for instance, that if, twenty years after the conclusion of peace, France should succumb as a result of the remote consequences of the war, Germany would rule Europe. It would thus be shown that the Allies would have been completely deceived in declaring, as many of them are doing at this moment, that they were certain of having brought off a final victory.

France, being the pivot of the coalition which has just imposed conditions for an armistice on Germany, is consequently victorious; but for the present only in the virtual and conditional sense, even after the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine. Undoubtedly, it is in many respects a great advantage for France to regain her lost provinces. But, in the first place, France is only doing this after she has been deprived of them for forty-seven years, and, secondly, the advantage resulting from this restoration will only be a real one for France *if the peace conditions are such that she can keep Alsace-Lorraine permanently.*

On the signature of the armistice securing to France the occupation of the lost provinces France has not the certainty of being able to keep them permanently, because of the

conditions brought about by the war, first, in their population, and, secondly, in their finances, conditions which *at the moment of the signature of the armistice*, in spite of appearances, put France in a clearly unfavorable situation with respect to Germany.

Everything is a question of comparison. The Americans are 100 millions, and their war losses (about 55,000 dead and 180,000 wounded) are very rightly felt by them. But the harm done by the war to the French people assumes proportions infinitely more considerable.

It is a tremendous fact which should be kept in mind by all those who wish to guarantee the immediate future of Europe and of peace that France has lost more men than Germany, not only in proportion to the population of the two countries but actually in absolute figures.

As a matter of fact, Germany with its 68,000,000 inhabitants in 1914 has had 1,580,000 killed, while France with its scarcely 40,000,000 inhabitants has a total of dead which has not been officially published at the moment of this writing but which those who are semi-officially informed know to be greater than the figures of German deaths just given.

Besides, not to speak of the numberless

wounded who may recover sooner or later, France has about one million cripples and invalids, and one million and a half coming out of the war with serious and permanent forms of illness; say, 4 millions of the physically and morally best men of France destroyed or reduced to the most serious incapacity. (If, in proportion to its population, the United States had had losses on the same scale as those of France, these losses would be about 10 millions of Americans).

This is not all. At least 2 millions of French civilians have endured the Boche yoke for the space of four years, and the health of great numbers among them has been broken down by what they have undergone. Thousands of women and girls have been forced to bear the worst ineffaceable stain.

The evil effects of the war on the population of France will be still more aggravated by the fact that the French birth-rate is a third less than that of Germany. It is, therefore, certain that Germany will repair her losses in men much more quickly than France.

This situation of the French population is so serious that it will make real and definitive victory for France impossible, unless the conditions of peace imposed by the Allies shall bring about

in Europe such a condition that Germany shall not be able to profit by her superiority in numbers by renewing her attacks on France.

Let us now take up the economic inferiority in which France finds herself with respect to Germany at the moment of the signature of the armistice.

War expenses have been very much heavier for France than for Germany. A French shell made with English coal and American steel is, of course, very much dearer than a German shell made with metal stolen from Briey and coal seized from the Belgians; and this is true not only of nearly all materials of war but also food, when we compare the expenses of the two countries during the war.

The richest provinces of France have been devastated; they cannot be restored under a very long time, even if Germany pays the expenses. Germany, on the other hand, is intact, therefore in an infinitely more advantageous position to resume her activities after the peace.

Any reparation for *direct damage* done which Germany makes to France, can only at the best put things back as they were before the war. But it must be distinctly understood that this reparation for *direct damage*

leaves still existing the *indirect damage* which has been inflicted upon the whole of France by the war—*indirect damage* which is almost never spoken of, and which in the material field is infinitely greater than the *direct damage* done to the invaded French departments. This *indirect material damage* consists in the costs of the war to France—so great that only to pay the interest on the loans made and the pensions to the widows, orphans, and wounded, the taxes paid by the French, which were 1 billion of dollars before the war, will be increased *in a nearly permanent form* to almost 3 billions of dollars. Thus, in spite of the optimistic assertions which I sometimes hear, I claim that in a country of which the population has been so thoroughly decimated as that of France, it would be practically impossible to make the people pay each year for a length of time three times as much in taxes as before the war.

The word “reparation” only having been generally understood hitherto as applying to *direct damages*, we have as a result that, owing to the fact of the *indirect material damages* which the war has caused France, she finds herself at the time of signing the armistice under a financial burden considerably heavier than that of Germany.

These things lead us to the inevitable conclusion that when the armistice was signed the losses of all kinds produced by the war were considerably greater for France, and it is therefore perfectly fair to say that the conclusion of the armistice only assures a *virtual* victory to France. In fact, if the conditions of peace to be imposed on Germany do not radically abolish in some way the difference in mutual situation between France and Germany when the armistice was concluded, as far as actual losses of men and money are concerned, the superiority in the mutual position which will finally decide the real victory of France over Germany cannot be realized. In this case, in a very few years after the conclusion of peace, France, to the surprise of all the world, would appear in a condition of real and irremediable defeat, after having been in a condition of virtual victory at the moment of the signature of the armistice. It is, therefore, plain that this signature and even the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine are by no means sufficient to secure the real and definitive victory to France. This can only be settled long after the conclusion of peace, provided first that the terms of the armistice are thoroughly applied, and afterward that the conditions of peace, carefully considered

in the interest of Europe and the whole world, assure to France material reparation extensive enough to compensate for the immense disadvantage from the point of view of indebtedness and the state of population, as explained above, at which she stands with regard to Germany at the present time.

* * *

The whole German pacifist manœuvre since the conclusion of the armistice has precisely in view the prevention of France and her Allies from accomplishing those results which are the conditions of real victory. This Boche manœuvre in its essence consists in this: To profit by the words "republic" and "socialism," so that the Boche Social Democrats, who are nearly all tainted with the Pan-Germanist spirit and have vigorously supported the Kaiser for four years, may bring about by their connection with the pacifist Socialists of the Allied countries, who know nothing of Germany and easily allow themselves to be taken in by phrases, that peace shall be negotiated with the greatest possible speed and concluded with the approval of the "Internationale." The success of this manœuvre will secure for Germany the following results:

1st. Peace will be concluded very quickly

before an exhaustive study by the Allies of the vast and difficult problems which the war has presented.

2d. The responsibility for the war being concentrated on Kaiserism, the German people for the sake of republican fraternity will only be forced to repair a small part of the damage they have caused.

These two results will of themselves be sufficient to save Germany from defeat to-day, and to assure her of victory to-morrow, for they will leave the following consequences when but a few years have passed:

The peace being merely a patched-up one, the anti-Pan-Germanist Slavic states, Bohemia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania and Poland, will not be securely organized. The Germans will keep on with their intrigues among them all the more easily because they will have remained practically the masters of Russia, deprived of its middle class destroyed by the Bolsheviks.

France having to support the burden of the enormous excess of its war expenses in comparison with Germany would succumb financially. The French birth-rate, lower than that of Germany, and the French losses in men, greater than those of Germany, would each year after the war increase the relative weak-

ness of France. Thus a state of things would be brought about which would enable the German people to accomplish that of which Maximilian Harden warned us nearly three years ago when he said:

“If it is felt in France that peace can be possible only through the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and if we are forced to sign such a peace, the 70 millions of Germans will soon destroy it.” (See the *Temps*, February 9th, 1916).

On the day when this attack is brought about by the conditions just explained, France—which has saved the world by giving England time to arm herself and the United States time to become convinced of the Pan-Germanist peril—will go down irretrievably in the midst of her glory.

This is the result that the Germans are seeking, and that the Allies of France, morally and materially united, ought to prevent at any price. What I have said shows that *we are at present really in this curious position: we may have to-day the appearance of victory and to-morrow the reality of defeat.* To avoid the danger, however, it is enough to see the Boche manœuvre clearly and not allow ourselves to be misled by ideologists.

It would be a terrible mistake to believe that a German republic will abandon all war-like ideas and wishes for revenge. Very probably a German republic would be extremely military, particularly if the Allies were so foolish as not to deprive the Germans of the means to rebuild their forces; and in any case no precaution can be too great to avoid a repetition of the war. I have explained in detail in this book (see page 70 and following) that one of the surest ways to prevent another war for the possession of Alsace-Lorraine would be to create in central Europe a barrier of free states, strongly anti-German, and as this would restrain Germany from fresh outbreaks in any direction, it should be brought about in the interest of the entire world.

* * *

The essential object of the peace conference is to assure the reparation by the German people of the damages they have caused and to reconstruct Europe, but this reconstruction, to be durable, must be well done. In order that the new European machine which is to be built up from the parts of Pangermany should work smoothly under normal conditions, it should be very thoroughly put in

order by skilled mechanics, which is as much as to say that the rehabilitation of Europe demands the right solution of very numerous and difficult problems which require precise information on ethnography, national psychology, and practical political economy. Such information was certainly not possessed by many leaders in the Entente when the armistice was signed. The proof is this:

It was only at the end of the fourth year of the war that the Entente understood the importance to the world of the Czecho-Slovak people, which for twenty-five years at least the Germans had considered as one of the greatest obstacles in the way of the Pangerman plan. It is only at the end of 1918 that Czecho-Slovaks were recognized by the Allies as an independent people.

When the armistice was concluded the Roumanians and the Jugo-Slavs had not yet been recognized by the Entente with anything like the same formality as in the case of the Czecho-Slovaks, though the creation of Greater Roumania and of a strong Jugo-Slav state is just as necessary to the foundation of peace as the independence of Bohemia. I will not speak of a crowd of other questions raised by the war, particularly those relating

to finance, which are of immense importance, and have only been touched by the Allies in the most superficial way. Thus, the vital fact that the *indirect damages* made by German aggression in France are far larger than the *direct damages*, and like them call for reparation, has not yet been clearly brought out.

It is under such circumstances that as I write these lines there is talk of an extremely early meeting of the peace conference, with the aim of deciding all these questions on which for many years the fate of nations will depend.

I hold it as my solemn duty, in no way to be set aside, to declare openly that if the peace congress meets without taking the time needed to obtain in Central Europe informations which are now still lacking, fatal mistakes will inevitably result, and causes sure to provoke future conflicts will remain, which will soon bring forth their evil fruit.

One cannot all at once "patch up" a peace and reconstitute Europe on a firm basis; the thing cannot be done.

If the Germans are making the greatest effort to bring the peace conference together at the earliest possible moment it is because

they are well aware that the Allies lack information, and hope to gain great advantage thereby.

Public opinion would do well to protest at once against the hasty conclusion of the peace conference. The Allied people have spent their blood and their gold like water, and it is their right and their duty to insist that the fruit of so many sacrifices shall not be spoiled by unnecessary haste.

* * *

In order to show the absolute need of avoiding a precipitate decision, I have in this book taken examples drawn from the war, chosen in such a way as also to enlighten my readers on the great events which have just passed with such extraordinary rapidity that their vast import is not easy to grasp.

Chapter I reminds us how the Germans must have constantly deceived us, from the beginning of the war; for instance, by making us think that they were starving long before this famine had become a reality, which happened in September–October, 1918, when revolts in Austria-Hungary and the Allied occupation of the Danube cut communications between Germany and the East.

This general survey of German methods of deceit shows us with what distrust we ought to receive their promises and transformations during the armistice. Already, it is easy to detect that these transformations are to a great extent camouflage.

In Chapter II, I show under what terribly dangerous conditions the Germans made ready for the armistice trick, which would have perhaps succeeded if the great success of the Allies in the Balkans, and the insurrection of oppressed peoples in Austria-Hungary, had not—in October, 1918—abruptly changed the general situation in favor of the Allies.

Chapter III makes clear that it was not owing to diplomatic discussions but to military actions and Slavic insurrections in September–October, 1918 (the downfall of Bulgaria and of Austria-Hungary), which drove Germany to conclude an armistice on terms dictated by the Allies.

Chapter III also shows that on the solution in favor of the Allies of the effectives problem depended the events of October, 1918, in central Europe, for up to that time the superiority in man-power was on the side of Pangermany. The same chapter contains an exhaustive

description of the errors, which in my opinion are made by the Allies, even at the present moment, as to German man-power. The deduction is that if the Allies can really be wrong on a subject vitally important, it is certain that they lack indispensable information as to numbers of other questions, on the proper answers to which depends a firm and enduring peace.

In the same chapter, I have studied the sources of military effectives which could possibly be utilized in Russia by the German Republicans (!) coquetting with the Russian Bolsheviks. This shows that the Allies should cut Germany entirely off from Russia by a series of states organized as strongly as possible: Poland, Bohemia, a democratic Magyar state, Greater Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia.

Chapter IV describes the centres of imperialism which led to the formation and establishment of Pangermany, and shows with what care and in what manner the Allies should destroy these hotbeds to avert any renewal of the war.

Finally, the *Conclusions* present conditions on the observance of which public opinion should insist in order to guard against the

dangers of the armistice period, and thus arrive at a well-founded peace, at an enduring and complete victory.

NEW YORK, November 25, 1918.

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CHAPTER I.

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE ALLIED PUBLIC OPINION.

- I. The danger of a complacent optimism, and of the poisoning of Allied public opinion through biased news coming from neutral nations, but of Boche origin.
- II. The results of a systematic poisoning of Allied opinion by the Germans, and the consequent danger.
- III. The German high command directs pacifist offensives started from Berlin.

It is my conviction that Allied public opinion is constantly manipulated by the Germans, who thus shape it in a manner favorable to their plans. I know that this statement will seem surprising; it is nevertheless true, as I hope to show.

I.

Few are aware of a fact of tremendous importance: from the outset of the war, the government of Berlin has exerted a constant pressure on the Allies in Europe through a part of their own press. The fact that the war was a surprise to the Allies proves that they had previously no direct and trustworthy

information as to the Central Powers and the Balkans. In the course of the war, the same lack of information has been amply proved by the Entente's mistakes in policy, mistakes now understood and bitterly regretted. On the other hand, for the first three years of the struggle many in France and England allowed themselves to be complacently optimistic. Numbers of good people, seeing the huge Entente coalition, felt sure of a speedy triumph. Naturally this systematic optimism caused many among the Allies to accept any favorable reports as true. The Germans with their usual cleverness have employed a very simple method to turn these circumstances to their own advantage. In neutral papers, particularly those of Switzerland and Holland, they constantly published and continue to publish short extracts from German newspapers, or despatches, ten or fifteen lines long, as to the state of affairs in the German Empire, and from the beginning of the war, the Entente newspapers of Europe have made use of these extracts and statements to supply the lack of exact information about the enemy. The greater part of the news from Turkey, Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, before their collapse, and Germany appearing in Allied papers has

been dated from Zurich, Berne, or Amsterdam. The German Government has kept its own press, as well as that of the Allies, under the strictest observation, and every stranger passing through Pangerman territory has been closely watched; how, then, was it possible that information from such sources could be true? I have made a study for twenty-five years of the states which have made up Pangermany, and being thus in a position to judge of the worth of these reports, I can state positively that, during the first four years of the war, eight out of ten of these items were false, and made in Berlin.

This biassed information has been arranged with great ingenuity; it has taken a variety of forms, and contained just enough falsehood to be useful to the Boche cause. Allied newspapers and correspondents in Switzerland and Holland were frequently taken in, and reprinted this so-called information. The great number of these reprints caused the danger, which has been most serious, for since the beginning of the war, Germany has succeeded in using them at any given moment to foster the state of mind among the Allies necessary to the success of any serious military operation. For example:

No one now doubts that the junction with

Turkey and Bulgaria was of vital importance to Germany. Austria-Germany must have yielded long ago without the help of the Bulgar-Turks and their eastern resources. It was therefore necessary to crush Serbia at any cost, as a condition of this eastern alliance.

From the early part of 1915, the psychological foundations for this enterprise were laid by means of the German papers, all docilely following instructions from the General Staff in Berlin, and dwelling on the idea that "the decision must come on the west front, which is all-important, and where alone we must look for it."

Many organs of the western Allies, being converted to this theory of the principal front, which, in fact, allowed Germany to take possession of three-fourths of Europe, have found in these Boche statements arguments in support of their ideas, and have reprinted them with a readiness which must have been delightful to Berlin, for at this time the General Staff dreaded above everything to see the Anglo-French send even 150,000 men to the Danube. These with the 350,000 Serbians and 700,000 Roumanians, would have made up a force of 1,200,000 men, amply sufficient to have kept Austria-Germany from seizing

the granary of the east, to keep open through Roumania communication with the Russians, who were still in Austria, in eastern Galicia, and to prevent the entrance of Bulgaria and Turkey into the war, the Balkan campaigns having stripped them of munitions.

In addition the government of Constantinople as soon as it saw itself deprived of the possibility of German help, by the establishment of a firm Allied front on the Danube, would have been shortly forced to reopen the Turkish straits.

The interest of the Germans in the destruction of Serbia was therefore absolutely vital. Their propaganda having helped to prevent France and England from understanding the extraordinary importance of the Danube front at the beginning of 1915, in October of that year, they began the invasion.

At that time, most men at the head of western affairs thought the east could have no decisive influence on the fate of the war. There was, nevertheless, a party in France which wished to send a strong expedition from Salonika to the help of Serbia, with the object of sharply opposing the junction of Germany and the east. At the end of 1915, it was, therefore, much to the interest of Berlin

to persuade the Franco-English that there was nothing to be gained by reinforcing Serbia. As a part of Allied opinion was opposed to the Balkan expedition, this was pressed into the service of the German plans by means of a great number of despatches which appeared in the Dutch and Swiss papers, copied in a simple-minded way by the French and English press. These despatches stated that railroad communications were already reopened between Hungary and Bulgaria, via Serbia. A comparison of the date of these first despatches as they appeared in the Entente press with the truth afterward published, as to the re-establishment of normal communication by rail between the Central Empires and Bulgaria shows a difference of about six weeks. Now these reports, though nominally from neutral sources, came really from Germany, and as they anticipated events they resulted in encouraging those in France and England who opposed the Salonika expedition. Their argument had a specious appearance of truthfulness. They said: "Let us not strip our most important front, for it is too late; we have lost our chance in the Balkans; railroad communications are already reopened between Hungary and Bulgaria." This was

enough to satisfy Berlin, and this one false idea disseminated by German propaganda had incalculable consequences, and for a long time sufficed to turn the current of the war into channels desired by Germany.

If the numerous despatches from Boche sources had not misled Franco-English opinion, and if Serbia had been promptly reinforced at the end of 1915 when Roumania could have come in with great effect while Russia was still fighting bravely, and the Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary were ready for revolt, the known facts show that the Anglo-French could have saved the Balkan situation to a great extent, and could have prevented the economic and military reorganization of Turkey and Bulgaria by the Germans. Without this eastern alliance, Austria-Germany would long since have become unable to hold out against the coalition as is proved by the terrible blow given to Austria-Germany by the Allied victory over Bulgaria. These considerations bring home to us the deep injury done to the Allied cause by the newspaper propaganda of biassed news.

Many similar instances could be cited; in fact, each important German campaign has been aided by this inspired information coming

through Holland and Switzerland, which is then reprinted by a part of the Allied European papers with a credulity hard to understand.

This has happened so often that I believe there is a department in the General Staff at Berlin which might be called "Bureau for the manufacture of blunders to be made by the Allies." In this bureau are elaborated biassed news despatches which, when finished, are sent out through the neutral press.

To show how far it is possible to go in this direction with the Allied newspapers in Europe, this Berlin office feels its way by publishing news as absurd as it is false. Thus, about two years ago almost the whole Allied European press copied a neutral despatch asserting that William II was dying of cancer. Recently many of our papers have informed us that Hindenburg had died of an apoplectic attack brought on by a violent quarrel with the Emperor; this also purported to be a neutral rumor. If news of this caliber is believed one can understand how ready are many Allied papers to reprint less sensational reports, but some of these are even more dangerous; as witness the repeated rumors which have led the Allies to believe that overtures for a sepa-

rate peace had come from Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, or that a coolness had arisen between these countries and Berlin. The facts have proved, however, that only Bulgaria has tried seriously to negotiate separately, and even this only recently.

In fact, the Germans hoodwinked the Allies just as at a Spanish bull-fight the matador distracts the attention of the bull so as to take him at a disadvantage. The bull is ten times as strong as the man, and can soon make an end of him by a direct charge. But, as we know, red is particularly obnoxious to the bull, and that is why the matador flourishes a short red cloak. The enraged animal can see nothing else, and as he makes his furious charge his enemy's long sword is plunged into his withers.

The Germans play this identical game with the Allies. They know that our united strength is greater than theirs, and that they would be quickly beaten if we hit them in the right place. To avoid this they distract our attention from the weak points of Pan-germany by misleading despatches, which affect us as the matador's red cloak acts on the bull.

Our complacent optimism inclines us to

believe this manufactured German news; our minds have been perverted by it, so that we see things as we wish and not as they are. This explains how, only a few weeks after the war began, the Allied public in Europe firmly believed that the shortage of foodstuffs in Germany would soon cause her to yield, that supplies for her munitions were lacking, that the Socialists would force a peace on the Berlin government, that their reserves were nearly exhausted, that each German offensive was the last, the sign of the desperation of a people longing for peace, etc.

Now, after four years, results have shown the emptiness of these conclusions, but as they have constantly been repeated for so long a time, in spite of themselves the Allies think about Germany much as Berlin would have them, and this on many important points. This state of mind favors the unprecedented efforts that the Germans make to secure an armistice before Germany itself should be completely invaded.

Of course, it is pleasant to find news in the paper which leads one to think that the war will soon be over; but war is not a pleasant thing; it is a grim necessity, which must be ended as soon as possible by a decisive vic-

tory. Pleasant tidings when they are untrue greatly prolong the war, and cause the death of great numbers of brave men; this encouraging information, when inexact, may have the most sinister consequences.

It is largely because much of our Allied press has imbibed false news, that the Entente with its large forces and resources of all kinds has not brought them to bear where they would have won a decision in the quickest and easiest way. For this reason, we are confronted with the remarkable fact that there are 68 millions of Germans, 50 millions subjects of Austria-Hungary (inadequately prepared from the military standpoint, and of whom 28 millions at least are thoroughly anti-German), 5 millions of Bulgarians, and 20 millions of Turks lacking proper armament on account of the Balkan Wars, and of whom at least 14 millions wished to keep out of this struggle—altogether a total of 143 million inhabitants of the Central Empires, who have been able for four years to conquer or withstand 370 millions of Allies (France has 40 millions, England 46 millions, Italy 36 millions, Serbia 5, Roumania 8, Japan 53, and Russia 182 millions). (These figures do not include the large colonies, which have rendered such valuable assistance to the Allies.)

This situation has made indispensable the entry of 100 millions of Americans into the war.

II.

The systematic dissemination of biassed news among the Allies combines with the influence of the pacifists and Bolchevist groups that exist in all the Entente countries who play the German game—unintentionally perhaps, but that matters little. A considerable part of Allied public opinion is so poisoned and distorted by this double influence that it forms wrong views on essential points, on points where a right understanding is vitally necessary. For example, the action especially of England and America as to the war was decided by their indignation at Germany's violation of the treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, and of international laws as to marine warfare. There can be no doubt that when Germany cynically broke her word, it so shocked Great Britain and the United States that they were convinced of the necessity of the great sacrifices of men and money demanded of them.

Since these great countries entered the war, Germany has broken every law, human and

divine, in a way never before known in history. She tortures prisoners, kills the wounded, and torpedoes hospital-ships; her soldiers resort to the most treacherous tricks; the German authorities sent to Bucharest tubes filled with bacilli to spread infectious diseases. In the countries they occupy, they have killed thousands of civilians, including women and children. They stirred up the Turks to murder more than a million of Armenians, and hundreds of thousands of Greeks. On the very morrow of its signature, the government of Berlin had violated the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which it had itself dictated. It is clear now, therefore, that no right-thinking man can ever again trust in the German word. It would indeed be insane to do so. In spite of these self-evident facts, corroborated by common sense and the war map, there is actually a large number of people among the Allies willing to accept the idea of a negotiated peace, which would put an end to hostilities by a treaty in which Germany would pledge herself to restitution and future good conduct. The war into which many of the Allies were led by their horror at the German violation of a "scrap of paper" would thus, in spite of their unheard-of sacrifices in men and money,





be ended for these same Allies by another "scrap of paper"! If those among the Allies who admit this eventuality showed similar signs of mental aberration in their private affairs, would they not soon be put in a lunatic asylum?

But there are other reasons which show yet more strongly how little the real bases of victory and lasting peace are understood in Entente countries, even among the most enlightened. A great proportion of the Allies think the war will end by a peace conference around the green table, between our representatives and those of the Central Powers. A glance at the war map (see *Pangermany in August*, 1918, page 14) will prove that this is practically impossible. The choice is clear. If the Allies open negotiations with Germany without having destroyed completely her grip on Central Europe—the key of the world—which implies the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the German hegemony will continue; their position will be so weak that these negotiations can only end, as did the pseudo-negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, in complete deception followed by the most irremediable of catastrophes. But if the Allies, after having materially destroyed the German hold on

Central Europe—which is quite possible if, thanks to extended air transport, they supply the necessary means of action to the oppressed peoples of that region—Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians and in reinforcing with them the Allied army of the Balkans—if they are willing after such frightful sacrifices to discuss peace on equal terms with Germany in a conference, instead of purely and simply dictating their just conditions as victorious soldiers, conscious of the right, it will then be clear that the Allies are completely ignorant of German psychology, and a peace will be made which will allow Prussian militarism to continue to exist, and later to begin it all over again.

Under the influence of constant Boche-inspired though pretended-neutral despatches, many among us think that Germany is ruined by the war; but the truth is that she is running over with wealth of every kind stolen from three-fourths of Europe, as I shall show in Chapter II.

This German news has also convinced large numbers that the Teutons can be starved into submission, but such is not the fact.

Everything is comparative in war. From the standpoint of food-supply, we need only

ask if conditions in the Central Empires were better or worse than with us. *Let us look into the situation as it was up to October, 1918, that is up to the collapse of Bulgaria.* The German people, undoubtedly, suffered a serious lack in foodstuffs, but much of this suffering came from the severe but far-sighted prudence of the Prussian administration, which imposed strict regulations in order to hold out longer against the Allies. The German difficulties were less in production than in transportation, owing to the lack of means of communication between Germany and the East. These difficulties of transport, however, diminished with time by the construction of new lines of railroad, which were being rapidly built, especially since Germany controlled the whole course of the Danube, which running from southern Germany to the Black Sea, north of the Roumanian Dobrudja, furnished easy transport for Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and the vast regions belonging to Turkey and Russia, bordering on the Black Sea. For these reasons, though Germans may have suffered sharply from insufficient food, they could not be starved out. There was no famine in the Central Empires except in Slav or Latin districts, where Teutonic cruelty

used this hideous method to slowly destroy a hated people. It was stated that Germany was more in need of food than the Allies, but how could this be? When you study the war map (page 14), you realize that England, France, and Italy were forced to supply themselves from Australia and America at ruinously high rates, owing to the increased freight charges due to submarine warfare.

On the other hand, Germany had easy access to all the granaries of Europe; Hungary, Roumania, the Balkans, Asia Minor, southern Russia were all free to her, and she could plunder them as she pleased. She stole everything she needed, over immense territories. She has 50 millions of slaves, Allied subjects, who raise her crops without wages, and Christian populations in Turkey were forced to intensive cultivation for her in Asia Minor. Even behind the German lines in the west the unlucky Belgians and French, with their beasts of burden, work for the Teutons. They even had to keep a strict account of the eggs, most of which were reserved for the Germans. All over the wide Pangermanist territory production was carefully supervised. Under these circumstances, how could Germany be starved into peace before France, England, or Italy? *But*

if the Allies wish it, famine can become a reality in Austria-Germany. Now that the Allies are masters of the Danube, the revictualling of Austria-Germany is at once imperilled.

The aim of Berlin's biassed news has been to conceal the great extent of the German gains in the east, and to concentrate the attention of the Allies on the western front, so that they may not view the European situation as a whole. This aim has been easily reached, especially since the Allies lost their hold on the east, enabling Germany to bring all her available force to bear on the western front, where by force of circumstances all large military operations are now taking place. As we now no longer had the entire European war map in view (page 14) a large section of Allied public opinion was apt to give undue importance to actions in the west, though these could not bring about a final decision and real and complete victory, while the surrender of Bulgaria has proved by its consequences the immense importance of the Balkan effort.

I will cite, by way of illustration, the effect on the Allied public of the loss and recapture of a part of the salient between Rheims and Soissons.

On the 27th of May, 1918, as a result of

the surprise at the Chemin-des-Dames, the Teutons succeeded in forming a good-sized salient between these points. A week later, they advanced to Château-Thierry; less than 80 kilometres from Paris, which was therefore threatened with severe bombardment in case of further advance. However, since the 15th of July, General Foch has so ably handled his forces that, assisted by American reinforcements, they regained up to the 30th of July a part of the salient, showing a dash and courage beyond all praise. Laying aside other great Entente successes which have since occurred, I select the 30th of July for my illustration. The Germans were then forced to retire from Château-Thierry to Fère-en-Tardenois, a distance of about 20 kilometres. What did a part of the Allied press at once say? It declared that Germany had suffered a decisive defeat, which would open the eyes of her people, and deal a terrible blow at Prussian militarism, etc. Observe that this sort of thing was encouraged even on the 30th of July by the Boches, who have a deep interest in making the Allies count on victory before it is within their grasp. It is easy to see why, for Germany wants to "discuss" peace terms while she holds firmly to the territory she has occupied,

and means to keep. She has, therefore, the strongest reasons to wish to persuade the Allies that their successes are great enough to justify peace talk.

The London Daily Express, followed by several other Allied papers, published a despatch dated Geneva, July 30th, 1918:

“*La Suisse* states that a high neutral official, who has just arrived at Basle from Berlin, declares that in spite of all German precautions to hide the defeat in the west, the truth has penetrated among the masses.

“Such great moral depression has not been seen before during the war, which it is now considered is lost whenever Foch chooses his hour to strike. . . .

“The German losses during the last three months reach nearly a million. The losses in the last two offensives amounted to 350,000 and these have completely disorganized the plans of the high command.”

Let us consider these despatches and comments coming from this mysterious neutral, but one so well informed that on the 30th of July he knew the exact amount of the German losses for some weeks previously, though the Berlin General Staff is not usually very communicative on such points.

Let us examine what had taken place when this despatch was dated, without considering the great retirements of the Germans, which have taken place since, yielding to military pressure and, perhaps, also because of the political strategy spoken of in Chapter II. As I desire especially to emphasize, I am simply proposing by choosing a precise and limited example to show the necessity, if the Allies would arrive at a true victory, of understanding the importance of military events by distinguishing carefully between their local significance and the influence which they may have upon the European war-field considered as a whole, which is quite a different thing.

Can it be denied that the operations engaged in by the Allies south of the Soissons-Rheims salient after July 15, were chiefly intended to cover Paris, and prevent a bombardment? This local object was completely attained on the 30th. The operation was skillfully conducted by General Foch, and all the Allies did wonders, including the American "boys," who proved themselves extraordinarily fine, working well with the other troops, while their spirit and freshness were of incalculable service in putting new life into soldiers, who had stood the strain of four years of terrible

struggle. The success of the operation was due mainly to these American reinforcements, and it is the plain truth to say that America saved Paris, the heart of France, of which the Germans thought themselves sure. They also believed they were about to end the war by a brilliant and decisive victory. The defeat inflicted by the Allies has crushed this hope. The vast majority of Germans wished to ruin France completely, and it is certain that it was with disappointed rage that they accepted their defeat and deception, and found themselves obliged to continue the war with modified plans.

Our successes dating from July 30th were a great encouragement, and we were fully entitled to our joy in them; they were still increasing and showed much improvement in the conduct of the war. The unity of command with the help from America have proved their value and given rise to the highest hopes which have since been entirely justified. Such events naturally make us optimistic, and optimism is necessary to victory, and should be cultivated whenever it is justified by facts resting upon a solid basis.

This appears to be a fair estimate of our recapture of part of the Soissons-Rheims sa-

lient on July 30th, viewed from the local standpoint. But in order to show how overconfidence can imperil the real victory of the Allies, and to demonstrate the biased character of the news from the Swiss source quoted above, let us see how the situation on July 30th, 1918, eliminating, I repeat, all subsequent events, could affect the evolution of the war, considered in its whole European aspect.

The whole military situation on the 30th of July is seen at a glance on the map (page 14). Germany was mistress of three-fourths of Europe, in control of large sections of Russia and Asia Minor, while the Allies, pent up in the west, could only feed themselves through maritime communications, lengthy and difficult in the extreme. At Château-Thierry, the Germans were 80 kilometres from Paris, and when they fell back 20 kilometres on July 30th, they were still only 100 kilometres from the heart of France. Our mysterious neutral assures us that German opinion interpreted this retreat as implying the loss of the war to Germany. I am convinced that such an opinion, voluntarily accepted at this date by many of the Allies, would be highly prejudicial to a real and complete victory by producing dangerous delusions. I think I know

the Germans and the methods of their General Staff well enough to be sure that the opinion attributed to the German people at large, on the 30th of July, cannot be the true one. No doubt it enraged them to be balked when Paris and the end seemed near; but it is a far cry from that to the belief that a retirement of 20 kilometres at that date meant the loss of the war.

Besides, we may be sure that the German people knew only part of the truth.

Another despatch from Zurich in the *New York Evening World*, August 12th, says:

“A neutral banker just returned from Germany was interviewed here to-day. ‘Events on the French front depress the educated Germans, but the masses are ignorant of the real situation,’ he said.”

This flatly contradicts the former despatch above, and may be regarded as true because it is much more probable. The Berlin General Staff, by means of absolute authority, exerted over the German press, could easily make the people believe that the retirement of 20 kilometres from Château-Thierry was a check, not a serious defeat. Even at that time public confidence was maintained by sight of the war map, showing the immense territories held

by the Germans, and their enormous gains in consequence; while on such a map a retirement of 20 kilometres looks insignificant. It is ridiculous, therefore, to believe that the German people thought the war to be lost on the 30th of July.

But common sense shows still better that it could not have been so. Let us suppose that the Allies had first advanced and then retired just as the Germans did, and imagine ourselves liberators of the people enslaved by Teutonic ambition with three-fourths of Europe in our power, Germany surrounded geographically, and the Allied army within 80 kilometres of Berlin. Suppose then the Germans bringing up their reserves and making a great effort, admirably carried out. They would push back the Allies from a distance of 20 kilometres to one of a hundred from Berlin. Would the Allies after such a blow believe that the war was lost? Certainly not. Then, knowing the tenacity of the Germans, why should they think themselves vanquished because they were forced back 20 kilometres on the 30th of July?

Looking at the argument from another angle, the annexed map shows the French military front before the great German of-

fensive which began seriously in April, 1918, the extreme limits reached by this offensive, and the ground retaken by the Allies by August 3d, as against that gained by the Germans.

At the end of March, before the offensive, we did not consider ourselves victorious, though it was then the general opinion that the Germans could not advance much on the western front. They did, however, gain considerable ground in three directions: toward Armentières, toward Amiens, and as far as Château-Thierry. By the 3d of July, we had retaken nearly a fourth of the ground lost since April, as may be seen on the map. Looking at the whole European theatre of war under these circumstances, how could we call ourselves more victorious then than we did before the German offensive, when they had less of our territory than on August 3d?

It may be said, because the Germans lost enormously in men and material during their retreat. Let us look into this question. True, their losses were so great as first to bring their offensive to a stand and then to force them to fall back. But can we seriously believe that our own losses from April to the end of July were not practically equal to those of the Ger-

GERMAN OFFENSIVE AND COUNTER OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES, APRIL 1918 TO AUGUST 6, 1918.



- Front in April, 1918, before the great German offensive
- Extreme limit reached by the great offensive in the middle of July, 1918
- Regions evacuated by the Germans as a result of the counter-offensive of the Allies

The district indicated in order of the respective withdrawals are: (1) The Marne front below the Vesle; (2) the Albert region; (3) north of Montdidier; and (4) north of La Bassée

mans? While their rapid advance lasted up until the end of July, they took from us many guns, prisoners, and ammunition. In our own counter-offensive, we have done likewise. In order to compare the losses on both sides fairly, we must not look at a short period, but at the whole operation. We shall have to reckon up our losses from April to July 15th, and those we inflicted on the Germans when we retook the ground previously given up.

Now, by the 3d of August, we have taken back a fourth of the ground occupied by the Germans since April. Have we caused them greater losses than we ourselves have suffered? It is possible of course, but improbable, and no reports published seem to confirm it. In military operations, when both sides are acting under nearly the same conditions, the losses in men and material are about equal, unless in cases where one army is completely demoralized, while the other remains intact. If the Allies exert all the power they possess throughout Europe, this demoralization will surely come for the German army. The surrender of Bulgaria hastens considerably the moment, but all I wish to prove is that on August 3d, we had no good reason to believe that the German losses had been much greater

than our own, reckoning from the beginning of their offensive in April, 1918.

On the matter of losses and also on other questions, just after they took Château-Thierry on the 4th of June, the *Frankfort Gazette*, published the following article, which suggests some interesting comments:

“Whenever our armies start a new offensive, the enemy press ascribes some distant objective to our high command. In this manner, when our front becomes stabilized before these supposed aims are reached, they can say the operation has failed. When we attack in Flanders, they say our object is Calais. Now that we are marching on the Marne, they accuse us of trying for Paris.

“Neither Hindenburg nor Ludendorff wage a geographical war; their aim is always to weaken and finally to destroy the enemy’s army. They acted on this principle in the east, and apply it now on the western front. They choose a sector and make a surprise attack, supported by superior numbers, and push forward until the enemy’s reserves come up and restore the balance. During our attack the enemy losses are the greater, but from this on they tend to be equal. It is, therefore, useless to pursue the action, and our

positions become fixed, while we take measures to deal another blow where our complete preparations or superiority in numbers promise a fresh victory at little cost.

“We have often dealt in this way with our enemies, and will do so again. The great battle lasted seven days, and during that time the enemy brought his reserves from the Channel and the Vosges, stripping sectors where we shall attack the next time, and where we shall gain another success like that just ended.”

These lines, like most German publications intended to impress opinion at home, contain some truth and some falsehood. As I have frequently explained, large operations of the German General Staff are planned to reach a maximum result, if luck is on their side, and at worst a minimum. To hide their disappointments the Germans lie when they say they were not trying to reach Paris or the Channel. When they attacked in Flanders and toward Amiens, they meant if they had the chance to push through to the sea, their maximum objective in this case. In the same way, they moved on Château-Thierry with the ultimate hope of seizing Paris. They could not reach these farthest points, but when we look at the map (page 29), must we not admit

that they did accomplish an important part of the minimum results implied in the article from the *Frankfort Gazette*?

The German offensive from April to August 3d, of this year has not been strong enough to keep all the ground gained; but up to that date it held most of it. Even if the Germans were forced to yield all the territory won by them since April, unless they meet with an absolutely crushing defeat, their offensive, looked at as a whole, must have brought them important gains, if we try to look at the war from the point of view of the enemy, as we must if we wish to draw the right conclusions from the course of events.

In the first place, the Teuton offensive has forced the Allies to strike back at fixed points, instead of leaving them free to attack when and where they choose.

Again, in his advance the enemy has devastated large districts, at the cost of millions to France, driving hundreds of thousands from their homes, and obliging the French Government to devise complicated and expensive defenses for Paris, and to prepare to send away a considerable part of its population. The German war plan includes this economic injury to its adversary, increased

by the direction given to each blow; but up to now, this highly important point has been but little understood among us.

I shall be told in answer that our own operations from April to August have caused great loss to the Germans in men and material. This question of losses needs careful consideration and to understand it better we should keep in mind the general conditions under which the war proceeds and which we are apt to forget.

Many among us talk of the enemy's losses as if we had discovered a way to make war without hurting ourselves, but unfortunately this cannot be. It is hard to realize that in the great offensives and counter-offensives at the western front lasting for weeks, even if the Germans lose 500,000 men and we only 400,000, a difference of 100,000 in our favor, the former would still be the gainers owing to the capital factor in the situation which we leave out of account. We think of the Allied position as if the western front were a wall with comparable conditions on each side. Many of us believe that if the enemy extends his line toward the west he gains, while if we push it eastward in the same proportion the Allies achieve a success analogous to that

reached by the Germans. In order to see why this impression is not the correct one, we must grasp the great difference made by the fact that Germany is fighting in France and Belgium, while we make war on our own soil. Every kilometre that Germany has gained on the western front has brought her closer into our vital points, the Channel coasts and Paris. Meanwhile in their advance her armies reduce their war expenses by living on the country, robbing us and enriching themselves at the same time. On the contrary, in order to regain her invaded provinces, France spends milliards in projectiles, and with her own shells tears to pieces French towns and villages which the Germans had not entirely destroyed.

Are France and Germany, then, in the same situation? The Allies look too much at the military side of the question, without considering economic factors which, nevertheless, are closely connected with the conduct of the war and will strongly influence the conditions of peace. The Allies do not realize the difference made by the fact that the war has not touched Germany directly, except at the very first, when the Russians penetrated a small part of eastern Prussia. On the other hand,

the richest provinces of France have been bled white, and the economic effect of this alone would decide in favor of Germany if the Allied victory should not be so complete as to insure compensation to France for her immense losses. The situation, therefore, is not all the same for both sides on the western front.

There are other reasons yet more conclusive. In the course of an offensive followed by a reverse, let us assume that the Germans lose more men by a fourth than the Allies, but even this sacrifice may have its military compensations enabling the enemy to keep his general position nearly the same, with the difference of a few kilometres, while he occupies behind his western front a great extent of country over which he can still fight and fall back indefinitely, thus weakening his adversary before his own soil can be directly attacked. An objector to this argument may urge that "we shall exhaust the Germans if we continue to kill 100,000 men in excess of our own loss, and the German retirement of July 15th shows that they are already short of reserves." This reasoning would be right if our calculations as to the German resources were well founded, but unfortunately events

have too often falsified them as a natural result of our mistaken premises, as I prove in Chapter III. Also, the German retirement from France and Belgium may be viewed as a necessary part of the great pacifist movement described in Chapter II, and a consequence of the great Entente success in the Balkans. Even if the Germans do lack men on a local front in consequence of their losses since July, 1918, this can only be a temporary condition. Before winter they can bring into the field the class of 1920, a contingent reckoned by many Allied papers at 400,000 men. I consider this question in Chapter III, and will explain why it seems to me that this class will amount to much more. Finally the disorganization of Russia has opened to Germany sources of new effectives from which she can probably draw fresh troops. For these various reasons, we were not justified in affirming in August, 1918, that by a simple excess of losses inflicted on the Germans in the west (unless these losses surpass enormously the total of the Allies, of which we have as yet no instance) we can bring about a German defeat adequate to insure a complete Allied victory.

Many among us do not perceive this ab-

olutely essential point which is, nevertheless, easy to grasp by looking at the map (page 14) and reading the following chapter.

Even if our military successes had continued and forced our enemies out of France and Belgium, if they had been able to keep control of Austria-Hungary the Germans would still have been victorious, because the war would have left them in possession of their ill-gotten gains and would have given them the economic monopoly of Central Europe and Russia, all enormously rich countries, while the Allies, on the contrary, would have come out of the struggle triumphant in the west, but reduced in population, and in such a hopeless financial position that they could not enforce conditions of peace. Within very few months after the signature of such a treaty, the Allies of western Europe would have become vassals of Germany. This inadmissible result could never have been a cause of apprehension if, instead of concentrating their attention on the western front, the Allies had kept the war map—that of Pangermany—before their eyes. For the last four years I have explained in every possible way that on the eastern side there were many weak points where the Allies could injure Germany. With the help of political

strategy, they could prevail there in a shorter time, and at much less cost than by exerting military pressure in the west. We could only win a complete western victory by annihilating the German army. If this were possible, it would entail also the equal destruction of the Allies by the Germans. A mistake was after all within the bounds of possibility; it is understood at last that we must insure ourselves against it by working on Pangermany's weaknesses. This was the only way to destroy her hold on Austria-Hungary and Russia, a task as necessary to accomplish as the liberation of France and Belgium. This campaign against the causes of weakness in Pangermany could have been prosecuted without slackening our efforts on the western front. It has even proved helpful in that region. The defeat of Bulgaria has besides contributed enormously to weaken the morale of the German soldiers fighting on the western front. The insurrections organized among peoples oppressed in Austria-Hungary have destroyed the indispensable communications with the east, and the situation of the German armies in the west has become materially and morally untenable. These immense advantages will have their vast effects on condition that the

Allies act to the end in the most decisive fashion in central Europe.

* * *

The mistaken estimate of facts which I pointed out is largely produced by German influence, which has tended to stupefy public opinion for the last four years. I dwell on these mistakes because I am convinced that they form a state of mind in Allied countries which widens the distance between us and real victory. Throughout history an exact knowledge of facts has brought success, not illusions, and these erroneous views expose us at this moment to these serious dangers.

1. Our misinterpretations play the game of the pacifist and the Bolshevist parties among us. To take the most favorable hypothesis, if the German retirement lasts for weeks, if France and Belgium are completely evacuated, a large part of our public will claim the victory, as, indeed, it has already begun to do, and the pacifists and Bolsheviks will say: "If we are the victors, you have no right not to make peace." What answer is there to their argument? But if we treat with Germany without taking the most extraordinary pre-

cautions, it will mean our ruin and leave her dominant in Russia.

2. Teuton propagandists tell the Allies that Germany is ruined and starving; that her man-power is exhausted and that our western victories are decisive. This produces the mistaken views of which I speak, raising illusions in the public mind which contribute to the success of the great pacifist offensive which Germany continues obstinately, and of which I shall unmask the reasons in the following chapter. As a preliminary it was needful to show the atmosphere of false ideas caused by German propaganda, which furnishes the medium in which these dangerous intrigues can act with success.

III.

For the first time in history war has shown this most singular characteristic of alternately prosecuting military and peace offensives, sometimes even both together. We must bear in mind that the pacifist advances are an integral part of war technic and as such are all launched by the German Government. The Allies have followed the old rules and act on strategic military lines, but the Berlin General

Staff used political strategy also; this is more complicated and difficult and demands wide and precise information, but to succeed it utilizes all possible factors, especially the enemy's psychology, his lack of outside information, and his imperfect comprehension of the nature of a modern victory where economic consequences bring about results as far-reaching as military operations themselves.

* * *

We often hear it said among the Allies that "The invasion of Belgium brought England into the war, and America entered because of the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The German psychology is all wrong!"

Certainly, the Germans have committed psychological faults; I should be the last to contradict it, for I have had only too much experience of their lack of tact, but if they have made blunders of this sort it would be a mistake to suppose that they are always at fault.

In truth, the German has a peculiar psychology which has grown out of slow and patient observation of foreign nations. It is based on exact information, and from it he draws immense results. His minute knowledge

of those best able to act strongly on the Russian intellectual proletariat led to great consequences. As soon as the revolution broke out, Lenine was hurried from Switzerland to Russia in a special train, as the man fitted to lead the proletariat toward Bolshevist Pan-germanism. This utilization of Lenine was undoubtedly good psychology. Germans understand that some French and English socialists are surprisingly ignorant of geographical, ethnographical, and economic questions, and that they love fine words and sonorous phrases. The Boches made dexterous use of this state of mind when they suggested the formula, "Peace without indemnities or annexations," which penetrated to the Allied socialists through their Russian brethren. This formula, voted by the Reichstag, July 19th, 1917, was a psychological manœuvre, as we see by an article in the *Germania*, quoted by the Paris *Temps*, April 18th of the same year. This article says cynically: "The July resolution was a question of tactics, which tends to strengthen the Bolshevist power and increase the longing for peace in the east. These tactics are now laid aside, and our present object is to reach a victorious peace in the west by force of arms."

Another prominent psychological manœuvre consists in utilizing the blind optimism of the Allies by means of neutral newspaper propaganda. Contrary to their hopes, force of arms was not enough to impose a German peace in the west, chiefly owing to the size and value of the American reinforcements; now, in order to deceive the Allies and trap them into peace negotiations without complete victory, we see the Berlin government resort to an astute combination embracing many psychological elements.

Let us admit the truth; the Germans are capable of the sort of psychology which grows out of exact information and is adapted to war aims as they are seen in Berlin. The real brain of the German General Staff is General Ludendorff, who inspired and moulded the pacifist offensives as well as the military campaigns. These offensives proceeded in many ways; through the German press, which, like a Prussian soldier, obeys the suggestions of the high command, or through neutral journals. Sometimes a man like Hertling dropped a phrase of double meaning, or a word came through an Austrian intermediary like Burian or Czernin. Sometimes agents from Bulgaria (during a very long period), Turkey,

or Austria entrapped the Allied emissaries in Switzerland, or a bait was offered to the Vatican, which simply swallowed it.

All these pacifist offensives under any form start from the General Staff in Berlin. The part played by this organization in pacifist plans, which at first sight seem so different from military offensives, ought not to surprise us. Those who really understand Germany—unfortunately too few—know well that the Reichstag has no real power in the empire, and that the force which guides German policy, even in time of peace, is this formidable intellectual machine, on which rests the fate of the Hohenzollerns and of Prussian militarism.

The officers who compose the General Staff are carefully selected. They not only control military affairs, as we know, but there are among them experts on all questions. These officers are certainly accomplices in a great scheme of robbery, but we shall be wide of the truth if we do not understand that they are men not only well versed in military subjects, but also in applied sciences; geography, ethnography, political economy and national psychology. This stupendous organization is so old, so well supplied with technical informa-

tion brought up-to-date, that the General Staff of Berlin is able to pursue a political strategy specially adapted to the conditions of each region. This strategy often misleads the Allies because they were even less prepared for the intellectual conduct of the war than they were in a material sense.

When one looks at the German General Staff as a whole, it is easy to see that it initiates pacifist offensives, and this is still more clearly realized when we note the strong pressure these offensives exert on the conduct of the war, and the many technical objectives of a particular sort at which they invariably aim.

The first object of a German pacifist offensive has been to hide the extent of the gigantic Pangermanist plan from the Allies. To carry this out, the General Staff knew that it should conquer its many adversaries in succession, employing the classical tactics of the Horatii against the Curiatii, that is to say, beating them one after the other.

To reach this end it resolved to utilize the undoubted ignorance of the Pangerman plan which the Allies had shown in the first years of the war, so as to persuade them that each large military operation against Russia, Serbia,

or Roumania, would be the last. This is why newspaper articles through Holland and Switzerland inspired by the Berlin General Staff frequently gave out that Germany was exhausted, that she had enough of it, and that she lacked food or munitions to carry on the struggle. As these items were credulously quoted, whenever desired, by many Allied papers, during the first three years of the war, a large part of public opinion in France and England has been convinced that the war would be over in three months, and this state of mind has made it easily possible for the Germans to carry out successive military offensives in due order. The pacifist offensive is, therefore, a way of pursuing a military offensive.

Secondly, the German pacifist offensives, with their suggestion of an early peace, have made it possible for the General Staff to organize Central Pangermany, that is to say, to put Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey in a position to support a long war. Further, these three countries, particularly Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, were in every way the weak strategic points of the Central Powers. Berlin had therefore a strong motive to prevent the Allies from acting in these re-

gions. This third object has been attained for four years by pacifist propaganda, through agents in Switzerland, who persuaded the Allies that Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary desired to conclude a separate peace with them.

Fourthly, the mission of the German pacifist offensives was to act on the pacifist groups in all Entente countries. These consist often of good people honestly desirous of putting an end to the frightful conflict, but these worthy folks are profoundly ignorant of technical problems, and know next to nothing about Germany, Austria-Hungary, or the Balkans, where most of them have never set foot. The result is these pacifists seize on the smallest incident which seems favorable to their cause, and which is really a Boche pitfall. They say: "Peace is possible, we should look into it, and negotiate." This is what they said in 1917, at the time of the interminable discussions on the Stockholm conference, which contributed greatly to consolidate the Bolsheviki, and so disintegrate Russia. This they repeated when in July, 1917, the Reichstag voted for "Peace without annexations or indemnities," a formula hiding the most treacherous manoeuvres, as we have seen in the article from

Germania above quoted. They said the same thing when the Emperor of Austria published his letters about Alsace-Lorraine at the very moment that his troops invaded southern Russia. The effect of this persistent credulity on the part of the Entente pacifists has been that for the last two years particularly, the Allied governments have lost precious time in discussing incidents which would not have occupied them five minutes if they had possessed exact information, as subsequent events have shown in every case. The general result from these efforts has been that, dragged in all directions by contradictory opinions, the Allied governments could not make the best use of the forces of the Entente, which was exactly what the Berlin General Staff wished to bring about by its pacifist offensives.

Now that the war is at last entering on its decisive phase, now that the number and bravery of American troops obliges the Germans to admit that they were wrong as to the value of help sent from the United States, and forces them to renounce the hope of a speedy and brilliant victory, while the prolonged struggle has produced an unprecedented financial condition in the west, of the most serious importance, the great pacifist manoeuvre

has for its first object to stop hostilities before the invasion of Germany.

In the conduct of the war the German General Staff has already shown a high order of imagination: asphyxiating gas, for example, on the material side, Russia destroyed by pacifism on the intellectual. But the blow which they sought to make successful exceeded all the others in audacity, in surprise, and in psychological ingenuity. They intended to compass the final defeat of the Allies by means which I shall lay bare in the next chapter, and they sought to make them accept this defeat through a well-advised camouflage hiding it under an apparent military victory.

The wide reverberations of the Bulgarian defeat have come to discredit this plan, but nevertheless it still has its dangers, for with the help of the Allied pacifists the Boches are making persistent efforts to prevent at any price the invasion of Germany.

CHAPTER II.

HOW THE GERMANS, IF THEY SECURE AN ARMISTICE, COUNT UPON CARRYING OFF THE VICTORY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CONDITION CREATED IN EUROPE BY FOUR YEARS OF WAR.

- I. Germany's war profits form the chief basis of the pacifist manoeuvres.
- II. The fact that the circulation of paper currency in Germany is largely measured by the produce of her gigantic thefts, while, on the other hand, that of the Allies depends on their complete victory, constitutes the second base of German schemes.
- III. If circumstances make it feasible, the Alsace-Lorraine trick will be tried in order to enter on the practical realization of German plans by dividing the Allies, and leading France to "peace talk" before a complete victory.
- IV. Why the Germans believe that if the Allies are led into "peace talk" before achieving a full grasp of the European situation which assures their victory, their financial ruin will ensue. This without more great battles would be enough to bring about the final success of Germany.

As Berlin sees it, the economic situation caused by four years of conflict, will make it possible for Germany to win the war on the sole condition that the Allies, even if victorious, confine their exertions to the western front—

that of France and Belgium—and grant to Germany an armistice not followed by a deep invasion of her territory.

The economic situation of the Allies, does indeed differ so materially from that of Germany that the General Staff can try something quite new in the way of pacifist machinations. These will be all the more dangerous because they will gain the advantage of a surprise, as the close connection between the economic position of the west of Europe and the Allies' success in the war is little understood. German blows owe most of their effect to surprise; therefore, if the conditions necessary to the realization of the policy of Berlin were made known beforehand to the great Entente public, it would render much of this policy abortive.

Germany wants to make a western Brest-Litovsk treaty. This treaty was really an operation of strategic policy in two acts. First act, Peace in appearance, which on account of the nervous tension resulting from an exceptionally long and cruel war is enough to shake the morale of the enemy. Second act, Resumption of hostilities under relatively easy conditions, the spirit of the adversary being once broken. We now see clearly that Germany overthrew Russia, without the need of

resorting to large military operations because the treaty of Brest-Litovsk had destroyed the Russian armies. Now that they see where "peace" with Germany has led them many Russians are in revolt, but the lack of material means weakens their rebellion, and it is now certain that the Germans, through the Bolsheviks, can act directly on Russia as far as Siberia. A step analogous to that at Brest-Litovsk would enable Germany to gain the war easily and entirely, even if she were previously forced out of France and Belgium by military means. This step could be taken by utilizing this time the particular economic condition of western Europe, favored by illusions entertained by a section of the Allied public, as I have shown in the preceding chapter.

In order to throw into relief the effects of a western Brest-Litovsk, we will take in turn the essential constituents of the German manœuvre, viz.:

1st. The profits of the war to Germany.

2d. The fact that the circulation of paper currency in Germany is guaranteed by the produce of her thefts.

3d. The Alsace-Lorraine trick.

I.

I have already written on the subject of Germany's profits from the war, but in order to make her pacifist manoeuvres clear I will once more show what she has gained by her aggressions. She has long labored with a view to keeping the fruit of her gigantic thefts after the conclusion of peace. In order to hide them as much as possible, she uses neutral papers to spread abroad the idea that Germany is ruined by the war. This is what most of the Allies believe, as they think, on just grounds. When they read in the Swiss papers that the mark has depreciated 45 per cent, and the franc only 20 per cent, they think this indicates the proportion in which France and Germany are touched financially by the war. But such is not the fact. The German rate falls, first because a general and well-founded feeling exists that Germany will be beaten. This can only come about if the Allies fight to the end with all the resources at their command, and if the United States throw their whole weight into the scale. Secondly, and above all, it is because Germany is blockaded, and has no exports, consequently she is paid nothing from the outside and must settle in

gold for all that comes to her from neutrals. The result is her foreign credit shrinks and causes the German rate to fall. But this position of Germany on the outside does not at all affect her credit at home. This we never hear spoken of, but it is very important and increased with every new seizure of enemy territory. Each of these operations yielded Germany much more than they cost. For instance, when she laid hands on Belgium after long premeditation, it was because of the extraordinary wealth of that unhappy country, from which the Berlin government has drawn sums much greater than the expense of the conquest. The same is true of German seizures in northern France, Serbia, Roumania, Russia, etc., which were carried out on a paying basis, according to the best Boche traditions. It is therefore untrue to say, as the Allies often do without having really looked into it, that Germany is ruined by the war. In the first place, this is contrary to fact, as I shall show, and again if we believe this we play into the Boche hands by believing that Germany can never repair the harm she has done, or restore the value of all that she has stolen.

The war has been much less costly to Germany than to the Allies, because of her long

preparation and her thefts in all directions, as well as for the reason that the Teuton armies live on their enemies' country. On the other hand, the Allies were obliged to improvise the enormous material required in great haste, and they pay their bills honestly.

The proof of this is that in three years of war the cost to Germany is 1,612 francs per head, 608 francs less than in France. The latter has spent 2,220 per head, 38 per cent more than in Germany. Therefore, if we made peace according to the formula "Peace without indemnities," it would lead to an unheard-of injustice. Every peace-loving Frenchman would have to bear a financial burden a third heavier than that of a faithful servant of the Kaiser, who wished for war. If this difference in war expenditures continues, it will be enough to ruin France. Clearly, if the Frenchman has to support a weight 38 per cent heavier, he will have to yield before the German. The latter will be saved, while his adversaries succumb, leaving him to gather in the spoils.

On the whole, at the end of the third year of the war, the Allies had spent at least 144 milliards of francs more than the Central Empires. During the fourth year this figure has increased considerably on account of the im-

mense expenditure of the United States, which in August, 1918, amounted to 50 millions of dollars a day.

There are still worse economic consequences to be feared from the fact that if the existing situation continues in eastern Europe, Germany will be secure now and in future of huge profits much greater than her war expenses, while the Allies will stagger for many years under crushing financial burdens.

Germany's war-profits, *as they appeared before the victory of the Allies over Bulgaria* (October, 1918) were:

1st. The value of plunder in occupied countries, Serbia, Roumania, Russia, Belgium, and France (materials of war, foodstuffs, raw material, industrial plants, furniture, objects of art, war contributions, bonds, securities, etc.).

2d. The accomplishment of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, secured by Pangerman mortgages, loans made by Germany to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. These loans are only made on paper, and have cost Germany nothing, but they give her the great advantage of entire economic control over her Allies, the three Central Powers.

3d. The treaty signed by Turkey at Berlin, 11th of January, 1917, gives Germany a mo-

nopoly in the Turkish Empire, a country enormously rich in agricultural and mineral resources, of which she has begun already to take advantage.

4th. The realization of economic Pangermany, in other words, the orderly development on a large scale of all its productions, mineral, vegetable, animal, and industrial (see map, page 14), transported through a network of canals at the least possible cost. The Germans could thus pay large wages to their own workmen, while the cost price would be so much lowered in all departments of production that they could undersell everywhere in Europe, and perhaps all over the world.

5th. The realization of military Pangermany. This guarantees the permanence of economic Pangermany, and through it Berlin controls all its forces (about 30 millions of soldiers) occupying Antwerp, Riga, Trieste, Cattaro, the Ottoman straits, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. Never before on earth has there been so vast a strategic whole in the hands of a single power.

6th. The exploiting monopoly in European and Asiatic Russia, great regions with infinitely rich opportunities.

7th. The actual substitution of German

credit for that of the Allies in Russia and the east represents tens of milliards.

Now, in four years of war, Germany has spent about 140 milliards of marks. The sum of these seven war-profits shows a difference in her favor of hundreds of milliards, as we see without difficulty.

The war profits of Germany are therefore much greater than her war expenses; this is contrary to the opinion of many among the Allies, but it is the fact that the war is exceedingly profitable to the Germans, and for this reason their government directs it particularly from the economic standpoint. Without doubt the surrender of Bulgaria has begun to get back some of the oriental profits of Germany, but all these may be destroyed. Also it is necessary for the Allies to complete thoroughly their victory in the east, which would have the practical effect of loosening the hold of Germany on Russia. Besides, there would remain to the Germans all the booty that they have stolen, and that it is our business to make them restore.

The war as waged by the German people is essentially predatory; it is the largest piratical enterprise known in history, and has been carefully planned for years.

Long before the war, the Berlin government maintained a secret propaganda to convince the people that if Greater Germany became an accomplished fact it would materially add to the prosperity of the working classes. It was this hope of material and personal advantages to be gained from economic Pan-germany that caused the great majority of the socialists to stand by the Kaiser and his General Staff. The methods of obtaining these rich prizes, were clearly thought out beforehand; as an example read the remark of Baron von Wangenheim, German ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Morgenthau: "Remember that this time we will make war without mercy. . . . We will carry off to Berlin all the French art treasures which belong to the state." This principle has been applied wherever possible, and even private property has not been respected. The booty brought in by the war has exceeded all expectations, as the Germans themselves admit, though it is the policy of their government to conceal the truth as much as possible from the outside world.

L'Homme Libre of February 16th, 1918, quotes from the January number of *Die Hilfe*, a review by Frederic Naumann, the man of

Mitteleuropa. Here we can read an avowal which should be known to every Allied citizen:

“The war in general was looked upon as a piece of good luck, so much so that a business man in good standing did not hesitate to say that ‘a man who does not make money out of this war does not deserve it.’”

This particular Boche ought to be satisfied, for his compatriots have been worthy of the struggle they provoked, and have enriched themselves beyond measure according to their deliberate plans.

The truth which the foregoing facts are meant to impress on the American mind is that, since Germany has made enormous war-profits, the European Allies have undergone unprecedented losses without any compensation. Their economic position is therefore greatly inferior to that of Germany, but unfortunately this state of things is but little known. It must be seriously considered, however, before laying down the conditions of a peace which shall bring restoration and justice to the world.

Great losses for the Allies, great gains for Germany—this, then, is the situation which lies at the root of her pacifist plan.

II.

The financial reverberations of this war will have deep and lasting results to every citizen of the belligerent countries, without exception. Each American has therefore a direct personal interest in understanding a state of things which will affect him strongly for good or evil. As we have seen, Germany is so far the only one of the belligerents whose gains by the war much exceed her expenditures; this is the first thing we must grasp if we would understand the war situation. The second is that this enrichment of Germany, dishonestly acquired, but real none the less, has placed her in so favorable an economic position that, even if the Allies drive her out of France and Belgium, she can *still* discuss peace terms with advantage. This is hard to understand, but is elucidated by the following considerations:

It is well known that without exception all the belligerents have much extended their fiduciary circulation, at present represented by a large issue of bank paper and currency. This extension is so great that the specie reserves have not been increased in the same proportion, so that with each new issue of paper the gold and silver guaranty shrinks

equally. There are even countries where the specie reserve is much less than it was in 1914, while paper money has much increased. The following table, taken from the figures of the circular of the *Schweizerische Kreditanstalt* of Zurich, May 31st, 1918, gives a review of the situation from the end of June, 1914, to the end of April, 1918; for Germany in millions of marks, for Austria-Hungary in millions of crowns, for France in millions of francs, and for England in millions of pounds sterling.

Country	Currency		Specie Reserve		Increase or shrinkage from end of June, 1914, to end of April, 1918	
	End of June 1914	End of April 1918	End of June 1914	End of April 1918	Specie	Paper
Germany.....	2,597	19,225	1,631	2,465	834	16,628
Austria-Hungary	2,325	18,440	1,609	382	-1,227	16,115
France.....	6,051	26,773	4,697	5,636	939	20,682
England.....	29.78	287.50	40.08	89.86	49.78	257.72

This table shows that Austria's specie reserve has shrunk to the enormous extent of 1,227 millions of crowns in the period that her paper increased by 16 milliards, and it is nearly certain that this 1,227 millions of crowns were handed over to Germany as security for

the heavy loans made by Berlin to Vienna to carry on the war, an indication of the absolutely dependent condition of the latter.

If the principal ally of Germany is brought to such a pass as this, it is reasonable to suppose that the state of the currency in Bulgaria and Turkey and of their finances is even worse. There can be no doubt these allies of Germany, considered as states, are ruined by the war, for the immense inflation of their paper money added to war expenses and the huge debts owed to Berlin, weaken them economically. But it is well to observe that the ruin of friendly states does no harm to Germany; on the contrary, *if the Allied troops do not materially reorganize central Europe on an absolutely new basis*, Germany profits by it, for the poverty of the governments of Vienna, Sofia, and Constantinople puts them completely in the power of Berlin, which dictates all the combinations leading to the support of Pangermany, and dominates central Europe and the Ottoman Empire.

England has more than doubled her gold reserve, but her output of paper money and Bank of England notes, according to the figures of the Swiss Bank above quoted, have increased in round numbers from 30 to 287 mil-

lions of pounds sterling, that is to say, 9 times more than at the outbreak of the war.

As for France, as she is the pivot of the coalition, and her richest territory is invaded, the war has caused her nothing but loss. Her specie reserve has indeed increased by nearly a milliard, but of the 5.636 milliards which made up this reserve in gold and silver at the end of April, 1918, 2 milliards were set aside as security for debts contracted in foreign countries, while the increase at this date of notes of the Bank of France exceeded 20 milliards.

We can see by the above table that the bank paper of the European belligerents is nowhere sufficiently secured by gold reserves; therefore the value of this paper depends on victory, which will affect profoundly the credit of the various states, and, consequently, the money issued by them. In practice, then, when peace is concluded it will be then that the notes and paper money of all the countries in Europe will show their strength or weakness, and very shortly too, for then the situation in which each one is left by the war will stand out clearly.

From now on, we can see a result brought about by the war, most unjust but none the

less certain: when we come to discuss conditions of peace Germany will be in a much more advantageous position than the other belligerents because her fiduciary circulation will be sounder, consequently her issue of bank-notes more secure. While France has contracted enormous foreign debts to buy large amounts of raw material for manufactures and food necessary to her population, the Allied blockade, curiously enough, has been of service to Germany. She could buy nothing outside, and therefore could not run in debt, but was forced to supply her needs either by substitutes or products of Pangermany. These products, as a rule, cost her nothing because they were simply stolen from invaded countries: food, crops, metals, coal, etc. It stands to reason that a shell made of stolen French iron, with stolen Belgian coal, costs Germany less than a shell costs the French Government, which is made with coal bought in England and steel from the United States. This example might be multiplied indefinitely, but it serves to explain how Germany makes war more cheaply than the Allies, and why she has kept her money at home, while that of France is sent abroad.

The circulation of bank-notes of the Ger-

man Empire had increased during the war by 16,628 millions of marks at the end of April, 1918. At this date, the specie guarantee of these notes was 2,465 millions of marks. This was not enough to secure about 20 milliards of notes, a figure which includes those issued before the war; observe, therefore, that for special reasons this considerable increase in bank-notes does not cause as great risk and inconvenience to Germany as to other countries; this is a point not before touched upon, but very necessary to consider. In point of fact, the bank-notes of the empire are not only secured by the government reserve in gold and silver but by the material profits Germany has gained by the war. These are of different kinds, and consist of money taken from Belgium, France, Serbia, Roumania, or Russia, of which the government of Berlin is careful to say nothing. Other values are not represented by gold and silver, precisely because these are a purchasing medium. The immense war material and the ships which the Germans took from Russia, the rolling-stock of railways everywhere seized by them, represent milliards. Again, colonial monopolies cost millions to acquire, which were paid by great companies hoping to grow rich by de-

veloping such territories. The war has given to Germany the economic control perhaps of the Balkans and of the Turkish Empire, but certainly of Russia, all rich countries which she is already opening up, and where, if she can maintain her hold, she can realize a profit of many milliards on a relatively small outlay, for this monopoly cost her only what she has paid in war expenditures—little compared with the stupendous results obtained. It is obvious that the value of all this loot is infinitely greater than the 20 milliards of notes issued by the German Bank, even if one adds about 84 milliards of marks borrowed in Germany up to July 1st, 1918. The Germans have long been led by their government propaganda to look upon war as a “get-rich-quick” scheme; they feel, therefore, that the war gains constitute an additional security for the credit of the empire. The result is that, within their own borders, and because Germans believe firmly that their conquests will be permanent, particularly those in the east, government loans and the circulation of paper currency are thought safer than ever, resting, as they do, on two firm supports; first, the specie reserve, and second, the immense wealth gained by the war. Certainly the most recent

events compel the Germans to give up a notable part of their gains, but those which remain are yet so great that Germany is still, in spite of everything, in an advantageous situation to discuss peace.

England, Italy, and France have had to increase their paper money enormously over peace-times without adding to their security proportionally; there is necessarily, therefore, a wide difference between the economic position of Germany and that of the Allies not understood among us, but which the Germans comprehend perfectly. *L'Homme Enchaîné* quotes from an article in the *Rhine and Westphalia Gazette*, August 24th, 1917: "Every milliard extorted from Belgium, France, or Serbia is just so much gain to us and loss to the enemy."

Germany tries to draw advantage from this difference by peace parley and armistice before the Allies can completely reverse the situation in central Europe and force her to disgorge her prey, dishonestly come by, but valuable as security for her bank issues. Berlin will endeavor to lead the Allies into premature peace negotiations, in order that their swift economic downfall, resulting from the difference of security of the German bank-

notes and that of the bank-notes of the European Entente Allies may suffice to secure to Germany a real victory, not by military means, but by the ruin of her adversaries at the moment when they believe themselves victorious on the strength of a brilliant success without taking into account the economic diversities.

III.

Let us try now to find out how the astute government of Berlin makes use of differences in economic conditions which four years of war have made between her and the Allies.

This difference, as already shown, has two notable characteristics:

1st. Germany has gained and the Allies lost largely by the war.

2d. The German circulation of paper money is safely secured by the booty she has seized, and her commercial monopolies in the east, especially in Russia. The security of the Allies, on the contrary, depends on a victory thorough enough to force Germany to restore what she has stolen, and repair the profound injuries her aggression has wrought on Europe.

The German plan will succeed only if the Allies are surprised and can be induced to

parley without full comprehension of their precarious financial position, outlined above. They must comprehend not the western situation only, with a view to victory, but all Europe as the sole method of forcing Germany to relinquish completely her eastern gains, which form the chief basis of her war profits.

Berlin counts on the Alsace-Lorraine trick to bring the Allies into peace negotiations before the time. I predicted this two years ago, but since then several Austrian or German personalities have baited the hook with such assurances as "the Alsace-Lorraine question is the sole obstacle to peace." The letter written by the Emperor of Austria as to French rights in Alsace-Lorraine was part of the same plot, which has been taken up again recently. According to the paper *La Suisse* of July 30th, 1918, "the German people are willing to cede Alsace-Lorraine, in order to make peace before it is too late." The mass of the French nation is ready to thwart this Boche manoeuvre, but Americans should know that there are groups of Frenchmen who would let themselves be deceived in all good faith, and the German General Staff has learned by experience in Russia and Caporetto that in countries worn out by a long and cruel strain one may suc-

ceed by acting on a relatively small number among civilians or in the army.

There are three groups in France who may be taken in by the Alsace-Lorraine trick: First, those who only wish to thrust the invader from the soil of France. These do not look at the war in Europe as a whole, nor do they at all understand that France would be irretrievably ruined if Germany retained control of central Europe and her eastern war gains.

The second group is composed of well-meaning people also, but who fix their eyes on Alsace-Lorraine, forgetting the vital importance of the money questions raised by the war. If after four years of exhausting struggle an undoubted military success should force the Germans back, and oblige them to restore Alsace-Lorraine, many among this group would think us wrong to lose the opportunity to put an end to such carnage.

Finally the third group, the smallest but the most dangerous because it makes the most noise, composed of peace-at-any-price members and a few very active French Bolsheviks. These two sets of people have not dwelt on the restoration to France of her lost provinces, but they would eagerly accept sug-

gestions coming from Germany, as they are in agreement with her action. We cannot doubt this when we read a demand that "no peace proposition should be rejected, no matter what its source" (see *Le Temps*, June 28th, 1918). This demand was contained in a letter dated June, 1918, addressed to the French Parliament by the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, the only large union in France, but which really represents a small number of French workers. This state of mind is, moreover, that of some Socialist deputies, careless of realities to such a degree that they have even declared that the war map means nothing.

A part at least of the French population could be influenced by these pushing groups, ready to listen to "peace proposals from anywhere," even from Germans, whose word is worthless, and without waiting till the military situation advances far enough to force Germany to keep her engagements toward oppressed peoples, and indemnify France for her stupendous losses.

On the other hand, we should completely misapprehend the Germans if we supposed that after their victories and seizures of three-quarters of Europe and part of Asia they mean to yield Alsace-Lorraine permanently

to France. They will probably use Alsace-Lorraine as a bone of contention among the Allies, to tempt the French to a premature peace talk, which will destroy their union and morale. This result obtained, they will say: "We will not restore Alsace-Lorraine to you, for you are ruined and unable to take it." All of German tactics is contained in this sentence from the *Frankfort Gazette*, December, 1916, "Negotiation does not mean renunciation."

Even if it were true that Germany might be disposed to return for the moment Alsace-Lorraine to France, France would be incapable of holding it if Greater Germany still controlled Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey, a group strong politically and commercially, with 30 millions of soldiers under the orders of Berlin.

The map here inserted and the accompanying table shows Alsace-Lorraine restored to France and Central Pangermany, so that we can see clearly why the former would be too weak to keep her provinces under such circumstances. According to the figures of 1914, without counting men killed in the war, France, including Alsace-Lorraine, could raise at the outside an army of 8,300,000 men, while

ALSACE-LORRAINE AND CENTRAL PAN-GERMANY

France		Central Pan- Germany	Differences in favor of Pan- Germany
Square kilometres	France in 1914 538,000 Alsace-Lorraine 14,522	3,333,478	2,795,958
Population	France in 1914 39,600,000 Alsace-Lorraine 1,874,000	158,128,000	114,652,000
Army	Actual military contingent	1,400,000	1,100,000
	Mobilized troops on the basis of 20% of the population	8,300,000	22,500,000

"Whatever is of a military order shall be centralized,"
the Pangermanist Friedrich Naumann warned us in
his pamphlet "Bulgaria and Middle-Europe," sub-
lished in Berlin in 1916.



Pangermany would have nearly 22 million more. France, however, could not keep up her army on account of the ruin brought her by the war, while Germany would flourish on the fruits of her vast robberies. These suppositions show that the underlying problem of the war which touches us all is not the question of Alsace-Lorraine, but that of Central Pangermany, the foundation of Prussian militarism, which has threatened the entire world. No, neither France nor the Allies are fighting for Alsace-Lorraine—part of a great whole—they are fighting for the triumph of peaceful democracy, and this implies the necessity of setting free the peoples enslaved by Germany and her allies. Undoubtedly, Alsace-Lorraine has a right to freedom; she is a symbol of oppressed peoples, but only a symbol, for her population is a small part of those enslaved. True, in 1871, 1,500,000 Frenchmen were torn from their country, against their will; but in central and eastern Europe, there are now close to 100 millions of Slavs, Latins, and Semites who are reduced to a frightful slavery by the pro-Germans. Their servitude is an obstacle to the establishment of democracy, and so is that of Alsace-Lorraine. Our map, then, shows us that the fate of the latter depends upon

the overthrow of Central Pangermany, which will put an end to the Prussian military system. Pangermany can be permanently destroyed only by the liberation of the people she oppresses; we can therefore say justly that the complete freedom of the Poles, Czechs, Jugoslavs, Roumanians, etc., is the first and unavoidable condition on which Alsace-Lorraine can be lastingly restored to France.

It is possible that some ill-informed groups in France may drift toward the Alsace-Lorraine snag; we should therefore guard against it, and we have everything needful to this end.

The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine depends on an Allied victory which will reconstruct Europe on the principle of nationalities; we must therefore set on foot the necessary propaganda to instruct those in France who have not yet grasped this fact. America has begun this propaganda in the most convincing way, for the spectacle of masses of soldiers from the United States fighting with enthusiasm on French soil gives the greatest imaginable encouragement to war-weary men, and makes them feel anew that no stop is possible before the war is brought to a righteous conclusion. President Wilson has also partly blunted the

edge of the Alsace-Lorraine stroke in advance. In a speech delivered July 4th, 1918, he says: "The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No half-way decision is conceivable." Again Lansing's note of May, 1918, defines with justice and clarity the attitude of the United States toward the oppressed Slavs and Latins of Central Europe; thus the Alsace-Lorraine trick is already checked in the best way imaginable. But with the Boches one can never be too sure, and the more our press insists on the perfidy hidden under this cloak, the more its success will be rendered impossible.

IV.

We have explained the situation resulting from four years of war, and we will now show how the Germans could exploit it. Let us assume that the Allies have driven them out of France and Belgium, that Alsace-Lorraine is restored, and that peace negotiations are going on, but that Germany continues to predominate over central Europe and Russia.

On this hypothesis, how can the bankruptcy of the Allied European states be brought about, according to the German design? It is not

necessary in this connection to touch upon the financial situation of Great Britain and Italy; it will be sufficient to sketch broadly the effect of the German aggression in this respect on France. In the first place, her position is particularly striking, for she has borne the burden and heat of the day. She is the bulwark of civilization and has made greater money sacrifices, and endured losses much heavier than those of her allies. Secondly, as France is the pivot of the Entente coalition, it is at her finances that the Germans aim, in order by reflex action to reach Italy and Great Britain.

At the opening of hostilities France had issued 6 milliards of bank-notes, and in July, 1918, this circulation had increased to 29 milliards of francs. In June, 1914, France had 3 milliards in gold and silver, and in July, 1918, the specie reserve of the Bank of France amounted in round numbers to 5 milliards, 600 millions, of which 2 millions in gold was abroad as security for war debts. The French national debt was 30 milliards before the war; when this is over, what with huge war expenditures, reconstruction of railways, etc., it will amount to 200 milliards of francs. Now prior to 1914, the entire fortune of France was estimated

by economists at between 250 and 325 milliards. The pensions alone for the wounded and for the widows of soldiers, with interest on the war debt, will bring the annual budget up from the former figure of 5 milliards to at least 12 milliards of francs, an increase of not less than 7 milliards which will have to be raised by permanent taxation.

The German invasion, besides, has ravaged and pillaged the northeast of France, the chief industrial region, and so rich that before the war it paid a fourth of the French taxes. French citizens also have lost nearly 20 milliards in Russian, Balkan, and Ottoman securities.

It has been stated, that in the first three years of war, French imports exceeded exports by about 25 milliards, and finally France has borrowed large sums abroad to buy raw material and feed her population.

Every intelligent Frenchman therefore understands that the 29 milliards in paper-money at the above date, must have for their security not only 5 milliards in specie (2 of them abroad), but a victory sufficiently real to force Germany to make good her thefts, and progressively repair the injuries she has caused.

This conforms to the most elementary idea of justice, and is also the sole economic possibility. While Germany is gorged with riches as the fruit of her crimes, how could our brave French soldiers pay a tax increase of 7 milliards, when they come back from the trenches after such years, the country torn by the struggle, while Germany preserves the greater part of her immense profits?

We must face the truth and speak it plainly: only annuities paid by the Germans, for damage inflicted, used to back French national loans, will enable France to save her people from taxes that would soon be fatal, and to keep engagements which she holds sacred.

The French believe firmly that a just peace will bring restitution, and that is why they have not lost faith in their paper currency, which in spite of its increase retains its full purchasing power. This economic and psychologic position is watched carefully by the cunning Boches, for they hope to make use of it through their pacifist manœuvres.

The Berlin *Deutsche Oekonomist*, May 4th, 1918, says: "The money situation in France is worse now than at any time during the World War. The printing-press is the only source of revenue for M. Klotz, Minister of

Finance, and he makes liberal use of it. . . . If this goes on, fresh notes will have to be issued in France to pay interest on the national debt, just as in Russia."

On the other hand, the Boches know well enough that these difficulties are as naught, as long as France remains the corner-stone of the coalition, for the Entente as a whole, especially since the United States entered the war, has large financial resources. To succeed, then, in their scheme, they want to isolate France, leaving her to cope single-handed with her money difficulties.

To understand and thwart this Boche plot we must presuppose a state of things best adapted to its success, as follows: Seeing the influx of American troops, the German Government will admit that a military decision is not immediately possible, and will endeavor to bring about a treaty of Brest-Litovsk suitable to western conditions. The Berlin General Staff will then adopt the following tactics. Their armies will fall back slowly on the western front, destroying all behind them, so that the ground regained may cost the Allies as much as possible. France and Belgium will be evacuated, while we advance slowly but continuously. Meanwhile, our papers will be

filled with accounts of victory, and the public will believe that the German army is conquered because it has certainly retired before the onslaught of the Allies, the German press will not deny this, it will even offer Alsace-Lorraine as the price of peace. Our pacifists and Bolshevists, encouraged by these events will urge their views more strongly than ever, and the majority of people in Entente countries will be so influenced that at last they will say: "Why accept new sacrifices since we are now victorious? We can talk of peace on our own terms." The Allied governments feel the danger of negotiations while Germany still holds Central Europe and Russia, but on our hypothesis we will imagine them overborne by public opinion. Military operations would then cease, and parleys would begin.

Nothing would suit the Germans better, for they would then be sure of the success of their western Brest-Litovsk. They believe that the money position of the Allies is such that peace conversation would be no sooner begun, than it would give rise to the following chain of circumstances:

The Germans argue thus: "Suppose we engage the Allies in talk, we are none the less masters of Central Europe and Russia. Shortly

after the opening of negotiations, the French will be brought to see that Germany will not act as she expects, and repair the harm done by the war. As the purchasing power of the French notes rests entirely on the public confidence in German restitution, if this confidence disappears, at the same time, the purchasing power of the notes will also vanish, while the cost of living, already high, will rise still further. This effect is bound to follow since to buy the same article a larger amount of paper money will be required continually, as was the case in Russia. This drop in the purchasing power of notes of the Bank of France will cause wide-spread troubles in daily life over even now invaded districts, which will soon grow inextricable. The people, worn by the long nervous strain, will lose their heads; there will be riots before which the government will be helpless, because the vitiation of its currency will have undermined the national credit. Bonds of the National Defense and French rents will fall with the same rapidity, and this, joined to the hardships of the winter months, will at least destroy the morale of the French, rendering further military resistance out of the question. Under these circumstances, the British troops and

the two million Americans in France could be of no use. 'From this moment,' argue the Germans, 'we have only to repeat the trick which worked so well in Russia after our negotiations with the Bolsheviks had broken the national spirit. The financial crisis leaving France at our mercy, having carefully saved our effectives, reinforced by a new class, we will resume the offensive, this time without serious resistance, and penetrate to the very heart of France. We can then control the material wealth of the hitherto uninvaded districts, and, with the whole country in our power, will use it as a base against the United States according to programme.' "

Such is a bird's-eye view of the plot the Germans are working at this moment in trying by every means in their power to secure an armistice which would save them from invasion and would open a period of negotiations. If our lack of foresight allows them to carry it into effect, the results will be infinitely disastrous. The success of this plan in France would entail the downfall of England, and of Italy also, on account of her dependence on France. Berlin has built up this clever scheme, on which she counts to give her victory, just at the moment that the Allies

think they have won. She trusts that these economic methods will prevail, even if she is driven back in the west, as long as she can hold the rest of her war booty and retain her grip on Russia.

From the foregoing, we draw three important conclusions:

1st. The Allied credit depends on a true victory implying restitution from Germany and the relinquishment of her control of central Europe, which implies the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.

2d. Four years of war have produced an unprecedented economic situation; therefore the purchasing power of the Allied currency must necessarily diminish if negotiations are entered on before an economically restorative and really decisive victory from the European point of view.

3d. These dangers threaten us only because the Allies have not argued as they should on peace as it would affect the extraordinary state of finance resulting from the war.

This omission in most of our peace programmes would end, if these programmes were applied, in a disaster more hopeless than any military catastrophe. This sword hangs over our heads because many of us think of the

Germans as impoverished instead of being enriched by the war. It is, however, easy to parry this blow and to make its success impossible; we must undertake a campaign of popular education to instruct the whole Allied public as to the reality and extent of the German war profits. All will then see that the war must not end till Germany has restored the fruit of her enormous thefts and repaired the vast damages which she has caused, not only by the destruction she has carried out, but by the war costs, much greater than her own, which her aggression has forced upon her adversaries.

CHAPTER III.

PANGERMANY'S PROBABLE MILITARY STRENGTH, AND ITS WEAKNESS AT THE OUTSET OF THE FIFTH YEAR OF WAR.

- I. The annual military contingent of Germany.
- II. Approximate strength of German mobilized forces in August, 1918.
- III. Critical discussion of the figures found to represent the man-power of Germany.
- IV. The probable total forces of Pangermany in August, 1918.
- V. How new sources of effectives could have been used to offset the American numbers, if the Allies had not acted in the Balkans and time had been left to the Germans.
- VI. How it is the successes of the Allies in the Balkans that secure the superiority in man-power to the Entente.
- VII. The teachings of the recent past and of the present prove the immense power of political strategy, and that for the Allies the Danube-Central Europe front exerts a decisive influence on the issue of the war.

The progressive evacuation of France and of Belgium by the Germans, the surrender of Bulgaria, of Turkey, of Austria-Hungary, must not prevent us from studying thoroughly the military forces of the states which have made up and may again make up Pangermany.

This study is necessary to avoid, in estimating the German man-power, any error,

at the conclusion of peace, which would be fatal to the cause of democracy. We shall see in effect that the Germans have still more men than the Allies generally believe, and that consequently the Allies ought still to be cautious.

The opinion prevailing in Entente countries is that victory will fall to the group of belligerents possessing the greatest man-power, but this opinion is not altogether in harmony with the teachings of history. Thanks to superior strategy, Napoleon often conquered even with numbers against him, and in the first four years of the World War, success has not fallen to the largest numerical group, as the following table will show:

Entente		Central Powers	
	Millions of Inhabitants		Millions of Inhabitants
Russia.....	182	Germany.....	68
England.....	46	Austria-Hungary..	50
France.....	40	Turkey.....	20
Italy.....	36	Bulgaria.....	5
Roumania.....	8		
Belgium.....	7		
Portugal.....	6		
Serbia.....	5		
Greece.....	4		
Total.....	334	Total.....	143

Great Britain certainly was short of men when the war broke out, but by 1916 she had raised a considerable army, and it is equally true that Austria-Hungary was of but little assistance to Germany, owing to the fact that the majority of her Slav and Latin population—about 28 millions—was averse to the war. Turkey and Bulgaria also were exhausted and stripped of their armaments by the Balkan Wars, so that they did not really come into line before 1915. As a whole, then, the Entente had an enormous numerical advantage of 191 millions of inhabitants over the Central Empires, which of course meant reserves of manpower much greater than those of the Boches, but in spite of this a glance at the map of Pan-germany in August, 1918 (page 14), shows that the latter had the upper hand.

Numbers, then, do not insure victory, which may rather depend on the strategic use made of forces covering the whole theatre of war.

It was necessary to show the relative value of numbers in a campaign, but there should be no misconception as to the extreme importance of large reserves, for, the strategic qualities of the contestants being equal, it is obvious that victory will fall to the share of the larger armies. The question of effectives

is most important to the Allies, and rightly so, but many of them think erroneously that since the American reinforcements assure our superiority in man-power, nothing can overthrow it. If this is so, it is only by reason of certain political-strategic conditions in the east, which I will explain at the end of this chapter.

During the first three years of the war, Allied opinion on the question of German reserves was influenced chiefly by Colonel Repington, military critic of the *London Times*; this paper, however, no longer publishes his articles. In these fateful three years, most Allied papers inclined to the views of the greatest and most devoted to the cause of the Allies of the British dailies, but Colonel Repington's premonitions have been falsified by the events. He announced many times that, according to his calculations, German reserves would be soon exhausted. This mistake as to the enemy's effectives has done an infinite amount of harm to our cause, as I pointed out in an article published by *La Victoire*, Paris, October 28th, 1916. The article is here exactly reproduced:

"In the *London Times* of Jan. 10, 1916, we read:

“Col. Repington estimates the German losses at 200,000 men a month; if therefore the struggle continues with the same intensity, up to a date between May and October, 1916, Germany will be unable to stop the gaps made in her lines by the fighting of each day. Before that date, then, she must try to obtain a decision, on one front or the other.

“Four weeks later Col. Repington made statements not only entirely opposed to the above, but much more reasonable, and which showed on what slender grounds his earlier calculations had been made. This is clear from his letter to the *Times* of the 9th of Feb. 1916, in which he asserts that the “Berlin government now has at its disposal reserve forces amounting to 2,700,000 men.” (See *L'Information*, Paris, February 10th, 1916.)

“A month before, when Colonel Repington stated that the Germans were losing 200,000 a month, and that sometime between May and October they would find themselves without reserves, he made a serious mistake. The extreme carelessness of his judgment appears yet more clearly when we read a statement in *The Times* of April 30th, which ignores his previous estimate of the number of German reserves, for he writes exactly as if these re-

serves did not exist when he says: 'The German armies on the Russian front do not amount to more than 1,300 men to the mile . . . and to sum up, the eastern front is a new wall of China with nothing behind it.' *L'Information*, Paris, May 2, 1916, accepts Repington's miscalculation copying *The Times* article, with the headline, 'The German armies have no more reserves.'

"By the end of August, 1916, Colonel Repington decides that Germany is reduced everywhere to the defensive (*Le Journal*, Paris, August 25th, 1916), the lack of reserves rendering it impossible for the Kaiser to make a serious offensive. A flat contradiction to this was soon shown when Berlin overthrew Roumania, with fresh troops which poured in from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria (see *Journal de Genève*, 19th of October, 1916, quoting from *L'Idea Nazionale*).

"The contrast between the actual facts in 1916 and Repington's calculations of the German reserves alone will prove to the least informed that even if these estimates were serious, they were quite insufficient to give so much as an approximate idea of the truth.

"In point of fact, when we speak of German reserves, we must surely mean to include ef-

fectives contributed by Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, all under orders from Berlin; for as far as we can see, without these vassals, Germany could not keep up the struggle. There can be no doubt that the Bulgars work for the King of Prussia in Monastir, and the Turks in Galicia and the Dobrudja. Thus, at the lowest estimate there must be 1,500,000 Turco-Bulgars to be subdued by the Allies, just as much as the Austro-Boches. These 1,500,000 Turco-Bulgars deserve particular consideration from Colonel Repington, for, as we all know, he has contributed to place them at the service of William II by his strenuous opposition to the Allied attempt to preserve the Danube front; though this was the only operation which could have prevented the junction of the Germans, Bulgars and Turks, and, therefore, the hold of the Kaiser on this 1,500,000 people. The colonel, however, does not include them in his calculations, any more than the 2 millions of prisoners held by the Germans, who work in their munition factories or behind the military fronts, thereby setting free just so many Austro-Boches, who without these prisoners would have themselves to carry on these labors indispensable to the army.

“Colonel Repington’s carelessness and incoherence on these points must be clear, then, to the meanest capacity. His estimates as to the enemies’ effectives are full of mistakes, for he neglects the essential factors to be considered; and these mistakes have produced the worst practical consequences. The great weight attached to *The Times*, has caused numerous Allied newspapers to quote Repington’s articles in the fullest confidence, and this has filled the public mind in Entente countries, with the most dangerous notions about the duration of the war, and the extent of effort necessary to defeat the barbarians from beyond the Rhine.”

These lines were written at the end of 1916. Since then the German offensives in different directions have proved how much Colonel Repington was mistaken as to the enemy’s reserves, but these errors have contributed materially to the cruel disappointments of the Allies and the prolongation of the war, for his statements fostered the opinion that the conflict would certainly end in three months, as Germany was near exhaustion, and that all that was needful was to push the fight on the western front until her reserves gave out, when our victory was sure to follow.

Four years of war and the fact that the progressive evacuation of France and of Belgium was decided upon by the Germans only after the defeat of Bulgaria at the end of September, 1918, demonstrate the depth of these errors, and as the interest of America is identical with that of the Allies, she should grasp the situation clearly that she may avoid the mistake made in Europe as to the man-power of Germany, which has always been greatly underestimated, so that even to-day, after the German retreat on the west front, it is placed at much less than it is in reality.

The Allies were so much surprised at the numerical superiority of the Germans during their great offensive on the western front in April-June, 1918, that in order to account for it, certain Allies explained that before the war Germany gave out false reports as to her population, which was much larger than the official figures, and now supplied her from resources greater than had been believed. The truth is really much simpler, for mistakes about the German forces arise from superficial ideas existing among the Allies on many subjects, not only about Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, countries difficult to understand, but about Germany as well.

We are apt to think it a sign of weakness when we see boys of seventeen in the German army, and from the early days of the war our press often mentioned this, saying: "Germany must be in a bad way, if she has to use recruits only seventeen years old." It is, however, perfectly natural, and long before the war it was the law that every German, able to bear arms should be liable to military service, that is, he might be obliged to join the colors at seventeen years of age. In time of peace these joined at twenty, but the circumstance of their enlistment during the war at seventeen, far from being a proof indicative of German exhaustion, shows, on the contrary, that the Berlin government resolved long ago to make war with all the means at its command, and thus to deal its enemies the deadliest blows.

In July and August, 1918, when our brilliant counter-offensives forced the Teutons back from the Soisson-Rheims salient, even as early as the first day of August, many of the Allies returned to the opinion that his retirement was owing to lack of men, and that complete victory would result automatically from the destruction of the German army on the western front. It is now hard to understand such fixed and definite ideas. On the 16th of Au-

gust many Allied papers estimated the German losses since July 15th at 250,000 men, a large number, no doubt; but to judge sanely of the effect of this on the war we must set against it the loss the Germans have inflicted on us since April, a loss certainly not negligible, as everything in war is a question of comparison between the two contestants.

The above figure for German losses is not high enough to allow us to conclude that the enemy at this period, when the Bulgarian disaster had not yet taken place, was already short of reserves, especially as we were assured that he had about 7 millions of men on all the western front. This retirement may, perhaps, be interpreted as part of the shrewd pacifist manoeuvre of which I have spoken in the preceding chapter, and which I had foreseen two years ago (see my preface).

Color is given to this idea by an extract from the *Stuttgart Neues Tagblatt*, dated August 19th, 1918, which quotes from the *Schwäbische Tagwacht*, a statement that Germany's soldiers are exhausted, and agree with the civil population in demanding peace at any price. I do not say this is not true; I merely state that, given the German censor-

ship at this period, an item of this sort could only have been published on the other side of the Rhine with permission of the General Staff, which must certainly have had some purpose to serve in authorizing the appearance of such a statement. There is at least ground for suspicion.

However this may be, four years of war have not justified these opinions held in the Entente, notably by Colonel Repington, as to German reserves. The only way of reaching a fair conclusion on this question, always extremely important, even at this moment when the Germans are beginning to evacuate France and Belgium, is to start fresh, renouncing all former opinions which stand in need of proof, and seeking corroboration from reliable sources as to Germany's man-power and her military strength at the threshold of this fifth year of the war, remembering always that this strength is exerted over the entire war-field subject to the direction of Berlin.

To approximate as nearly as possible to the truth, we must study successively the two essential elements of this problem.

1st. What is the annual military contingent of Germany?

2d. Making proper deductions, what was

the present state of Germany's mobilized military forces in August, 1918.

I.

The mistake of the Allies as to German reserves arises from an inexact valuation of their annual military contingent. Many people of importance put this contingent at about 400,000, and this figure is generally accepted by the Allies. According to *German reports dating from before the war*, these figures are much below the truth. According to the best-known German military publication, *Loebell's Jahresberichte* for 1911, published in the spring of 1912, the number of recruits for 1910 was 1,245,363, the population of the empire being then exactly 65 millions. On looking at these figures carefully, we see that they include the class coming up for examination as well as those adjourned from preceding classes. Taken in the lump, they can be analyzed thus:

Excluded on account of criminal conviction.....	890
Invalided	34,067
Men in advance of their time.....	39,970
Service deferred (<i>ajournés</i>).....	715,952
Men fit for service.....	454,484

Let us analyze these figures, so as to ascer-

tain the annual contingent of Germany *if she had wished to make war in 1910, instead of merely keeping up her peace establishment.*

To keep down expenses before the war, Germany did not enlist by any means all the men fit for service, so it is plain that if she had brought on war in 1910, she would first have taken into the army the whole number ready for that year; say 454,484 men. Now let us examine the list of those whose service was deferred, 715,952, a very high figure. We must first understand the conditions under which men are deferred (or adjourned) from the German army. This does not happen in cases of sickness, but where the men are physically fit, but suffering from some temporary weakness. It was easy to get an adjournment before the war, as there were more men fit for service than the state could afford to enlist. Moreover, excuse is granted in Germany for any one of a number of reasons, depending on family or commercial considerations, so that men obtain it as—

1st. The necessary support of a family.

2d. The sons of a landed proprietor, farmer, or manufacturer incapable of work.

3d. Next of kin to soldiers killed, or dead of wounds in the service.

4th. Having inherited property or land, which can only be managed by themselves.

5th. Owners of factories or important business houses where their presence is indispensable.

6th. Young men preparing for any profession, study or trade to which interruption would be prejudicial.

7th. Young men living abroad.

From this it is clear that the men exempted in peace-time are all physically capable of bearing arms for the Kaiser, or of work in the many branches of service in the rear of an army. Observe also that according to military law adjournment lasts only three years, so that the number, 715,952 men for 1910, mentioned above includes only three classes adjourned; consequently, taking a third of this figure—238,650, we reach the mean number of men adjourned in 1910, who would unquestionably have entered the army in that year.

In 1910, Germany had also 34,067 *reformés* (men invalided), and of course in all the belligerent countries it is much harder to be invalided in time of war; therefore we can allow a third of the figure 34,067, say, 11,355, men who would have been part of the war contingent in 1910.

To sum up, if Germany had begun the war

in that year, her war levy would have been made up of three categories, as follows:

Fit for service in 1910.....	454,484 men
A third of those adjourned in 1910.....	238,650 men
A third of those <i>reformés</i> in 1910.....	11,355 men
Total.....	704,489 men

Let us say in round numbers 300,000 men besides the 400,000 generally allowed to be the regular annual levy.

This total of 700,000 men is probably less than the present annual war contingent in Germany, as it pertains to the year 1910, and according to the *Almanach de Gotha*, page 531, in 1910 Germany had exactly 64,925,993 inhabitants, in 1913 she had 66,835,000; indicating an average increase for each of the three years of 636,335 inhabitants. On this basis, without considering effects resulting from the war, the population of Germany was:

In 1911.....	65,562,328 inhabitants
In 1912.....	66,198,663 inhabitants
In 1913.....	66,835,000 inhabitants
In 1914.....	67,471,335 inhabitants
In 1915.....	68,107,670 inhabitants
In 1916.....	68,744,005 inhabitants
In 1917.....	69,380,340 inhabitants
In 1918.....	70,016,675 inhabitants

These figures provide a basis for calculations

of great practical interest because the two causes which at present diminish these figures—the German losses and the decline in the birth-rate caused by the war—certainly do not influence the increase of the annual military contingent of Germany. Since 1915, those who have reached the military age of seventeen are not less in number owing to events now taking place, because they were born after 1898, that is, during a period in which the German birth-rate was steadily rising from year to year; hence we can fairly consider that the above figures reflect accurately the size of the population from which Germany has drawn recruits since 1915, but we must bear in mind that on account of the high birth-rate after 1898 resources in men are considerable, and will continue for some years to come. Consequently, *from the recruiting point of view*, the figures showing the growth of the German population from 1911 to 1918 will allow us to estimate as closely as possible the annual military contingent of Germany for the same period. If this amounted to 700,000 men in 1910, as against 65 millions of inhabitants, that is, about 10.77 for every 1,000, it would have been:

In 1911.....	706,055 men
In 1912.....	712,908 men
In 1913.....	719,761 men

In 1914.....	726,614 men
In 1915.....	733,467 men
In 1916.....	740,320 men
In 1917.....	747,172 men
In 1918.....	754,025 men

This gives a total of 5,840,322 men for these eight years. As the Entente usually reckons the annual German levies at 400,000, in the light of the facts just presented, based on the latest German official figures obtainable, their last eight military contingents would have been calculated as only 3,200,000 men, making an underestimate of apparently about 2,600,000.

This showing explains in a striking manner some of the events of the last four years—up to the moment when the Bulgarian débâcle and the Allied advance toward the Danube have compelled the German General Staff abruptly to shorten the western front to rush to defend central Europe—particularly:

1st. How Germany has been able, up to the time of the Bulgarian defeat, to continue her penetration in Russia, while maintaining defensive pressure in the west.

2d. How the Germans have been able to keep up their long lines of communication, a feat rarely mentioned, but which must require a large personnel.

3d. How for the last four years the Ger-

mans have surprised the Allies, always opposing them with forces superior to their calculations at any critical moment.

II.

The annual military levy of Germany since 1910, being known by means of the foregoing calculations, let us now estimate her mobilized forces at the beginning of the fifth year of war, August, 1918.

In Mr. Gerard's book, *My Four Years in Germany*, he says that there were 12 millions of soldiers mobilized by William II when he declared war. As Germany had a population of about 68 millions in 1914, this would mean $17\frac{3}{4}$ per cent of the people. The French ex-generalissimo, General de Lacroix, estimated the whole German mobilization at 13 millions of men, say 19 per cent of the population. According to law every German is liable to military service from 17 years to the end of the 45th year of age. Compare the official figures of the French census of 1910 showing that the male population from 17 to 45 inclusive represents 21 in 100 of the French people, the general average in most countries—we can therefore reckon the entire German mobilization at 20 per cent of the inhabitants, which

gives us 13,600,000 men, it being more prudent to put the German strength at rather more than less. This figure of 13,600,000 men mobilized is very conservative, as it relates to the number of inhabitants in 1914—68 millions. In the last four years the German population has increased on an average of 636,335 a year, deducting war losses, of which we will speak later. These figures are taken from the *Almanach de Gotha*, 1914, page 531, above quoted (see page 103).

In 1918, then, Germany contained 70,016,675 inhabitants. Hence, taking as a basis the mobilization of 20 in 100 on the round number of 68 millions of people in 1914, we are probably if anything short of the truth.

In this number of 13,600,000 men are included, of course, soldiers on the various fronts, and those in the innumerable service departments of all kinds of the German army.

This lump sum of 13,600,000 has been modified in two ways. *First*, it has been diminished by war losses. *Secondly*, these losses have been partially compensated for by the German annual recruitment.

Let us consider the value of each of these factors. According to an authority which I am bound to hold as particularly trustworthy,

on the 1st of June, 1918, the German loss may be estimated by the use of the following data.

Figures carefully collated state their loss to have been exactly 3,400,000 on April 1st, 1917. Add to this the losses from April to the 31st of December, 1917. Battles of the Aisne, Flanders, etc., say 1,100,000 men, which brings the total on January 1st, 1918, up to about 4,500,000. By June 1st of this year, the list was estimated at 300,000—making 4,800,000 men; then we must include the sick and wounded, a constant figure estimated at about 500,000. Putting all these together, according to those in a position to know best, we reach the total of a loss of 5,300,000 men to Germany by the 1st of June, 1918.

We might add subsequent losses incident to our victorious counter-offensive since July 15th, but from the 1st of June to the 1st of August data are lacking for an exact computation, and, on the other hand, the problem before us consists in the attempts to ascertain the average annual loss of Germany. Relying on the authoritative sources of information above mentioned, we have brought our estimates to the 1st of June, 1918, and from this point we can reach an average for the four

years of war within a month, or very nearly exact.

Now let us see how much the annual levies of Germany have compensated for her losses.

These annual contingents (see page 105) amount to about—

733,000 men.....	in 1915
740,000 men.....	in 1916
747,000 men.....	in 1917
754,000 men.....	in 1918

a total of 2,974,000 men for the four years of war.

The mobilized strength of Germany in 1914	
was.....	13,600,000 men
Ascertained losses resulting from the war,	
June 1st, 1916.....	5,300,000 men
reduce this to.....	8,300,000 men
Four military levies, 1915-1916-1917-1918, in	
round numbers.....	2,900,000 men
bring this to.....	11,200,000 men

Eleven millions of men mobilized were, therefore, at the disposal of Germany at the opening of the fifth year of war. The moderation and probability of this statement can be verified by the following reasoning. The Allied High Command and Senator Berenger, of the Committee on Effectives of the French

Senate, in their figures estimated the number of Germans on all the western front at 7 millions in June, 1918. From our estimates that would leave only 4 millions to carry on all the work in the interior of Germany, to supply the armies in Russia and Turkey, and secure extended communication in hostile districts. For all these purposes 4 millions is rather an insufficient number, so our calculations are probably not too high.

We can now see clearly two causes for the misapprehension of the Allies as to Germany's military resources. First mistake: The German annual contingent is usually reckoned at 400,000 men, but according to German statistics (page 103) it ought to be about 700,000. Second mistake: German losses on June 1st, 1918, are counted as positively 5,300,000 men, without reflecting that, if this figure is right with regard to the total population of Germany, it is not so when it is compared with the figures of the initial mobilization. It is important to remember that the length of the war feeds the war, that is, four annual military contingents have filled up in a great measure the gaps made by losses in the German army. Our task is to destroy the men who compose this army faster than

they can be replaced by the German people. It is wrong, then, to speak of the absolute German loss (5,300,000 on the 1st of June, 1918), for this implies a corresponding diminution in the mobilized forces of Germany, which is not the state of the case. Her strength being kept up by annual enlistments, her real losses after four years of war would be: 5,300,000 less 2,900,000 recruits, giving 2,400,000 men. Keeping in mind *the comparison with the amount of the initial mobilization*, the actual loss of the German army to August, 1918, was in round numbers only a fourth of that number, say 600,000 men a year, a very much lower figure than is generally allowed.

This number of men annually lost, if admitted as right, accounts for much that was obscure in the evolution of the war, and explains the disappointments of the Allies at finding superior forces always before them, contrary to their calculations. These figures also prove the falsity of Colonel Repington's theories, for he has always maintained that Germany can be completely conquered, driven out in the west, and forced to yield central and eastern Europe, as well as Turkey. To this end he would pursue a concentrated war of attrition on the western front, destroying

successively and surely the German effective force, and by this means arriving at a complete victory for the Allies. The weakness of this conception must be made clear by the fact that it was the victorious offensive of the Allies in the Balkans which compelled the German General Staff to evacuate more quickly France and Belgium.

If any doubt remains let us remember that if Germany has lost 600,000 men a year, she has also reached great results, for this sacrifice, combined with her political strategy, has gained for her the use and control of the wealth of three-fourths of Europe and a part of Asia. The Allies, on the other hand, underestimating the importance of the eastern front, neglected for four years the great strategic possibilities of a campaign on the Danube, and thus deprived themselves of the resources of Russia and the Balkans, which they controlled at the outset. They have been, for this reason, blockaded in eastern Europe, and obliged to bring from Australia and America at great expense most of the food and raw material of which they stand in need. Again, in proportion to her first mobilized army, Germany has lost 600,000 men a year, but the war map (see page 14) shows how nearly she has ap-

proached to the Pangermanist standard, and also that she has inflicted on her adversaries losses equal to her own. This cannot be denied, for we know the Russians lost many more men than the Germans; the French losses have not been made public, but we know that in April, 1918, there were more French prisoners in Germany than there were Germans in France, which shows at the very least that the French have certainly lost proportionately more than the Germans. It is not easy to demonstrate, therefore, that we can gain the victory through the exhaustion of Germany's man-power, since it is proved that the military and political strategy finally carried out by the Allies in the Balkans has accomplished in a few days results which four years of persistent effort on the western front could not secure.

III.

The figures given by our deductions: 13,600,000 for the whole mobilized German army, and 700,000 for its probable war contingent, being much higher than those generally accepted by the Entente, are of a nature to cause great surprise and raise objections. A profound

scrutiny of these figures is therefore not only needful but indispensable, for if finally it is well established that they certainly approximate to the truth it will demonstrate a fact of great value to the Entente, of which the practical importance will appear logically at the end of this verification. In order to go to the root of the analysis of our figures, I will review my statements from the beginning, following an entirely different method, by means of which the results of the first can be checked. First, I will prove that a grave error has been most certainly made by the Allies in their calculations of German man-power. Second, I will point out the different objections likely to present themselves to the mind of my readers, and present the answers which can be given.

1ST. THE MISAPPREHENSION OF THE ALLIES
AS TO THE ANNUAL GERMAN CONTINGENT
IS CERTAIN AND IMPORTANT.

The number of 400,000 men for Germany's annual contingent is generally accepted by the Allies. On June 10th, 1918, an article appeared in the Paris *Temps* by Lieutenant d'Entraygues, in which, speaking of the German class of 1920, which in June, 1918, was in

the Kaiser's instruction-camps, he said: "This class will yield an effective of 400,000 men." On the 7th of September, 1918, the *New York Times* published a despatch by an American correspondent in Paris, who had evidently gained his information in France. He says: "What the American factor now means may be judged from one fact. During the month of August 400,000 American soldiers landed in France. This number is as nearly as possible equivalent to the whole German 1920 class, on which there is no doubt that the enemy has been very largely counting to compensate him for the enormous cost in man-power which the Allies are causing him at present."

Now we will show why it is quite impossible that the German class of 1920 should amount to only 400,000 men. The figures of *Loebell's Jahresberichte*, on which I have based all my calculations, are to be found in a pamphlet called *The Military Situation of all Nations*, published in 1914, before the war, by Berger-Levrault, the foremost French military publisher, whose technical works are brought out with the assistance of qualified officers. To demonstrate that I have made no mistake, either in the sources or the conclusions drawn from the figures which formed the starting-point

ils ne le sont généralement que pour une seule période. Dans la landwehr du 2^e ban et dans le landsturm, il n'est plus fait aucune convocation.

Il importe de remarquer que les diverses règles qui précèdent ne sont pas absolues ni impératives ; ce qui caractérise essentiellement les lois de recrutement en Allemagne, c'est leur grande élasticité et, en même temps, le souci prédominant de l'intérêt militaire. Les ressources considérables et toujours croissantes du recrutement permettent de ménager, dans une large mesure, la population civile, tout en n'incorporant dans les troupes que des jeunes gens parfaitement aptes au service armé.

Aussi l'autorité militaire jouit-elle de la latitude la plus complète dans l'examen des cas d'ajournement, d'exclusion et de réforme prévus par la loi.

L'*ajournement* peut résulter, en premier lieu, d'une aptitude physique incomplète ; il ne peut être prolongé au delà de trois ans. Il peut aussi être prononcé, sur la demande des intéressés ou de leur famille, en faveur ; 1^o des soutiens indispensables

of my calculations, I will reproduce photographically the essential passages of this pamphlet, showing:

1st. That according to German military law adjournment of service can only last three years.

2d. That the figures on which I rely are really taken from *Loebell's Jahresberichte*, which is held to be the most authoritative German publication.

If, therefore, Germany had declared war in 1910, without counting young men who had presented themselves in advance, or those she

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tés physiques ou morales ; mais les jeunes gens qui ont cherché à se soustraire à l'obligation du service par mutilation ou autrement sont versés dans les sections de *travailleurs*.

(Pour le mécanisme et le fonctionnement du service de RECRUTEMENT en Allemagne, *se reporter à ce mot dans le corps du Dictionnaire.*)

Voici, maintenant, un aperçu des résultats du recrutement pour l'année 1910, extraits des *Læbell's Jahresberichte* (pour 1911 : publiés au printemps 1912), en rappelant que ces opérations embrassent non seulement les hommes de la classe incorporable, mais encore les nombreux ajournés des classes précédentes :

Jeunes gens ayant pris part aux opérations du recrutement.	1.245.363
dont :	
Exclus (<i>Unwürdige</i>).	890
Réformés (<i>Untaugliche</i>).	34.067
Ajournés	715.952
Ayant devancé l'appel.	39.960
Déclarés bons	454.484

could make up out of her *reformé* list, she could have utilized in the various branches of her mobilized army:

1st. Men fit for service.	454,484 men
2d. One-third of 715,952. This figure, according to German law, can only include 3 classes of adjourned, equal, therefore, to	238,650 men
Total.	693,134 men

If, in 1910, Germany, which then had but 65 millions of inhabitants, could raise a war contingent of about 693,000 men, how can it

be believed that in 1918, when Germany, from the recruiting standpoint, has 70 millions of inhabitants, and forms her classes not at 20 but at 17 years of age—that is, without having to take account of the deaths between 17 and 19 inclusive—should have a class of only 400,000 men, that is, about 293,000 less than the war class of 1910? It is impossible that this should be true.

A serious mistake has therefore been made. It is hard to explain logically, because, as we have just seen, the figures which prove it were published in France, even before the war. The only explanation of this extraordinary misconception is that it is of the same nature as those held by the Entente regarding many other problems—the Bulgar question, the question about the King of Greece, the question of Austria-Hungary, the Bolsheviks—all questions on which for a long time the Allies were misled by superficial preconceived ideas, lacking proof, and which events have demonstrated to be as contrary to facts as to the interests of the Entente. The problem now is to discuss thoroughly the extent of the error committed, and in what it consists.

2D. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES.

1st Objection.—The man-power of Germany (70 millions of inhabitants) cannot be greater than that of the Allies put together (France 40 millions, England 46, Italy 36, United States 100), etc.

Answer.—Certainly this is true, but we must compare, not the man-power of the Allies only as against that of Germany, but the number of Allied soldiers able to serve in Europe, opposed to the man-power of all the Central Powers, as, since the war, they form a group of forces directed by Berlin, to the advantage of Germany, who without them must have yielded long ago. By this comparison alone can be discerned which are the weak points of the effectives of Germany's allies, on which the Entente should consequently bring pressure to bear. The great successes achieved since the Entente finally decided to attack Bulgaria, show the absolute necessity of this method of procedure.

2d Objection.—The figures of 13,600,000 men, which we found to represent the number of the entire mobilized German army, and that of

700,000 for the German contingent, are so much larger than those generally accepted that they cannot be correct.

Answer.—It is unfortunate not only regarding the German effectives that considerable errors, reaching 50 per cent, have been made by the Entente on questions nevertheless of capital importance for the winning of the war. For instance, when the war began the opinion prevailed in dominant circles of western Europe that Germany had only 50 army corps. Now it is a fact that she began the fight with 100, that is with 50 more, the existence of which was not even suspected. This was clearly recognized, particularly in several articles which appeared in France about two years ago, therefore authorized by the censors. The error, very serious at that time, was in this case of 50 per cent. Granting the above, it is not impossible, *a priori*, that, instead of estimating the annual German contingent at about 700,000 men, it should have been wrongly placed at only 400,000.


3d Objection.—It is improbable, *a priori*, that Germany's man-power should be estimated at 13,600,000 fighting men.

Answer.—It is absolutely necessary to come

to an understanding as to the meaning one should give to the expression man-power, for it seems to be imperfectly understood in the Entente.

Many of the Allies, in fact, imagine that the man-power of a country consists alone in its ability to place so many combatants on the firing-line. This idea of man-power is incomplete and gives rise to serious mistakes. An army is not made up of fighting men only. At the present day, the mobilized army of a state comprises innumerable departments; the fighting units, services immediately behind the front, home services, war factories, working of mines necessary to the war, sometimes even agricultural production, and numbers of bureaux. Now, all these services, being indispensable to the working of the army, in consequence are equally necessary to victory. Soldiers fighting at the front are therefore only a part of the man-power required, and their number is itself the reflex and the result of the strength of the organizations of non-combatants in the rear.

If, further, we should attempt to estimate Germany's man-power by counting simply the number of fighting men, we should find ourselves certainly mistaken. On the one hand,



the Allies' information services had to be made out of the whole cloth since the war, and have therefore inevitable defects; and on the other, the Germans are past masters in the art of dissimulation. The result is that all the identifications that the Allies can make of German divisions fighting on the different fronts, only reach an approximation, and leave unreckoned elements of the enemy's strength, which it is indispensable to take into account.

For all these reasons, the man-power of a nation is represented by the whole number of men it is able to mobilize, no matter to what service these men are attached. I have taken great care to specify (see page 107) that the figure of 13,600,000 included, of course, the fighting men on the various fronts and those in the innumerable service departments of all kinds of the German army.

4th Objection.—Ought not the number of 13,600,000 to be reduced by 15 to 20 per cent to allow for these *reformés*?

Answer.—In Germany the number of these *reformés* must be much less than the above percentage. The war has been so premeditated and the study of military things by the General Staff has gone on for such a length of

time that it is only natural that of all the belligerents Germany should know how to get the best results out of the men who come up for mobilization. The system by which mobilized men are utilized in Germany is quite unlike that which obtained in France, for instance, at least during the two first years of the war.

In France, through a false notion of equality and of the modern needs of war, in the beginning, they tried to act on the principle that each mobilized man should be exposed to the same danger, no matter what might be his particular aptitudes. Intellectual power of the first rank which could have done much toward a speedy victory, was sacrificed to this idea, to the great detriment of the common cause. Thus, for example, Jean Gravier, who was probably the Frenchman who knew most about Serbia, because he had long made a special study of the country on the spot, was recalled to France by the mobilization, and killed as a sergeant before Souchez, when he might have rendered invaluable services in the Balkans. The forces thus uselessly sacrificed have been very great, and it was only toward the third year of the war that France began to remedy this fatal error.

If Jean Gravier had been a German he would have been assigned as technical adviser to the Staff charged to prepare for the invasion of Serbia, because in Germany, from the outbreak of hostilities, the utilization of mobilized men has been arranged on the principle that each man should be employed, not necessarily where there are the most risks to be run, but where his personal aptitudes would allow him to render the best service with a view to victory.

The application of this principle explains why mobilized Germans, 30 years old, strong and well, have been kept away from the firing-line and attached at home or abroad to propaganda service, from which the Berlin government has derived so much advantage. Striking examples are the cases of Von Papen and Boy-Ed, who were the German officers retained as long as possible in the United States because Berlin considered that they were much more useful to the German cause in this way than if they had been killed on the western front.

This principle carried out explains why the Germans make *reformés* of a relatively small number of men among those subject to mobilization. It is, in fact, clear that, with the

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exception of those seriously ill, any man merely weak or delicate who is employed in civil life can be used in some sedentary service in one of the innumerable departments of the German army. The number of those *reformés* varies according to age, as is shown by the following table drawn up according to the official figures of German mortality for 1901 (see page 134).

Out of 100 Germans of	Number of Deaths	Out of 100 Germans of	Number of Deaths
1 year	20.23	24 years	0.50
2 years	3.98	25 "	0.50
3 "	1.49	26 "	0.51
4 "	0.94	27 "	0.52
5 "	0.69	28 "	0.52
6 "	0.52	29 "	0.53
7 "	0.42	30 "	0.54
8 "	0.35	31 "	0.55
9 "	0.30	32 "	0.57
10 "	0.26	33 "	0.59
11 "	0.24	34 "	0.62
12 "	0.22	35 "	0.66
13 "	0.21	36 "	0.70
14 "	0.21	37 "	0.74
15 "	0.23	38 "	0.78
16 "	0.27	39 "	0.83
17 "	0.32	40 "	0.88
18 "	0.38	41 "	0.91
19 "	0.43	42 "	0.99
20 "	0.48	43 "	1.05
21 "	0.50	44 "	1.11
22 "	0.50	45 "	1.17
23 "	0.50		

This table is very interesting because it shows:

1st. That the mortality is enormous the first year, and great for the second and third years.

2d. That at 45 it is 1.17 per cent.

3d. That at 16 it is only 0.27 per cent.

It is therefore evident that those *reformés* among men of 45, already worn, and suffering from serious complaints, are much more numerous than the *reformés* among young men, of just 17, who are full of life.

Applying the principles which govern the German mobilization, which start from the theory that every man is of some use, except those seriously ill, we can understand how it happens that those *reformés* are relatively few, even among men of 45, and fewer still among the youths of 17, who in time of war constitute each annual German contingent.

To make this plainer still, let us take, for example, 100,000 young Germans 17 years old who have come before the examining board to form the class of 1920. The reason why so few among these youths are *reformés* is that, according to the above figures (see page 125), from 16 to 17 the death-rate is only 0.27 per cent; that is, that among 400 young Germans

of this age only about one dies, because at 16 or 17 the serious maladies which attack men of more advanced years naturally do not exist. On the other hand, a sufficiently large number of boys of 17 are not yet strong enough physically to make good fighting men, but even these are quite able to fill useful places in some of the numerous branches of the army services, work which would not be too exacting for boys of that age. In this way, we see how those *reformés* among the youths of 17 who make up the war contingent should not exceed 5 per cent at the most. Allowing this to be the probable figure, we will understand how the Germans make use of the 95,000 boys of 17 remaining from the 100,000 whom we have supposed as coming before the Kaiser's board of examination.

Out of these 95,000 probably 70,000 are strong enough to be sent at once to instruction-camps and to the front in six months. The remaining 25,000 fall into two categories: The first is composed of specialists, workmen: miners, mechanics, electricians, tailors, etc. The second is formed of young men who need to be built up for some months, or perhaps a year, before they can be made fighting men.

The specialized workmen of 17 are sent to

different departments or to the workrooms of their trades, where they take the places of older men who go to the front. As for those who need strengthening, they are either sent to camps for physical training or divided among the different offices where there is sedentary work, and where they relieve young men of the preceding year who are now strong enough to join the fighting force, or older men no longer necessary behind the lines, who are sent forward. The result of this system is that if the 95,000 German soldiers at 17 estimated in our hypothesis do not at once enter the fighting ranks, their numbers make it possible to form a rotation from one year to the next by means of which men able to fight can be taken out of the various services. In this way, the military authorities can send to the front a number of fighting men virtually equal to that of the annual contingent, which thus acts as a sort of reservoir, supplying the different branches of the German army, which draws upon it as much as possible, allowing for the small number *reformés*.

5th Objection.—If there had been no war the effect of natural causes would have diminished the number of men from 17 to 45 years old.

We should therefore take into account this cause of diminution of the German army, which must have considerably lowered its numbers during the last four years.

Answer.—Of course deaths from natural causes, as in time of peace, would occur among men mobilized from 17 to 45, but practically the effects of this cause of diminution of the German army are confounded with losses produced by the war. If a mobilized German dies of bronchitis, of pleurisy, or of heart-disease, he might certainly have succumbed from such causes without the war, but they might equally have resulted from it. In any case, nothing is known about it, and nothing can be found out, because every mobilized soldier in the German army, if he falls ill, is sent to a military hospital. If he dies, from no matter what cause, his death is included among the war losses reckoned above, as we have seen, including a constant figure of 500,000 men in hospital (see page 108).

6th Objection.—If the German army increased by about 700,000 men each year, we must reckon also an annual loss of men released from military service, on reaching the age of 45 inclusive.

Answer.—This would be true in peace-time, but not in war. In France military service is obligatory up to the end of the 48th year, but now mobilized men have been kept with the colors beyond this age; this is why France has had soldiers more than 50 years old who have gone back only recently to civil life. In Germany, also, men have been kept in the service at more than 45 years of age, and therefore this cause for the diminution of the German army, in which many Allies believe, does not really exist.

7th Objection.—Is not the estimate of 13,600,000 men, based on 20 per cent of the population, too high a figure?

Answer.—1st. There is nothing extraordinary in the mobilization figure of 20 per cent of the German population. Even little Serbia with her rudimentary organization mobilized at 14 per cent of her inhabitants in 1912-13. The Germans' theory of mobilization enables them to get the best possible results from their resources in man-power, their powers of organization are not to be doubted, and therefore we ought not to be surprised that they can mobilize at 20 per cent of their people, dividing the men among the many branches of their service.

2d. This figure only gives a difference of about 600,000 men, against that stated by General de Lacroix in an article published in the Paris *Temps* nearly two years ago, in which he studies the numbers yielded by the German mobilization. Thus, the amount of 13 millions has been fixed by the ex-generalissimo of the French armies, after proper deductions for *reformés*.

3d. This sum of 13 millions, fixed by General de Lacroix, is drawn from the year 1914, when the population of Germany was only 68 millions, but in 1918, from the recruiting point of view, she had 70 million inhabitants.

4th. As we know, men at the close of their 45th year are theoretically free from all military obligations, but they have been kept with the colors during the war, and thus the German army has increased beyond the limits which were at first set.

5th. The statistics of the German Empire only give the number of German subjects present in Germany, and the German effectives are generally calculated with this number only in view, forgetting that there are, besides, many Germans scattered all over the world who are subjects of the empire, and therefore those from 17 to the end of the 45th year owe mili-

tary service to Germany. Owing to the Allied blockade, it is true that nearly all Germans of this category living in America, Africa, or Asia have not been able to reach Germany to perform their military duty, but, per contra, some German subjects living abroad have certainly obeyed the order of mobilization since the beginning of hostilities. These Germans are those domiciled either in countries allied to Germany—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—or in countries occupied by German troops, such as Serbia, Roumania, Belgium, and Russia. There are besides those in states in direct geographic contact with Germany, like Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, or in European countries which were for a time neutral, like Italy and Spain.

The statistics of the *Alldeutscher Atlas*, by Paul Langhans, published in 1900 at Gotha, by Justus Perthes, enable us to calculate the number of Germans living abroad under conditions which would certainly have allowed them to join the German army.

German subjects of the empire resident in—

Austria.....	103,433
Hungary.....	6,597
Switzerland.....	112,342
Luxemburg.....	10,712
Belgium.....	47,338

Holland.....	28,767
Denmark.....	31,107
Sweden.....	4,066
Norway.....	1,471
Russia.....	60,000
Italy.....	25,000
Spain.....	1,826
Total.....	432,659
In round numbers.....	432,000

These figures, however, date from a period reaching from 1888 to 1898, on the average from 1893. From this date till 1918, that is, for 25 years, this total should be augmented in proportion to the mean annual increase of the German population.

In 1910, according to the figures of the *Almanach de Gotha* above cited (page 103), Germany had exactly 64,925,993 inhabitants, and at this date her population increased by 636,335 = 9.8 per 1,000 inhabitants. Therefore during 25 years—without even counting the progressive increase, which gives higher figures—the augmentation per 1,000 is 245; say, for 432,000 it would be 105,840, which, added to 432,000 in 1893, proves that in 1918 there were about 537,840 Germans—538,000 in round numbers—in foreign countries who could have joined the German army.

On the other hand, the proportion of males from 17 to 45 is at least 21 per cent of a whole

population; consequently, the 538,000 Germans living in neighboring states must have furnished to the German army 112,980 men—about 113,000 in round numbers.

To sum up, the foregoing five reasons justify amply the number of 600,000 in excess of 13 million men at which General de Lacroix estimated the yield of the German mobilization.

8th Objection.—The number of births in Germany in 1901 was 2,032,000—that is, about 1 million of males. The Carlisle insurance tables state that in 20 years there will remain only 600,000 men out of this million. If those in the *reformés* class are deducted from this figure, it is therefore impossible that the German *moyen* (average) war contingent could have reached 700,000 men.

Answer.—This objection appears very strong, but in reality it only shows, on the part of those who make it, a complete misunderstanding of the nature of an insurance company, and of the conditions under which should be accepted the mortality of a country in estimating its man-power.

The Carlisle insurance computations show that in 1,000,000 of men only 600,000 sub-

sisted at the age of 20; this would seem to mean that the death-rate for the first 20 years is 40 per cent, but this is a much higher figure than that of the German death-rate at the age of 20, as we shall prove by a German authority of the most conclusive kind, quoted later.

We must be careful also to note that we cannot trust to tables of mortality drawn up for insurance to discuss questions of manpower, and for the following reason: To avoid risks to which they are exposed, insurance companies, in making their tables, take account of special considerations which have nothing at all to do with fitness for military service. To know how many youths of a generation can pass a physical examination, the only tables we need to consult are those of the general mortality of the country whose contingent is in question.

According to the French annual statistics for 1913 (2d part, page 168) there were in Germany, in 1901, 2,032,000 births—the females slightly more numerous than the males—therefore, in round numbers, 1,000,000 boys.

On the other hand, the general mortality in Germany from 1901 to 1910 for the male sex is shown by official figures on page 34 of the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*,

published by Putkammer & Mühlbrecht, Berlin, 1915.

Of 100,000 births—

At	1 year	there are	79,766	survivors	and	20,234	deaths
"	2 years	"	"	76,585	"	"	3,181
"	3	"	"	75,442	"	"	1,143
"	4	"	"	74,727	"	"	715
"	5	"	"	74,211	"	"	516
"	6	"	"	73,820	"	"	391
"	7	"	"	73,506	"	"	314
"	8	"	"	73,244	"	"	262
"	9	"	"	73,023	"	"	221
"	10	"	"	72,827	"	"	196
"	11	"	"	72,650	"	"	177
"	12	"	"	72,487	"	"	163
"	13	"	"	72,334	"	"	153
"	14	"	"	72,179	"	"	155
"	15	"	"	72,007	"	"	172

At the end of the—

16th year	there are	71,808	survivors	and	199	deaths
17th	"	"	"	71,573	"	"
18th	"	"	"	71,300	"	"
19th	"	"	"	70,989	"	"

As this official German report gives in the two first columns of the table ages and survivors, it is easy to deduce the number of deaths at each age, according to government figures.

Out of 100 boys born in Germany, at 19 years of age there were—

	29.011 per cent deaths
Leaving	70.989 “ “ survivors
<hr/>	
To be exact,	100.000 per cent

But to make a calculation with an immediate practical interest we should finally consider the death-rate at the end of the 16th year, as it is from boys of just 17 years of age that the annual German class is formed in war-time. Thus at the end of the 16th year out of 100 boys born in Germany there are—

	28.192 per cent deaths
	71.808 “ “ survivors
<hr/>	
Which gives just	100.000 per cent

These figures are the best procurable on German mortality.

Let us first examine the result with reference to the number of 754,000 men, which we found to be (see page 105) that of the theoretic military contingent of Germany in 1918. We assume that this class was composed of young men of 20, because according to the figures of the German report on which we based our cal-

culations, the class of 1910 was formed in a period of peace from young men of 20, and besides included all young Germans living abroad who in that year were theoretically able to return to Germany. Now, in 1901 there were in Germany about 1,000,000 male births. The mortality at the completion of the 19th year was 29.011 per cent; therefore, out of this total 290,011 died, and 709,989 survived. To this we should add the number of young Germans, sons of German subjects of the empire living in foreign European countries (see page 133).

This figure can be verified with sufficient accuracy. If the German war contingent was 700,000 in 1910—a round number which we reached (see page 103) through German reports when Germany had only 65 million inhabitants, it follows that 1,000 Germans yield about 10.76 men to the annual draft. On this basis the 113,000 Germans abroad, whose children are so situated geographically that they are able to feed the German army (see page 134), furnish to the annual contingent 1,215 men.

We know, therefore, that in 1918 the German examining boards had before them $709,989 + 1,215 = 711,204$ young Germans about 19

years old. From this we should deduct 5 per cent for those *reformés* who for reasons above indicated (page 127) probably do not exceed that rate. We must then deduct for those *reformés* 35,560 men, leaving certainly about 675,644—in round numbers, 676,000—boys 20 years old absolutely fit to make up Germany's war contingent for 1918. We reached (see page 105) the number of 754,000, which gives a difference of 78,000 men, but this difference can be to a great extent logically explained.

We see by the *Alldeutscher Atlas* that in 1893 there were of German subjects of the empire:

In America.....	2,842,744
“ Asia.....	2,366
“ Africa.....	3,877
“ Australia.....	43,861
Total.....	<hr/> 2,892,848

Out of this number, since 1895, a part of these German subjects have become naturalized citizens of the countries where they live. It is difficult to arrive at the exact number, but allowing that it amounts to about a third, say, 964,282 of our total, there remain 1,928,566. From 1893 to 1918, that is, for 25 years, this last figure has been augmented in proportion to the average increase in the German popu-

lation, which is annually 9.8 per 1,000 = say, 18,894 per year, and therefore for 25 years 472,350; consequently, our total in 1893 of 1,928,566, in 1918 becomes 2,400,000 in round numbers.

In addition, as we have shown (page 104), that 1,000 Germans furnish about 10.76 men to the annual German contingent, it follows that the 2,400,000 German subjects in America, Asia, Africa, and Australia could have yielded an annual contingent to the empire amounting to 25,824 men, or 26,000 in round numbers—if their children of military age could have reached Germany. We noted (page 102) that deferred service is permitted in Germany in favor of young Germans living abroad. It is nearly certain, therefore, that these 26,000 German youths, outside of Europe, must have been included in the figure of 238,650 men for deferred service of the year 1910 (see page 103) and consequently form part of our total of 754,000 which we reached for the contingent of 1918, starting from the figures of Germany's annual report for 1910.

We should then subtract these 26,000 young Germans living in America, Asia, Africa, and Australia from the number of 754,000 men,

as, the communication by sea with Germany being cut, they have certainly not been able to reach that country and contribute to the contingent of 1918. This figure 26,000 reduces by just so much the difference of 78,000 that we found between the number of 754,000 men and the estimate of 676,000 we made by means of the tables of mortality. This difference, therefore, is not more than 78,000 minus 26,000, or 52,000 men, which one must admit is a discrepancy, or a mistake if you choose to call it so, which is very slight for a figure like 754,000 and a calculation of this sort.

We must furthermore bear in mind that in reality if all the Germans overseas had been able to defer their mobilization orders this difference would probably even then be less than 52,000 men. As a matter of fact, I have estimated at one-third the Germans, subjects of the Empire in foreign countries, who within twenty-five years have been naturalized in their foreign residence without reckoning on the fact that according to Delbrück's law naturalized Germans can secretly preserve or resume their condition as subjects of the German Empire and as such become subject to German military service.

Let us again make use of the mortality tables to analyze, no longer in theory, but in practice, the military contingent of Germany in 1918, remembering that now it is made up of youths, not of 20 years of age, as in peace-times, but of boys completing their 16th year—that is, just 17.

The German death-rate being 28.192 per cent at the end of the 16th year, out of 1,000,000 boys born in 1901, 281,920 die at 17. The number of survivors in 1918 is, therefore, 718,080, and to this we must add 1,200 young Germans contributing to the annual contingent as subjects of the empire living in foreign European countries (see page 138).

$718,080 + 1,200$ make 719,280—720,000 in round numbers, who come up before the German examining boards in 1918. Deducting 5 per cent, say, 36,000, for those *reformés*, there remain in 1918 $720,000 - 36,000 = 684,000$ young Germans who are certainly capable of service in the various branches of the German army. This is within 16,000 of the figure of 700,000, which was our estimate for the German contingent, in round numbers. This difference is relatively insignificant, therefore a thorough scrutiny shows that my figures of 13,600,000 men for the entire mobilized Ger-

man army in June, 1918, and 700,000 in round numbers for the annual contingent of the same year, are by no means an exaggeration, but as close as possible to the truth.

One error alone in the preceding calculations consists in the estimation of the sum of the four military contingents of 1915-18 at 2,900,000 men (see page 109), while at the least in round numbers they come to 700,000, say, 2,800,000, for the four contingents.

The only effect of this mistake on the number of absolute losses of Germany, which we calculated in June, 1918, is that instead of having been for each of the four years of war at least 600,000 men annually, they have been 625,000.

But in the general discussion of German man-power it is well to keep this mistake in mind. No war can be managed without mistakes, and these are of two kinds, the helpful and the injurious. In order to be sure that we are not deceived in war-time, we must systematically try to make only helpful mistakes, that is, those which tend to overestimate the enemies' forces, and in this way we are led to make the most strenuous efforts, which lead to a more speedy victory. Therefore, if the minutest calculations show that 100,000 men

are necessary for an operation, it is best to allow for it 125,000, so as to get the advantage of the helpful mistake. That is why in discussing the German reserves it is more to the interest of the Entente to err on the side of estimating the German losses at 600,000 men a year, than to believe that they were 625,000. In a case like this the error is advantageous to the Allies, while a miscalculation in the opposite direction might lead to the worst consequences.

In conclusion, practical proofs can be added to the results of our calculations to make it certain that Germany is not yet in so much need of men as too many among the Allies believe.

The *Temps* of August 7th, 1916, quotes the following intercepted letter from a man in the 76th Landwehr, dated June 16th: "I am still at Kief," he says; "the people are so hostile to us that they would make an end of us if they could, but there are too many German and Austrian troops here, so they can do nothing. There are police posts everywhere."

We see by this letter that there were still many Germans in Russia, and in addition *Le Journal de Genève*—quoted by the *Temps* on August 30th, 1918—summed up various state-

ments made by travellers who had recently made some stay in Germany, as follows:

“Militarily Germany seems to us still very strong, and in no need of men. Even after the great Allied offensives, the large cities are full of men on leave.”

Would not this lead any fair-minded, unprejudiced person to see that mistakes existed and are still made among the Allies as to the numbers of the forces of Germany, and that it is to the great advantage of the Entente, in order to avert any surprise and win the war with speed and certainty, that these mistakes should be corrected?

In any case, these different statements lead to the following practical results:

1st. It was unreasonable, therefore extremely dangerous, for the Allies to believe that they could win the war only through the exhaustion of the German reserves, reduced by battles on the western front, a theory of Colonel Repington's which was shared by many Allies, who still hold this opinion. This way of thinking does not make success impossible, but it tends to prolong the war enormously, as has actually happened, for if Repington had been right the war would have been over long since.

2d. The Allies must be convinced that military action should not be limited to the west front, but that the value of the other war-fields, those of Italy and Salonika, should also be thoroughly understood. The far-reaching successful effects of the rapid advance of the Allied army in Serbia, though obtained with relatively small forces, are a striking proof of this.

3d. The Allies must be persuaded that, to bring victory quickly and with lighter burdens in men and money, it is absolutely necessary to have recourse not only to military strategy, but also to political strategy, which enables them to act even within the boundaries of Pan-germany in order for the common good to work upon the numerous weaknesses there to be found. That this view is correct is proved by the insurrection which has already taken place in Bohemia and is extending in all the Slav and Latin regions of Austria-Hungary, greatly facilitating the penetration of Allied troops into Central Europe.

IV.

In order that Allied public opinion may appreciate the immense importance of the complete success of the Entente operations in

the Balkans in October, 1918, and may grasp the absolute necessity of using this situation to the fullest extent without delay—a course calculated to hasten in a considerable degree the complete defeat of Germany—it is necessary to call to mind again what were approximately the probable mobilized forces of Pangermany at the beginning of August, 1918, the opening of the fifth year of war.

Germany alone could not make head against the Entente. She has only done so by the help of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whose armies were controlled from Berlin. The troops of these powers held central Europe, the Balkans, and southern Russia, thus assuring to Germany the food and material necessary to her war industries, and leaving her free to concentrate all her energies on the western front. To know nearly what total forces were probably at the disposal of the German General Staff, we must now scrutinize the strength of Pangermany, that is, the German Empire and its allies.

We have seen (page 109) that after four years of war the actual forces of Germany, mobilized on the basis of 20 per cent of the inhabitants, amounted to 11 millions of men.

This is in round numbers, deduction being made of actual definitive losses up to June 1st, 1918. We come to the conclusion (page 111) that these German war losses—taking into computation the annual number of recruits—amounted in four years to 2,400,000 men. This represents a diminution of 176 in 1,000 in proportion to the figure for the general mobilization of Germany, which we placed at 13,600,000 men. This valuation will bring us probably close to the truth, if used as a basis from which to estimate the military condition of Germany and her allies before the catastrophe of Bulgaria.

In 1914, the population of Austria-Hungary was about 50 millions, exclusive of foreigners, Bulgaria had 5 millions, and Turkey 20; but the Ottoman mobilization was not extended to Arabia, for the most part in rebellion, and the presence of British troops in Bagdad and Jerusalem hampers the action of the Constantinople authorities; also great numbers of Greeks and Armenians massacred by the Turks obviously could not be included in the figures of the Ottoman mobilization. For these reasons, and to keep well within the mark, we will place the mobilization list in Turkey at half the population, about 10 million men.

It is certain that Germany made as great demands on the man-power of her allies as those she accepted for herself. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the basis of mobilization in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey was the same as in Germany, viz.: 20 in 100 inhabitants, hence—

Austria-Hungary	would have mobilized 10 million men.
Bulgaria	would have mobilized 1 million men.
Turkey	would have mobilized 2 million men.

For these three countries the losses from the war must have been approximately those of Germany herself. Keeping the true proportion in mind, the Bulgars, up to August, 1918, were in much the same military condition; the Austrians have not fought so many battles, but they have lost many more prisoners, for the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs pressed into the Austrian armies gave themselves up by hundreds of thousands to the Russians and Serbians. Comparing the Turks with the Germans, fewer have been killed, but their inferior sanitary organization had led to a high death-rate from disease, which equalized the losses.

For these different reasons the number of mobilized effectives of Germany's allies can be reduced in the proportion of 176 to 1,000,

which represents the really definitive losses of the German army at the end of the fourth year.

Austria-Hungary...	10,000,000	—	1,760,000	=	8,240,000 men.
Bulgaria.....	1,000,000	—	176,000	=	824,000 men.
Turkey.....	2,000,000	—	352,000	=	<u>1,648,000 men.</u>
Total.....					
					10,712,000 men.

This gives the probable number of mobilized men at the disposal of Germany's allies, August 1st, 1918, including not only fighting men, but also those attached to all other branches of the war service, direct or indirect. We may allow that these together amount to 11 millions, which added to 11 millions already attributed to Germany gives a total of 22 millions of men marching under the orders of Berlin. We shall see later on that these 11 millions furnished by Germany's friends were not entirely a source of strength to the staff at Berlin, but through them Pangermany was vulnerable in many ways, from the beginning of the war indeed, if the Entente knew how to act so as to take advantage of it.

V.

The summary of the new sources of effectives on which Germany could freely draw, if the Bulgarian collapse had not taken place

goes to show (1) how the Allied successes in the Balkans, by bringing about the impotence of Turkey, made it impossible for Germany from that time on to deal successfully with the sources of Mussulman effectives; (2) the absolute necessity that the Allies should bring about such a peace that it should be entirely impossible for Germany to deal with the Russian masses, sources of considerable numbers of effectives, which are still in a great degree subject to the influence of German recruiting agents.

The ever-increasing number of Americans landing in France has forced the Teutons to modify their plans. We see that they have been forced to abandon the hope of a rapid advance on Paris and the Channel coasts, and thence have been driven to take up the defensive tactics on the western front, which has become a much more emphatic retreat since the Bulgarian disaster has begun to make its favorable results felt. But if this event had not taken place Berlin, fertile in resources, would have looked to the east for means to parry the blow dealt by the United States. What these means were we may possibly discover.

Among the many consequences of the military disintegration of Russia is the fact that Germany has been brought into direct contact with new recruiting-grounds in Europe and Asia, from which she would have drawn as largely and quickly as possible, hence the Allies would have had to face a new and great danger.

Let us first inquire who are the people from among whom Germany could have recruited her armies, directly or through the help of Turkey, if Central Pangermany had continued to exist in its entirety. (See map, p. 154.)

In the Christian population of Russia men or allies would be most readily drawn from—

1. Germans, Russian subjects: about.....	2,400,000
2. Finns, about.....	3,100,000
3. Ukrainians, about.....	30,000,000

Total.....	35,500,000
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Among the Moslem populations in the European and Asiatic provinces of Russia an intense Turkish propaganda was going on, nominally based on the idea of the solidarity of the Turanian race, but really emanating from Berlin by way of Constantinople; therefore Germany could have drawn men from—

1. The Tartars, about.....	5,000,000
2. The Caucasians, about.....	1,600,000
3. The Bashkirs, about.....	1,800,000

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4. The Kirghiz, about.....	6,000,000
5. The Turkomans, about.....	400,000
6. Turks and other Moslem peoples.....	3,000,000
Total.....	17,800,000

In Asia, beyond the Russian frontier, Germany could have secured help from—

1. Persian Mussulmans, about.....	9,000,000
2. Afghan Mussulmans, about.....	5,000,000
3. Northern Indian Mussulmans, about..	66,000,000
4. Chinese Mussulmans, about.....	30,000,000
Total.....	110,000,000

There may be, then, $35 + 18 + 110$, say 163 millions of men, in round numbers, among whom—owing to the suppression of the Russian front—Germany could have found means of various kinds to assist her in carrying on the war.

The Germans certainly could not have hoped to draw effectives from such populations in proportion to their size; also the military qualities of these people vary considerably, and the use that could be made of soldiers thus recruited would depend much on geographical situation.

For instance, Persians as a rule do not make good soldiers, but in Aserbedjan there are about 400,000 men from whom might be formed a first-rate army. Afghans are all warlike, and German influence was so strong among



them that the Emir recently sent an ambassador to Berlin, in sign of friendship. In northern India the Moslems have hitherto been loyal to England, but the Pan-Islam agitation as well as the attitude of their Afghan neighbors might have inclined them in a German direction; also German influence has been at work for years among the 30 millions of Chinese Mussulmans, with the view of counterbalancing the part of China which leans toward the Entente. In central Asia there are the Bashkirs, Turkomans, Kirghiz, and Tartars, who could furnish excellent troops, well-placed geographically to act against the Trans-Siberian (see map), as their provinces border on it for nearly its whole length.

For its operations in Europe the Berlin General Staff could have found soldiers:

1st. Among the 30 millions of Ukrainians—this was already begun—and a good many Ukrainian officers are still being instructed in Germany.

2d. Among the 3 millions of Finns, the majority of whom are strongly Germanophile, and above all among the $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions of Germans, subjects of the former Russian Empire, but as Pangermanist as the Germans of Berlin themselves.

We thus see how the Bolshevik treachery had opened fresh sources of supplies for Prussian armies, and these recruits would have helped Germany to consolidate her new possessions in eastern Europe and Asia. As we have stated above, Germany's annual loss in men—in proportion to her first mobilization—was about 600,000, and if she could have drawn on all the sources of effectives pointed out above she could have made up her losses at least in part, thus resolving the problem of effectives once more in her own favor and finding a way to offset the American forces. But the strategic success of the Allies in the Balkans by the taking of Nish and of the Danube put it almost entirely out of the power of Turkey to be a dangerous source of new Mussulman effectives. It only remains to cut off Germany from Russia by creating a Poland and a Bohemia so strongly organized that in the future Germany can no longer have any dealings with Russian troops.

VI.

Let us now point out how the Allied victory in the Balkans, if we know how to develop it quickly in the direction of Vienna-Prague-Ber-

lin, will solve the problem of effectives definitely and peremptorily in favor of the Allies.

The positions heretofore established will allow us now to answer this all-important question: Would the Entente have been—even with the help of American troops to the greatest extent we can imagine in 1919—certain to have on the European battle-field forces superior to those of the Central Powers if she had been content to fight on the western front? The greater part of the Allies have believed this. Their conviction has received powerful confirmation in the eyes of Americans by the statements of General Peyton C. March, chief of the United States General Staff, before the House Committee on Military Affairs, in Washington. He said: "If you put 80 divisions of Americans in France of approximately 45,000 men to a division, you will give marked superiority in rifle-power, and we should be able to bring the war to a successful conclusion in 1919."

The *New York Times*, as late as August 30th, 1918, published the following:

"The efforts of the Allied Powers and the United States," General March said, "would be confined to actual fighting on the western

front, where the war would be won or lost, without taking into consideration conditions in Russia."

Let us see if it was true, as many of us believed, that the American assistance on the western front certainly assured man-power and complete victory to the Entente, without the need to consider seriously the situation, not of Russia only, but of the whole of Europe behind the western front and especially in the Balkans.

In order to reach as close an approximation to the truth as possible with the aid of successive deductions, we will proceed as follows:

We will first estimate at the highest allowable figure the mobilized forces of the Entente. In order to do so we will assume that the European Allies who were still in control of their own territory, that is, Great Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, and Greece, had made as stupendous efforts as Germany and her allies, and had mobilized on a basis of 20 per cent of their population. We will allow also that in four years the Allies have suffered losses proportionally identical with those of the Germans. We will take the figures for mobilization obtained from the European Allies, on the basis of 20 per cent of their population, and reduce them by 176 in 1,000, a figure

which, as we have seen above (page 148), represents probably the really definitive losses of the German army after four years of war. This figure being laid down after compensation of war losses by the annual military contingents of Germany, the amount of the Allies' loss that we shall reach will be for them also the sum of losses taken, not from their population, but from their armies alone, these latter having been fed as in the case of the German army during the last four years, by four annual levies, which have filled up to a considerable extent gaps made by the war.

By subtracting the actual definitive losses of each Allied state from the amount of its first mobilization—which we will suppose at the maximum, we reach the greatest possible number of Allied soldiers which would have been ready to march at the opening of the fifth year of war.

To make sure of these figures we will not count colonial contingents of the European Allies, though they have been of great value.

1st. Because there was no conscription in Ireland, in spite of the fact that her population (4,400,000) is included in that of Great Britain, on which our estimates of the total British mobilization are based.

2d. Both France and England were obliged to maintain large forces in their colonies—this is especially true of India—and the consequences of these two drawbacks diminish in a striking degree the effective assistance rendered by Anglo-French colonials in the European war-field.

As mobilization in the United States is not based on population, to the total obtained of the Allied European forces mobilized at the threshold of the fifth year of war we must add 4 millions of Americans as the maximum number which the United States is pledged to place in Europe by the end of 1919. On account of the difficulties of marine transport and food-supply, the presence in France in August, 1918, of 1,500,000 American soldiers was a remarkable feat, but it will be a new world's wonder if the United States by July, 1919, succeeds in transporting and victualling in Europe 4 millions of men, according to promise. If, then, we include in our present calculations 4 millions of American soldiers who cannot land in Europe before July, 1919, and proceed as we have done in the case of the European Allies, we are certain to put at the highest possible figure the man-power which the Allies would have been able to

oppose to the 22 millions of mobilized troops of the Central Powers; which figure we fixed as the probable one in August, 1918, and reached by the foregoing methods (page 150). Reckoning in the same way, we obtain the following table:

Population of Entente countries	Supposed mobilization at 20 per cent	Supposed losses, 176 in 1,000, to be deducted from first mobilization	Total man-power of Allies in the fifth year of the war
Great Britain..46	9,200,000 —	1,619,200 =	7,580,800
France.....40	8,000,000 —	1,408,000 =	6,592,000
Italy.....36	7,200,000 —	1,267,200 =	5,932,800
Portugal..... 6	1,200,000 —	211,200 =	988,800
Greece..... 4	800,000 —	140,800 =	659,200
Americans.....	4,000,000
			<u>25,753,600</u>

If this were correct, in 1919 the Allies would have in round numbers 26 millions of mobilized men against 22 millions of the Central Empires. Hence, under the most favorable circumstances, the Allies as a whole could have only 4 million more men altogether than the Central Powers. That is to say, a number equal to 118 Allied mobilized against 100 in the mobilized armies directed from Berlin. It is already plain that this Allied advantage in men of 18 per 100 was too small to be held as

an absolute guaranty of victory by weight of numbers alone. But we will now show that this numerical superiority of the Allies did not really exist, for the following reasons:

1st reason. It is well known that in July, 1918, there were many more prisoners of the European Allies in Germany than there were Teuton prisoners in Allied hands. This larger amount of Allied prisoners leads naturally to the supposition that the losses on our side have probably been proportionally greater during four years of war than those of the Central Powers. If this is so, it follows that the Allies have in comparison with the Teutons an excess of losses which does not show in our table, but which in fact diminished by just so much the man-power of the Entente.

2d reason. The European Allies certainly have not mobilized their population on a 20-per-cent basis. Neither Portugal nor Greece could go above 10 per cent, and even this has not been certainly reached.

3d reason. Even if Great Britain, France, and Italy, like the Central Powers, mobilized at the ratio of 20 per cent of their population, the Entente countries could not draw from their enlistments an amount of fighting men proportionally equal to that of Germany.

This was so because the scarcity of labor in Allied countries has driven them to use in their munition factories a much larger proportion of their enrolled men than was the case in the Central Empires. The Germans and their allies had at least 4 millions of prisoners and 50 millions of Allied subjects held as slaves, from whom they drew free labor for their war factories, and which left them at liberty to send to the firing-line a proportion of their enrolled men undoubtedly greater than was possible to the great Allied states.

These three reasons ought to convince us that the advantage of 18 per cent in manpower which our table leads us to think we possessed over the enemy was not founded on fact. Even if we imagine the 4 millions of American soldiers were already landed in Europe, the most favorable estimates could not assure us that during the fifth year of the war the Entente could have counted on manpower in excess of that of the Central Empires, if Central Pangermany had been able to hold out. But the Bulgarian defeat brought about by its consequences the exclusion of Turkey and of Austria-Hungary. The problem of effectives was then at once completely solved. At last directing their attacks on the weak ele-

ments of the effectives marching under the orders of Berlin, the Allies eliminated them from the conflict and on this head secured a crushing superiority of numbers. Such is one of the enormous profits that the Entente derives from the Balkan operations.

VII.

The great Allied successes in the Balkans, beginning in October, 1918, show that if the decisive importance of the Danube front and of political strategy had been understood in 1915 the war might have been ended long since by a complete victory.

To convince ourselves of this let us consider first the teachings of the past.

First example. Austro-Germany went into the struggle with 68 + 50, that is, 118 millions of inhabitants, against a coalition comprising 273 millions of people: Russia 182 millions of inhabitants, England 46 millions, France 40, Serbia 5. The Berlin General Staff saw at once that to counterbalance such a disproportion in numbers the help of Bulgaria and Turkey would be needful. This determination to solve the man-power problem in Germany's favor was one of the reasons for the

destruction of Serbia at the end of 1915, for it was Serbia which blocked Germany's road to the sources of eastern man-power in Germanophile countries.

I pointed out the particular object of this operation at the time it was begun, in an article which appeared October 23d, 1915, in the *Paris Illustration*, where I said:

"Let us now suppose the intervention of the Franco-English Allies via Salonika having failed, that the Germans can reap the greatest possible advantage from direct and permanent communications with Turkey. They can thus obtain a considerable number of fresh effectives. . . . In fact, this Turco-German junction, besides implying the destruction of 350,000 fine Serbian soldiers—who, fighting their own battle at the same time gave valuable help to the general cause of the Allies by killing many Austro-Boches—would produce direct contact with troops of Bulgaria and Turkey and the large recruiting-grounds of Turkey-in-Asia and Persia. In this way at least a million and a half of fresh soldiers, armed or not—but whom the Turks are already recruiting and training as far as possible—would be at once at the service of the Kaiser. *Can there be any doubt that, having*

solved the vital effective problem in his own favor, he would hesitate to make use of these new men on the west front, perhaps before Russia is again able to resume a strong offensive along her entire line?"

The weakening followed by the disintegration of Russia, begun several months after I wrote these lines (October, 1915), gave Germany the chance to fill up her western lines with levies of troops drawn from the Russian front and from Austria-Hungary and left her Turkish and Bulgarian effectives for her eastern operations. But it cannot be denied that when Serbia was crushed it decided the man-power question in Germany's favor. This operation gave three results to Berlin:

1st. It has provided the Central Powers up to now with about 3 millions of new mobilized Turks and Bulgars, equal to twice the number I estimated in October, 1915.

2d. It has deprived the Entente of the support of 350,000 brave Serbian soldiers.

3d. It placed Greece—with about 400,000 possible mobilized men, and Roumania with about 700,000 who might be enrolled, in a bad strategic position in case they wished to intervene later, as events have abundantly proved.

It was certainly thanks to these results that Germany was able to hold out until the Bulgarian collapse.

Second example. If the Entente had grasped earlier than Germany the vital importance of the Danube front, not only would she have prevented the Austro-Germans from securing the above advantages, but the Allies would have settled the great question of man-power in their own favor even more decisively than Germany settled it through the destruction of Serbia.

To understand this, let us suppose that in the first half of the year 1915, instead of sending 150,000 men to capture the Dardanelles under conditions which forbade success, the Entente had sent them to Belgrade on the Danube. This expedition was materially perfectly possible. The Salonika-Belgrade Railroad was not at all a wretched little mountain line, as Colonel Repington wrongly makes out in the *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1918. In 1915, it was a good single-track road, with double-track passing points about every 20 kilometres; it wanted rolling-stock, but this could readily have been supplied. If necessary, the double track could have been extended for nearly the whole length of the line; the sec-

tions where two tracks could not have been laid were relatively short and consequently could not have made the main line impracticable. Besides, in point of fact, the Germans made use of much of this railroad from north to south to organize the whole German-Bulgar front in Macedonia, a proof, if any were needed, that the Allies could have made it equally useful from south to north to transport an army to the Danube. If they had sent only 150,000 Franco-English men they would have brought about the following consequences:

1st. The appearance at Belgrade of these 150,000 Franco-English soldiers would have been a tangible proof to all Greeks, Serbians, Roumanians, Slavs, and Latins of Austria-Hungary, amounting to 44 millions of anti-German people, that France and England understood that the true aim of the war declared by Germany was the conquest of central Europe—the key of the world—and that the Allies realized that the best way to win the war was to put that key in their pocket.

2d. The appearance on the Danube of Anglo-French troops would have reassured the Balkan Allies of the Entente and the numerous insurrectionist groups in Austria-

Hungary; they would have seen in it a pledge that the great Western Powers would employ all material necessary for their liberation.

3d. Under these circumstances Greece and Roumania unquestionably would have joined the Allies without further delay. In fact, during the first half of 1915 popular feeling in Greece, and especially in Roumania, set so strongly toward the Entente that it would have been easy to overcome the opposition of King Constantine at Athens and the temporizing policy of M. Bratiano at Bucharest.

4th. These various psychological arguments should convince us that even so small a force as 150,000 Franco-English on the Danube would have made a tie strong enough to bind together the many elements favorable to the Allies in central Europe and the Balkans.

5th. If 150,000 Franco-Britains had been sent to the Balkans it would have had for practical effect the creation of an Entente army on the Danube and in the Balkans, made up as follows:

150,000	Franco-English.
350,000	Serbians.
400,000	Greeks.
700,000	Roumanians.

Say, 1,600,000 men.

6th. This army would have sufficed, on account of the nature of the country and the ease with which it can be defended, to form an insurmountable barrier stretching from Montenegro on the Adriatic to the mouth of the Danube on the Black Sea.

7th. The road to the east would have been closed to Austria-Germany by this barrier.

8th. South of this barrier, Bulgaria, denuded of munitions by the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, would have been helpless for the remainder of the war.

9th. Again, south of this barrier, Turkey, also lacking armament, and for the same reason, at the end of a very few weeks would have been forced not only to cease fighting the Allies, but to reopen the straits to them of her own accord.

To the north of this barrier, helped, cheered, and emboldened by the presence of a strong Allied force on the Danube, the 28 millions of Slavs and Latins, unwilling subjects of the Hapsburgs, who were restless from the beginning of the conflict, would have risen as one man, and the greater number, pressed into the Austro-Hungarian army, would have deserted to the army of the Danube, so that the Entente would have found in Austria-Hungary

itself an unlimited supply of good soldiers. All this certainly would have happened, for under much less favorable circumstances Slav soldiers, subjects of Austria, deserted in Serbia and Russia by hundreds of thousands and took service against the Central Empires. In the summer of 1916 the Czecho-Slovaks, who were so much admired by the Allies for their bravery and intelligence in Siberia were ex-Austro-Hungarian soldiers who surrendered to the Russians and afterward enlisted in the armies of the Czar to fight the Austro-Germans.

From the special point of view of the manpower question, the presence of only 150,000 Franco-English soldiers would have led to the following results:

1st. Three millions of Turkish and Bulgarian mobilized men would have been kept out of the Austro-Hungarian army.

2d. The Entente would have gained 1,450,000 Balkan soldiers, well placed geographically.

3d. The Entente was so placed as to excite under the best possible conditions the revolt of 28 millions of Slavs and Latins in Austria-Hungary, and this solution of the manpower problem would have had decisive influence



in favor of the Allies. In 1915, the Russians were still in the Carpathians, in eastern Austria; the breakdown of Austria-Hungary resulting from insurrection of its oppressed peoples would have encircled Germany in a geographical sense, and the latter, cut off from her eastern food-supply by the Allied barrier on the Danube, would have been forced at the end of a few months to surrender unconditionally.

These wonderful results would have been the logical effect produced if only 150,000 Franco-English soldiers had been sent to the Danube.

We can thus demonstrate the overwhelming superiority which political strategy sometimes possesses over that which is simply military. The sending of 150,000 men to a point, technically well chosen, may cause these men to influence the fate of a battle much more than their number would allow, but the use of political strategy can add extraordinarily to this effect. This is proved when we see by the preceding explanations that only 150,000 Franco-British sent to the Danube would have been worth millions of men to the Allies. Why should this be? Because Belgrade was just the one exact spot in Europe where the

Allies could have utilized all the factors in the political strategy of the situation as it was in 1915. The factor of geography, that is, a barrier region easy to organize and to defend between the Adriatic and the Black Sea—the ethnological factor, meaning the Slav and Latin anti-German groups of central Europe. The economic factor, which meant to cut off Austria-Germany from the granaries of the east, the psychological factor, that is, the hatred of the oppressed populations of central Europe for the German-Magyars. The results from these factors, added one to another, produce the wonderful force of political strategy.

However this may be, these two instances, that of the supplementary man-power gained by Germany through the ruin of Serbia, and that of the Entente, which failed to understand the tremendous opportunity given by the Danube front to solve once and for all, and advantageously, the effective problem, give proof, supported by facts, that man-power and even decisive victory can be gained through political strategy with absolute certainty.

The events in the Balkans since October, 1918, are a brilliant confirmation of this view,

for in spite of all the faults committed in this region for four years, the victory of the Allies over Bulgaria in less than a month made its consequences felt to the very heart of Germany. Why is this so? Because at last the Allies comprehended that it was necessary to attack on the weak fronts, and above all to shut out of the fighting the troops of Pangermany mobilized in spite of themselves by Germany. It is the view which I have supported for a very long time, notably in the *Atlantic Monthly*.

We are now about to grasp the basic reason of the great victories which the Allies have won at the end of 1918.

We estimated at about 22 millions (page 150) the mobilized forces of Pangermany at the outset of the fifth year of war. This figure represented not only the elements of German strength, but it contained also large elements of weakness in the armies of Pangermany. It is just these weaknesses which gave a great opportunity to the Allies, for in fact this amount of 22 millions of soldiers included a considerable proportion of Latins, Slavs, and Semitic soldiers forced into the service and who hate Germans, Magyars, and Turks with a deadly hatred.

Let us try to find what proportion of anti-

Germans were enrolled in German armies against their will, according to the figures for 1914.

The following table will show:

Total population	Pro-German elements	Anti-German elements
millions	millions	millions
Germany.....68	Germans.....61	Poles, Danes, Alsace-Lor- raines..... 7
Austria- Hungary....50	Germans.....12 Magyars.....10	Slavs and Lat- ins.....28
Turkey.....10	Turks..... 6	Semites..... 4
Total 128	89	39

Reckoning the Turks at only half their population for reasons given above (see page 148), the proportion of the anti-Germans as against the pro-Germans, included in the mobilization ordered from Berlin, is as 39 to 89. That is, among the 22 millions of soldiers in Pangermany, nearly 7 millions—6,700,000, to be exact—were determined anti-Pangermanists. Consequently, even if according to the strict provisions of the recent Austro-German alliance the Slav and Latin soldiers were already distributed among the German troops, the Pangerman armies com-

prised at this moment three men out of ten who served under constraint for a cause which they detested, for they knew well that the permanent triumph of Pangermany would have riveted their chains.

Until the recent offensive of October in the Balkans, the Allies had drawn no advantage from this situation, which was so favorable to them, for two reasons. *First*, they had failed for too long to see the enormous importance of the ethnographical character of this war. It is only at the end of the fourth year of the struggle that we are beginning to understand the value of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav populations, who with the Poles and the Roumanians form a group of nearly 60 millions of anti-Germans inhabiting central Europe. *Secondly*, the Allies pursued a purely military strategy, of which the effects were concentrated on the western front, while the Germans employed political strategy, which placed infinite resources at their disposal, allowing them to dissipate the adverse forces by other methods than those simply military, but which in certain cases are more efficacious than the latter in arriving at victory. The results obtained by the Germans by the help of political strategy have been striking and in-

disputable. It was thanks to political strategy and not by force that the Germans brought about the military downfall of Russia. It was their pacifist propaganda which permitted them to cause the surrender of the Italian divisions defending Caporetto, and thus to take possession of mountain regions considered impregnable to military attacks. If the Germans were in the Allies' place, is it possible to believe that they would fail for four years to play the trump-card in their hand, represented by 7 millions of anti-German populations of Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians of central Europe?

Among the Allies many people have long thought it was quite natural that the Germans should carry on intrigues in Ireland, in Morocco, in China, in India, in Afghanistan, etc., but held that it was impossible to act on the Slav and Latin soldiers incorporated against their will in the armies of Pangermany. Their great argument consisted in saying: "These soldiers are commanded by Germans and Magyars, and therefore they can do nothing." In the first place, those of the Allies who reasoned in this way did not know the peoples of central Europe. In addition, have the Allies ever tried the effect of political strategy in those

countries during the first four years of the war? Never. On the contrary, for a very long time the policy of the war was directed by the Allies so as really to discourage all action in their favor on the part of Slav and Latin soldiers mobilized unwillingly by Germany and her allies. These Slav and Latin soldiers, nevertheless, did of their own accord all that was possible to them. At the outbreak of war, as has been mentioned above, hundreds of thousands of soldiers included in the Austro-Hungarian armies gave themselves up to the Russians and Serbians. In May, 1917, the authorized representatives of the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs declared in open parliament at Vienna, in the plainest manner, in favor of the Entente and against Pangermany. Could they do more? And how were they answered? In November, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George under pressure from the British pacifists, who thought to shorten the war by eliminating from the Allied peace-programme the solution of the problem, most vital of all, that of central Europe, made an address in which he declared himself a partisan of the maintenance of Austria-Hungary. The text of this speech was widely reproduced in Austria-Hungary by the government of

Vienna, in order that its Slav and Latin subjects should cease to count on the Entente, since the latter was no longer interested in their fate. This propaganda produced among the Slavs and Latins of central Europe a very natural period of discouragement. Under these conditions, how could they be expected to revolt efficaciously against their oppressors?

Since this, however, events have immensely developed. The Allies have realized at last that a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, if it was not a terrible piece of trickery, would be a chimera. The congress of oppressed nationalities which met at Rome in April, 1918, sealed the alliance of Italians and Jugo-Slavs. Lansing's note came near to approbation of the hopes of the nationalities of central Europe, as did also an analogous note of the War Council at Versailles, which at last turned the policy of the Entente in the right direction, bringing the political aims of the war into harmony with the democratic principles that she has invoked as justification for her military action.

At last the offensive against Bulgaria, after having been carefully prepared by General Franchet d'Esperey and General Henrys, who rendered immense services, was developed in

October, 1918, into a complete success. The results already assure to the Entente complete victory on the sole condition that it does not lose in negotiations the essential fruits of the strategic-political manoeuvre which has just taken place in central Europe. But the explanations just made allow us to be convinced that these results could have been gained much more easily and with still more decisive consequences at the beginning of 1915 if the fatal theory of the principal front had not prevented for four years the realization that the front of the Danube-Middle Europe Allies is the decisive one.

CHAPTER IV.

WHY THE ALLIES OF GERMANY HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS TO THEIR INTEREST TO ACT WITH HER.

- I. Why Turkey went with Germany.
- II. The advantages which the Bulgarians thought to gain by siding with Berlin.
- III. Reasons for which Austria-Hungary is unavoidably an indispensable base for Pangerman imperialism.
- IV. The five centres of imperialism must be destroyed.

Many of the disappointments suffered by the Allies arise from the fact that they have not completely realized the political aspects of the war in its European extent. The result is that after four years of war large numbers in the Entente, seeing only Germany as personified by her Kaiser, look upon her allies as participants certainly in the world conflict, but as partners of quite secondary importance, as relatively negligible quantities, and even sometimes as states worthy of a sort of compassion on account of the crafty violence which they endured at the hands of Germany to force them to follow her into the war. Many among the Allies are really convinced

that Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary have bent against their will under the yoke which circumstances allow Berlin to impose upon them.

These two opinions are not correct. In the first place, these three countries have given help to Germany which has been most valuable to her for the conduct of the war, and, secondly, they have done this with good-will, because these three states have believed that it was to their interest to take this course.

Too much importance cannot be attached to these facts. But to grasp the interest which has led Germany's allies to throw in their lot with hers, it is necessary to go outside of ourselves, or, according to the forcible expression of my teacher, Albert Sorel, "we must get into the enemy's skin," that is to say, judge the interests of the governments of Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople, not with the ideas of people fighting for justice and democracy, but from the point of view of the governmental aims of the Austrians, Bulgars, or Turks, who have been all aristocratic or imperialist or both. It is therefore only from the adversary's standpoint that we can see the advantage he seeks, and understand clearly why Constantinople, Sofia, and Vienna

have for four years been in close alliance with Berlin.

I.

The assistance given by the Turks to Germany has been much more valuable than is generally supposed. From the Ottoman Empire, the Germans have drawn foodstuffs, hides, fats, and minerals which aid them considerably in keeping up the war. The co-operation of the government of Constantinople has placed at the disposal of the Berlin General Staff about 2 million men, of whom many have been employed to cultivate the soil in Asia Minor, while the rest, fighting, have contributed strongly to the accomplishment of the Pangerman plan in the Balkans and the overthrow of Russia. Besides this, the close accord of the Commander of the Faithful with the Kaiser has allowed the latter to profit by the Pan-Islam agitation, which has been a hindrance to the Allies in Africa and India, and was destined to injure them still more in those regions, as well as in the Caucasus, southern Russia, Persia, central Asia, Afghanistan, and China, if the brilliant victories of the Allies in the Balkans had not come to render Turkey powerless.

The close solidarity of the Turkish and German Empires was caused for the clearest and strongest of reasons.

Under the Sultan Abdul-Hamid the interior situation of the Ottoman Empire had become so intolerable for all its subjects that, in 1908, the Young Turk revolution took place, based ostensibly on liberal principles, and was enthusiastically supported by the Christian populations. For some months all Europe believed that the Ottoman Empire would at last enter on the path of regeneration, but this illusion was short-lived. From the beginning the Young Turks had seized [on the revolutionary movement, and soon showed themselves to be inordinately vain, incapable of any reforms, and such harsh oppressors of the Christians that Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, in spite of the mutual distrust arising from their rival ambitions, united to rescue their coreligionists, the Ottoman Christians of Macedonia, from the Young Turkish yoke.

These events led to the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which left the Ottoman Empire in Europe deprived of all but a small territory to the northwest of Constantinople. This disaster showed in a still clearer light the profound incapacity of the Young Turks, so that

it was widely believed that the Turkish Empire would shortly crumble as a result of its internal disintegration. This state of things might have been predicted for some time, and particularly since 1910, and perhaps for this reason Sir Edward Grey, in 1912-13, as Prince Lichnowsky's memoirs assert, entered into secret negotiations with Germany for the division of Turkey in Asia among the Great Powers. According to the principles of agreement laid down on this subject, Germany obtained the lion's share as sphere of influence, that is, all Mesopotamia as far as Bassorah, the largest and richest district of Turkey in Asia, which is crossed by the Hamburg-Persian Gulf Line, and which from about 1895 had been ardently coveted by the government of Berlin. To the great surprise of Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador in London, if this treaty was negotiated, it was not definitely concluded, that is, signed by the German Government. On learning this, many readers of the Lichnowsky memoirs asked themselves why Germany did not ratify this treaty, which was so advantageous to her, giving her, as it did, the long-desired country of Mesopotamia. Events since this war began throw light on the reasons for which

Germany decided not to ratify the treaty arranged at London by her ambassador, and show also why Turkey threw herself with all her force into the war against the Allies.

At the end of 1913 and the beginning of 1914 the Young Turks found themselves situated as follows: Having banished or hanged most of their political enemies, the Old Turks, among whom were the adherents of a good understanding with the Western Powers, the Young Turks just before the war were undoubtedly sole masters of Turkey, and all the more because the government of Constantinople was absolutist and made up of very few persons, all leaders of the Young Turk party: Enver Pacha, Talaat Bey, Djavid Bey, General Djemal Pacha, Doctor Nazim, etc. As for the Sultan, Mahomet V, the poor man was so debilitated by the long captivity inflicted on him by the suspicious Abdul-Hamid that he had lost all will-power, had absolutely no influence, and was a mere puppet in the hands of the Young Turk pro-consuls. The latter held the reins of power, but they were confronted by insurmountable difficulties. Their financial embarrassments were enormous and nearly impossible to overcome. The Young Turks were detested by all the

non-Turkish populations of the empire, whom they had duped, and they were also deeply humiliated by the tremendous defeat which Turkey had suffered under their rule at the hands of the Balkan States. Lastly, the Young Turks were much irritated against Russia, England, and France, for these countries had come to see that there was nothing to be made of the Young Turks, and had shown in 1912-13 sympathy with the Balkan peoples.

These circumstances taken together brought about a material and psychological situation particularly favorable to William II, when he acted so as to decide the Turks to join with him in the struggle for which he was preparing.

Profiting by the above-mentioned state of affairs, it is most probable that at the beginning of 1914 the German Emperor should have spoken as follows to the Young Turks, especially to Talaat Bey, and even more to Enver Pacha—the most ambitious and Germanophile of all the Turks, who is known to have made a mysterious journey into Germany a few months before the war:


The Kaiser probably said:

“England wishes to break up the Ottoman Empire; here are the notes of the treaty on this subject, drawn up by Sir Edward Grey and

Prince Lichnowsky in London. I let the English go on, so that I could fathom their whole intention, but I refused to sign the treaty they offered me, because I am a sincere friend of the Ottoman Empire. A great plan is in preparation, which will put an end to all your troubles. In a few months Germany will declare war on her enemies, who are yours also. Let Turkey join us with all her might in this conflict, and not only will I oppose the disruption of your empire, but I will promise you the following advantages:

“At the present moment, the Young Turk party can scarcely maintain itself in the Ottoman Empire, which consists now of only 20 million inhabitants since the disastrous Balkan War. Confronted with 2 million Levantines and Jews, with 8 millions of Arabs, of whom a part hate you, with 2 millions of Greeks, and 2 of Armenians—your irreconcilable enemies—you have only 6 millions of Turks in your own empire, and are therefore a minority faced by numerous and insurmountable difficulties. [See the annexed map, which gives a clear view of the great nationalities in Turkey.] Well! come into the war with me and the situation will be radically transformed.

“Aided by the struggle, you can eliminate



THE NATIONALITIES IN TURKEY

the Armenians, Greeks, and those of the Arabs who are in your way. This 'ethnographical rearrangement' of Turkey will enable you later to dominate your non-Turkish populations without difficulty. Enriched by the war, Germany will advance the sums necessary to develop the enormous economic resources latent in your country, and will also furnish engineers and technicians. In order to increase the number of Moslems in the enlarged Turkish Empire, victorious Germany will also restore or acquire the Crimea, the Turkish parts of the Caucasus, Persia, and Egypt, which will extend your influence strongly over all Mussulman Africa. One of Germany's objects in this war is to destroy Russia, the age-long enemy of the Turkish Empire. Following the overthrow of the empire of the Czars, Moslem states will be set up in the Caucasus and in central Asia, and these states will be guided from Constantinople, owing to the solidarity of the Turanian races. When all those who would profit by this plan have well understood its value it will establish good and permanent relations between you, the Bulgarians, and the Magyars, who will form the geographical basis of your direct understanding with Germany.

“When this programme is carried out it will be as of old and even more; the power of the Commander of the Faithful will be exerted not only religiously, as in former days, but politically as well. It will extend over a great part of the world, reaching from South Africa to the heart of China.”

For any one who knows the imperialist tendencies of the Young Turks and their profound hatred for the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Arabs, such words from the German Emperor early in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire was tottering to its fall, must have been welcomed with pleasure and even enthusiasm by the Young Turk leaders, who knew that not only Turkey but they themselves were on the verge of ruin.

Most of these men had long held Germanophile opinions, and it is easy to see the motives which led the Young Turks and the empire which was entirely in their hands to take sides with Germany in the approaching war.

But the war has lasted too long for an empire in the condition of the Turkish Empire. Oriental indolence has been irritated at the length of the work which the Germans have imposed upon it. Finally, the defeat of Bul-

garia and the immediate seizure of the Danube by the Allies have cut off Turkey from Germany strategically, thus compelling its complete surrender.


II.

The attitude of the Entente toward Bulgaria has been for a long time wanting in the clearness which alone makes it possible to act with the decision needed to win a victory. After four years of war there were still Allies with Bulgarophile tendencies, and if that was so it was because in the Entente, with regard to Bulgaria, as also on other subjects, people lived on old ideas, which were well enough in their day, but were now out of date.

If the aspirations of the Bulgarian authorities since 1907, if the violent hatreds of the entire people, from the Treaty of Bucharest to the 10th of August, 1913, had been realized from the beginning of the war, the Allies would have known that on the first opportunity the Bulgars would throw in their lot with Berlin.

I cannot be suspected of partiality when I speak of Bulgaria, for I have visited that country often in the last twenty-five years, have been her devoted friend, and labored for a good understanding between her, Serbia,

and Roumania up to June, 1913, that is, until the Bulgars treacherously attacked their Greek and Serbian allies. This inexcusable aggression put an end to my sympathy, and my estimate of the Bulgars was definitely fixed when at Sofia in March, 1914, I became possessed of an official Bulgarian document which revealed to the fullest extent the imperialist aims which I had not before suspected. This document consists of the Bulgarian book called *The Soldier's Comrade*, first published in 1907 with the authorization and recommendation of the Bulgarian minister of war (Report No. 25, March 21st, 1907, and No. 31, March 10th, 1908). Since 1907, this book has been distributed in all the barracks and military schools, thus reaching every inhabitant of Bulgaria who has passed through these barracks since that date. On page 56 of the historical section of this book is a colored map of "Greater Bulgaria," which shows the whole scheme for Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. The accompanying drawing, an exact copy of this map, gives a clear idea of the considerable encroachments contemplated by this plan on neighboring states. It is therefore undeniable that the authorities at Sofia, ever since 1907, that is, seven years



THE ENCROACHMENTS OF THE PLANNED
BULGARIAN HEGEMONY UPON THE NEIGHBORING STATES
Boundaries of the Planned Bulgarian Hegemony.

prior to the war, have taught the people of Bulgaria that they should fight to conquer, not alone the districts of Macedonia settled by Bulgars, but also extensive regions in Greece, as well as those inhabited by Serbians, Albanians, and the whole Roumanian Dobrudja, up to the mouths of the Danube. This idea was spread abroad among the people of Bulgaria, as the Pangerman scheme was disseminated in Germany, and it has been pursued since 1907, by the Bulgarian Government, seeking tenaciously to bring it about by means of successive operations. The plan allows us to see why the Bulgars were not sincere when, in 1912, they concluded an alliance merely to make use of the Serbians and the Greeks in order to beat the Turks, who were too strong for them to conquer by themselves. But as soon as the part of their plan relating to Turkey was realized, in order to carry it out, this time at the expense of Greece and Serbia, Bulgaria attacked her former allies in June, 1913. Roumania then intervened against the Bulgars, and, the Serbians having won the battle of the Bregalnitza, Bulgaria was beaten and forced to sign the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10th, 1913. This treaty did not establish Bulgarian hegemony; rather the Balkan bal-

ance of power, just the reverse of what Bulgaria wished; for if the peace had lasted the Balkan equilibrium would have crystallized, and the success of the Bulgarian plan in the future have become impossible. This is why the Treaty of Bucharest was so deep a disappointment to the Bulgars, and created so much irritation as to alter their former feelings abruptly. Having taken from the Turks nearly as much as was designed in the plan for Greater Bulgaria, and seeing that it would be more to their advantage to declare themselves Turanians than to remain Slavs, the Bulgars decided to ally themselves with the Turks, and from that time concentrated their hate and vindictive qualities, which are enormous, against their recent conquerors, the Greeks, and above all the Serbians and Roumanians.

Granting the imperialist aims of the Bulgars resulting from their plan of 1907, and their resentment irrevocably directed against their neighbors since the end of 1913, it is plain that they could not satisfy their exaggerated ambition and their intense hatreds except by taking the side of Germany. The Entente was in no position to help Bulgaria to lay hands on Roumanian, Serbian, and Greek territory; and therefore, for these com-

bined reasons, an understanding was easily reached between Berlin and Sofia, several months before the war, as certain facts will convince us.

In 1916, Frederic Naumann, the man of Middle Europe, published a pamphlet called *Bulgaria and Central Europe*, of which Payot, the publisher at Paris, furnished a translation. Naumann writes as follows:

“When, about a year ago, in August, 1915, I wrote my book *Mitteleuropa*, I could not then speak of Bulgaria, for at that time in the eyes of the European public the attitude of that country was doubtful. *Even if the Czar Ferdinand, and his Minister-President Radoslavoff had then known exactly what they wished to do, and even if those in charge of foreign policy in Germany regarded Sofia with ever-increasing confidence, it would nevertheless have been impossible to discuss the rapprochement while it was forming. Now everything then hidden is brought into the light of day. The alliance is made, and the success of the war against Serbia has amply proved that they were right who labored for the Union of Central Europe with Bulgaria.*”

It is clear that Naumann tells only a part of the truth, but this part is most interesting, for

it is a proof that in August, 1915—that is, at a time when the Allies were still foolish enough to imagine that the government of Sofia was hesitating, or, as I have often heard it said, even that it could be bought—the Czar Ferdinand and his first minister, Radoslavoff, “*knew exactly what they wished to do,*” the whole thing being then a secret. Now, therefore, we are really justified in believing that the Czar Ferdinand and his Radoslavoff, who for a long time had been among the most notorious Germanophiles of Sofia, knew exactly what they wanted to do not only in August, 1915, but long before the war.

In fact, according to information published by the *Petit Parisien*, March 26th, 1916, and the *Temps*, April 10th, 1916, M. Radoslavoff revealed during a suit which took place in Sofia early in 1916 that the treaties between Bulgaria, Berlin, and Constantinople were concluded before April, 1914. These treaties were not made public for excellent reasons. In the first place, it was necessary to let the Allies entangle themselves in interminable negotiations, making them think that the Bulgarian Government had not yet made its choice; then it was best to wait until military events were sufficiently advanced to persuade the Bulgar

people, some of whom were still Russophiles, to join Germany. This object was attained after the defeat of the Allies in the Dardanelles and the great Russian retreat on the Dunaïetz in May, 1915, and was finished some months later.

During the first three years of the war the Bulgars were stalwart Germanophiles. They have undeniable qualities; they are sober and economical, but they are born rapacious to an incredible degree. This last characteristic accounts for the action of this democratic people—democratic, as it consists entirely of peasants—but they have been made imperialists through the propagation of the plan for Bulgarian hegemony since 1907, because that propaganda has developed in the peasants the passion for the soil, for territorial aggrandizement, to an extent of which nothing can give an idea. They were greatly pleased, therefore, with the acquisitions they made, thanks to their friendship with Berlin.

In his pamphlet called *Bulgaria and Central Europe*, published in 1916 and quoted above, Frederic Naumann describes as follows a trip he had just made to Bulgaria with ten other members of the Reichstag.

“Greater Bulgaria is not yet defined; foreign

powers threaten us continually with fresh attacks; but the first and most decisive step has now been taken; Bulgaria came to us in the midst of a besieged Central Europe, as the first addition to the group which we shall form in the future.

"A description from day to day of our journey, taken under the thoughtful care of the former Bulgarian minister at Belgrade, M. Tchaprachikoff* does not enter into our plan, and, besides, could hardly be put into words. One may experience the development of popular enthusiasm, loyal and simple, but it cannot be described in one place after another without needless tediousness. It suffices to say that we, German representatives, having some experience as critics of assemblies and popular movements, were impressed afresh each day by the clamorous wave of people who cheered joyously and vigorously those who came to help them to victory. The Bulgars are not dramatic by nature; they have nothing of the Latin, and little of the Greek; they do not

* Stephen Tchaprachikoff formerly studied at the School of Political Sciences in Paris about 1895, and up to March, 1914, was one of my personal friends. He was for a long time the private secretary of King Ferdinand and his confidential agent. Since the war, he has become such a thorough Germanophile that Naumann and his companions were placed in his care during their journey in Bulgaria.

pose as stage heroes, but they are brave and rough, practical, rather silent and shy.

“It was a nation of peasants who left their villages in crowds, flocking to the railroad stations to see us, German representatives. It was not on our account personally, being as we were for the most part unknown to them, but for the sake of the German army, the German state and policy of Central Europe, and for the cause of their own king and country. We received in this way a popular ovation, particularly significant and beautiful in the extreme. While the Bulgarian people spoke to us by the mouth of its representatives and magistrates, it felt that the first period of its national existence was closing: the period extending from its deliverance by the Russians to the Second Balkan War, from 1876 to 1914.”

But as the extension of Bulgaria was established over territories which were not truly Bulgarian, and as it was artificial and it was constantly necessary to be in conflict with the populations ripe for rebellion at the same time that they had to hold the lines of the Salonika front, the fourth year of the war was of an increasing strenuousness, which, never ceasing, became more intolerable from day to day. In

trying to become bigger than the ox the Bulgarian frog burst, and when the Allied offensive developed in October, 1918, in a few days Bulgaria fell.

III

Austria-Hungary is not a nation, but a state, alone of its kind, where everything is organized



with a special object, which is to make it possible for the German-Magyar minority to exercise the most complete political domination

over the vast majority of the inhabitants, who are Slavo-Latins.

In order to grasp the truth in its simplest form as to the organization of Austria-Hungary, it should be remembered that this singular state is made up of three distinct parts, as will be seen on the annexed map.

1. Austria, which, with a fragment geographically detached along the Adriatic (Dalmatia) constitutes one empire.

2. Hungary, which is a kingdom.

3. Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose constitutional situation in reference to Austria-Hungary is not clearly defined, but which may be considered as a sort of territory of the empire, a colony equally dependent on Austria and Hungary

The three maps below show exactly how the 50 million inhabitants (this figure is taken, exclusive of foreigners, from the census of 1910, the last given for the different nationalities) are divided among the three districts which together constitute the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The double lines which define these populations show the arbitrary nature of their distribution. In spite of themselves, nearly a million Italians are cut off from Italy, 5 millions

of Poles separated from Poland, 3,250,000 Roumanians kept out of Roumania against their will. The Jugo-Slavs and the Czecho-Slovaks are divided between the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary. In Bosnia-Herzegovina alone is the entire Jugo-Slav population homogeneous, but this is again involun-



tary, as she is a kind of colony common to Austria and Hungary.

The figures which accompany these maps bring out the fact that altogether there are:

12 millions of Germans (10 in Austria and 2 in Hungary.) 10 millions of Magyars in Hungary, which makes 22 millions of

inhabitants in Austria-Hungary who rule over:

4 millions of Latins (1 in Austria, 3 in Hungary).

24½ millions of Slavs (17 in Austria, 5½ in Hungary, 2 in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Say over 28½ millions of Slavs and Latins, who are forced to submit to this domination.

These figures show a majority of 6½ millions in favor of the Slav and Latin subjects of the Hapsburgs. In fact, however, this majority is much larger, for actually the above figures do not give the exact truth, as they are those of the official statistics drawn up by Germans at Vienna and Magyars at Budapesth, who have systematically falsified them to serve their own ends. The Germans and Magyars add to their numbers and diminish in a large proportion the true figures of the Latins and Slavs. Nevertheless, in spite of this perversion of the truth, it is plainly to be seen that, even according to the official German and Magyar figures, Austria-Hungary is run entirely in the interest of the 22 millions of German-Magyars. The truth is even more striking, for in relation to these figures two facts stand out—one relative to the Germans, the other to the Magyars.

THE NATIONALITIES IN AUSTRIA



Note.—The figures in the table below correspond with those used for the ethnographic regions in the map. The numbers without primes (for instance, 5) show the ethnographic regions of Hungary corresponding to the nationalities of which the scattered fragments make up the greater part of Austria.

No. 1' is not found in the table below, because it serves to indicate in Hungary the Magyars, no group of which exists in Austria.

No. 3' in Austria designates the Austro-Roumanians who are separated from Roumania.

No. 4' in Austria designates the Slovenes (1,250,000) and the Serbo-Croats (750,000) in Dalmatia, these being different names belonging to the Jugo-Slavic people still distributed in Hungary, Bosnia, and in Herzegovina or Montenegro or Serbia.

No. 8' indicates the Italians of Istria and the Trentino, separated from their mother country, Italy.

2'. Germans.....	10,000,000	} Germans, 10 millions. Latins, 1 million.
3'. Roumanians.....	250,000	
8'. Italians.....	750,000	
4'. Jugo-Slavs.....	2,000,000	} Slavs, 17 millions.
5'. Czechs.....	6,500,000	
6'. Ruthenes.....	3,500,000	
7'. Poles.....	5,000,000	Total... 28 millions.



Note.—The figures in the table correspond to those used for the ethnographic regions in the map.

The figures with a prime (5', for instance) indicate the ethnographic regions of Austria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Roumania, corresponding to the nationalities of which fragments, arbitrarily distributed, form the majority of the population of Hungary.

The figures given are in round millions.

1. Magyars.....	10 millions.	Race of Asiatic origin.
2. Germans.....	2 "	Teutonic race.
3. Roumanians.....	3 "	Latin race.
4. Serbo-Croats.....	3 "	} Slavic race, 5½ millions.
5. Czecho-Slovaks.....	2 "	
6. Ruthenians.....	½ "	
<hr/>		
20½ millions.		

Out of the 12 millions of Germans 10 millions are in Austria, of whom about 3 are mixed with the Bohemian Czechs, in a country which the Germans formerly wrested from them, and

2 millions of Germans are distributed over Hungary in small groups, geographically so far removed from the bulk of the Germans that one can hardly say that Austria-Hungary exists for their benefit; this is really true only of the 10 millions of Germans in Austria.

As for the 10 millions of Magyars, this figure should be analysed from the standpoints of differing social interests.

Among 10 millions of Magyars, 8, that is, the vast majority, are poor agricultural or industrial laborers, who have nothing and are cynically exploited by only 2 millions of large landed proprietors, priests, and government officials, who still enjoy many feudal privileges, as in the Middle Ages, and want to preserve them, not only in regard to the 10 millions of Slavs and Latins under the Magyar rule, but also as to the 8 millions of the unfortunate Magyar proletariat. The oppression of the 2 millions of feudal Magyars has a character at once national and social in the case of the 10 millions of Slavs and Latins incorporated as unwilling citizens of Hungary; and social as regards the 8 millions of Magyar working men. Now, if these last were really free and were not subjected to the domination of the 2 millions of Magyars who oppress them socially,

they could surely come to an understanding with their Slav and Latin neighbors, which would enable these to form the states to which they are entitled; and for themselves the Magyars, freed from their feudal masters, could erect in the midst of Poland, Bohemia, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia, a democratic Magyar state which could agree with its neighbors to form part of the economic territory of southern central Europe.

Remembering the state of mind and the social interests of the 8 millions of laboring Magyars, it is plain that in reality it is not for the advantage of the 12 millions of Magyars, but only for the 2 millions of feudal masters and functionaries of this race that Hungary really exists.

The two observations just made are extremely important, for through them we establish the fact that Austria-Hungary only subsists for the benefit of 10 millions of Germans in Austria, and 2 millions of feudal Magyars in Hungary, a total of 12 millions of inhabitants, against the interests of 38 millions of Slavs, Latins, and Magyar proletarians.

Austria-Hungary is therefore the empire of extreme injustice, in a degree even worse than Germany. In the latter country, among 68

millions of inhabitants in 1914 at least 61 are Germans, and perfectly willing to be governed as a single nation; in Austria-Hungary, on the contrary, 12 millions only of German-Magyars, with the help of the Hapsburg dynasty, impose their will on 38 millions of Slavs, Latins, and Magyar laborers. For these causes, if modern justice does not demand the overthrow of Germany, at least it should insist inexorably on that of Austria-Hungary.

This empire is maintained, also, for the advantage of the Hapsburg dynasty, which is German, and has a strong interest in the continuation of the Austro-Hungarian state.

Before 1866, it was an open question if the Hapsburgs could dominate the Hohenzollerns, and rule in their stead over the mass of the German population of central Europe, but since the defeat of the Hapsburgs at Sadowa by the Prussians, in 1866, this question has been so completely settled that the Hapsburgs have entirely renounced the idea of their supremacy over the Hohenzollerns.

The alternative from which the former must choose is explained very clearly in a small pamphlet which appeared at Berlin in 1895, *Pangermany and Central Europe about 1950* (*Gross-Deutschland und Mitteleuropa um das*

Jahr 1950), which is a pamphlet of remarkable interest, for it described twenty-three years ago the Pangerman design exactly as it has come to pass since 1914.

“Certainly,” said our Pangermanist in 1895, “the successful Germanization of the non-Germans of Austria-Hungary would not be possible without the energetic support of the 47 millions of Germans of the empire (figures of 1895). Naturally, in order to reach this result the principle of the equal rights of nationalities, and certain existing principles as to public and private rights, would have to be abandoned. . . .

“In case that the House of Hapsburg should not be disposed nor well adapted to succeed in the difficult task of welding together Austria-Hungary and Germany, its part might be played by some less important German families” (page 28).

It is, then, twenty-three years, at least, since a sort of permanent ultimatum was presented to the Hapsburgs by Berlin, an ultimatum which, by the way, they long ago accepted.

It is easy to understand how this can be, when we know the present position of the Hapsburgs. To-day this house has an alternative from which to choose. It must totally disappear through the triumph of the demo-

cratic aspirations of its Slav and Latin subjects, who will no longer endure its yoke—and this triumph can only come by the victory of the Entente, or it can continue thanks to the support of the Hohenzollerns, and this implies that the Hapsburgs must do their utmost to bring about a victory for Germany. It is manifest that the latter solution would be much less disastrous for the Austrian imperial family, and they have therefore adopted it. To sum up, the Hapsburgs, the 10 millions of Germans in Austria, and the 2 millions of feudal Magyars have dynastic, national, and social reasons which give them a common interest in the maintenance of Austria-Hungary.

Under these conditions it is clear that the continued existence of the empire is of great advantage to Germany, as this existence is the geographical condition on which central Pangermany depends; for the Pangerman bridge toward the east rests on three piers, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria reaching to Hungary, and Turkey. Austria-Hungary is the main pier of this bridge which unites Germany to the east. The absolute necessity for the maintenance of the Austrian Empire by the Germans is so evident that in the pamphlet

above mentioned, *Gross-Deutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950*—Berlin 1895—it is stated plainly: “The present German Empire, especially North Germany, needs Austria for her eventual defense; this is well understood by all Prussians” (page 23).

Looking at another aspect of the question, at present the Magyar authorities, in order to preserve their mediæval privileges, which are identically those of the Prussian Junkers, very deliberately accept the creation of central Pangermany. On the 1st of January, 1918, the president of the Hungarian Council spoke as follows to the parliament at Budapesth:

“Closer relations with Germany, owing to considerations of the greatest value, are of capital importance to us. If we wish to form part of the great movement which will stretch from the North Sea to the Black Sea, and from thence into Asia Minor, we must take measures accordingly.”

Finally, the *Tagespost*, a German paper published at Gratz, in Austria, said on May 14th, 1918:

“The strengthening of our alliance with Germany demands an energetic conduct of our foreign policy. Germany has a vital interest in

the existence of Austria-Hungary, in the maintenance of order within the empire, in the economic development of its peoples, and the prospects of the Austrian state."

The whole truth is contained in these lines, as is well known to those, unfortunately too few, who have studied on the spot for twenty years the complicated problem of central Europe. The recent projects for reorganization of the Austrian state with autonomy extended to the Slavs, have been a farce to deceive the Allies. No experienced politician, either Slav or Latin, a Hapsburg subject, believes in these proposals, for the word of a Hapsburg is worth just about as much as that of a Hohenzollern. In 1871 the Emperor Francis-Joseph solemnly promised the Czechs to have himself crowned King of Bohemia, but he has never since chosen to keep his word.

Finally, at the moment when I write these lines, Austria-Hungary begins to yield under the pressure of her oppressed peoples. This result has not been brought about without trouble. A considerable number of Allied politicians, diplomats, and publicists have persisted since the beginning of the war in the idea that Austria-Hungary must be maintained. They have thus worked for the King

of Prussia, they have played the game of the Pangermanists, they have deserted the cause of democracy, they have incredibly prolonged the war by hindering the attack on Austria, the weakest point of the Central Empires, and have contributed to keep in an atrocious bondage admirable peoples like the Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary, who have been since the beginning of the struggle determined allies of the Entente, and for a long time worthy of unrestricted liberty.

IV.

The annexed map gives a comprehensive view of the causes which determined the solidarity of the Central Powers. This map again shows that there are five centres of imperialism which rendered possible the formation of Pangermany. The chief centre is Berlin, and the four secondary centres, Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople, have allowed German militarism during the war to extend its methods and its detestable influence as far as the eastern confines of Turkey. These secondary centres of imperialism, having greatly assisted the propagation of the Pangerman cause, ought to be completely destroyed.

THE FIVE CENTRES OF IMPERIALISM IN PAN-GERMANY



CONCLUSIONS.

The main object of the war for the Entente beyond and above all others should consist of so complete a destruction of German militarism that all other military systems will have no further reason for existence, and a general disarmament will ensue.

It is clear, therefore, that an incomplete victory of the Allies will allow German militarism to continue even in a German republic, a thing which is quite possible, because the German socialists are for the most part nationalists, many are even at bottom Pangermanists, and they have the military spirit in the very blood of their race. In this case, the other nations will be obliged to keep up exhausting armaments. For all the terrible nightmare of militarism would be prolonged under still more intolerable conditions than before, the war having laid unprecedentedly heavy financial burdens on the people.

To make the world really safe for democracy and enter into a new era, it is therefore indispensable to bring about the total annihilation of the German military system.

Let us, then, cherish no illusions; only the thorough and complete victory of the Allies

can bring about this annihilation, as the effect of peace conditions carefully studied out to produce such a result.

This final victory is now, however, relatively easy to reach if the Allies are unalterably determined to insist to the end on ten essential conditions. These conditions have this peculiarity that only one is applicable to the terms of peace to be imposed on the enemy; the others relate to the tactics and attitude to be held by the Allies, and this is particularly important in order to avoid mistakes, such as it is quite possible may be committed during the period of the armistice, mistakes which would suffice to deprive us of the conclusive success.

First Condition.

Written acceptances by the Germans and the foundation of the republic in Germany should not modify in any way the programme of guarantees and realizations of all kinds demanded by the Allies.

This for the reason that—

1st. An assassin is tried. His saying to the court, "I am a republican," does not diminish

his punishment in any way. The spirit of justice forbids it.

2d. The German socialists have shown themselves Pangermanists under the Kaiser; it is not reasonable to think that they have suddenly abandoned their opinions.

3d. The German people is not unhappy because it has fought an unjust war; it is enraged for the reason that it is forced to see that the game will soon be lost.

4th. The Boches are excessively double-dealing, and all their republican setting has for its first object to seek to prevent the occupation of all Germany by the Allied armies. This occupation, however, must take place to compass a complete victory for the Entente, assure in Europe the territorial changes necessary to peace, and the reparation of the damage done, for this reparation is indispensable to save from complete ruin the countries invaded by the Boches. In this direction every generosity which is shown them will be in reality at the expense of the French, of the Belgians, etc., whom the Boches have robbed and pillaged.

5th. Papers signed by the Germans have no value whatever. The treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium was as clear and precise as possible, but was of no use. We already

see the Boche republicans manœuvring to have the conditions of the armistice modified.

6th. To believe that the course of events may in a few months open the eyes of the German people and entirely change them is to betray complete ignorance of German history and psychology. The mentality of these people, their passion for wars of gain and for pillage, has remained the same ever since it was described by Tacitus. It does not, then, result exclusively from the Hohenzollern influence, it is century-long, which can only be gradually modified if the Germans, by well-advised measures, are prevented during a long period from following their predatory instincts.

Second Condition.

The Allies ought to be thoroughly convinced that the German people is just as responsible for the war as the Kaiser himself.

It is easy now that the Kaiser has fallen to see a tendency in the Allied countries to distinguish between Kaiserism and the German people. This tendency is, however, shown only by those who have been wrong as to the origin of the war. They say: "The German

people have been deceived by the Hohenzollerns. They have renounced their sovereign. It is a proof of good faith; we may consider now the responsibility of the people as greatly diminished."

I protest with all my force against this tendency and these opinions, for they show on the part of their advocates a profound ignorance of Germany and are very far from the truth.

I have studied Germany since the year 1894 and all my previsions as to the action of the German Government and the German people have been exactly fulfilled by the events, and I am therefore a qualified witness and have the right to be heard. I declare boldly that, if William II was the inventor and stage-manager of the Pangermanist plan, the Pangerman propaganda which was carried on from 1895 to 1914 throughout the empire was welcomed enthusiastically, almost unanimously, by the German people, for the Pangerman aims satisfied their mentality and their ancestral passion for spoils.

During four years of war, the whole German population has upheld the Kaiser to the extent of its power. The laborers have shown themselves quite as Pangermanist as the other

social classes. To give a proof of this, at the end of September, 1918, the Christian Association of Metal Workers adopted the following resolution: "The Christian Metal Workers assembled at Duisburg . . . dwell particularly on the hope that the coal districts of Longwy-Briey, conquered by German arms, shall remain in the possession of the Empire. . . ."*

These lines show the attitude of mind of the Boche Pangermanist workman a few weeks before the armistice, and if since then the German people have ceased to express themselves in the same way, it is because the Bulgarian disaster has taken place, opening to the Allies the road to Austria-Hungary, thus seizing central Europe, which is for Germany the key of the world.

It is not at all, then, the remorse they feel for having waged a wicked war that now torments the Germans and had put a stop to their annexationist demands, but solely their intense anxiety lest the Allies should act so as to bring about the permanent downfall of that Pangerman scheme which had just taken form, and in the accomplishment of which nearly the entire Boche nation was passionately interested during the last forty years. It is be-

* See *Le Temps*, September 30, 1918.

sides undeniable that the Germans mobilized from the outbreak of the war, have pillaged, burned, stolen, and committed unheard-of atrocities, as they were ordered to do. Since they thus docilely obeyed their leaders when they were commanded to commit crimes, they are themselves equally responsible. Never in the history of the world has any people acting after long reflection been more responsible for its acts than the German.

Those of the Allies who see only the guilt of the Kaiser try by that means to shield his people from their punishment, a thousand times deserved; but though they may not intend it, this would be a tremendous injustice to the Allied populations. In fact, to divide the cause of the German people from that of their Kaiser would restrict the application of conditions of reparation to the Emperor and his immediate surroundings, while the people of Germany with equal responsibility provide the only basis broad enough to furnish to the Allied populations of Europe the indemnities which are strictly due and must be paid to save them from complete ruin. It is, therefore, highly important to let the German nation bear the full weight of its responsibility; to relieve it of this would be in the first place

contrary to justice, and, secondly, in this way the Allied peoples would not obtain sufficient to make up the enormous losses they have suffered through German aggression, and the Germans, through the effect of the economic consequences of the war, would finally bear away the victory.

Third Condition.

Any negotiated peace should be resolutely and absolutely rejected, as it would make impossible a complete victory for the Allies.

During all the period of the armistice the Germans are going to struggle to arrive at a negotiated peace. If we concede that the republican attitude ought not to prevent the German people from suffering the consequences of the crimes that they have committed, we must likewise concede that one of the justifications of the war lies in the fact that peace shall be dictated to the German people. More than that, a negotiated peace would be inconsistent with the formula of unconditional surrender which expresses so exactly the will of the practical unanimity of the Allied peoples.

Fourth Condition.

To understand realistically the conditions of a programme for a lasting peace.

An Allied peace programme, meant to bring about precisely their ideal, should not be theoretic but exclusively practical. It is consequently useless for such a programme to lay down principles, already many times repeated, on which we have all agreed for a long time. But what is of capital importance is that this programme should contain only, without the omission of one essential point, the list of facts and practical changes, the realization of which on the soil of Europe will automatically assure respect for the principles for which the Entente is fighting. The peace programme of the Allies should be merely technical, something like a list of repairs which an expert mechanic draws up after a careful examination of a complicated machine which has suffered serious injuries.

Europe is, in fact, a huge machine thrown out of gear, and our common sense tells us that it can only be put in order by mechanics who thoroughly understand it.

The best Parisian architects could not sensibly pretend to come and build a sky-scraper in the city of New York unless they had previously carefully studied, with the help of American architects, the peculiarities and demands of this special form of construction. In the same way the most intelligent and well-meaning of the English, Americans, or French could not make a concrete programme for the reconstruction of Europe unless the plan had been long and carefully studied on the spot with the assistance of those who well understood the complications of European machinery.

Therefore, and this explains in a great measure the mistakes as to the political situation made during the war, there are in the Entente countries extremely few men in politics who, before the war, devoted themselves seriously to the study of these grave foreign questions. The Allied leaders, in order to be sure of establishing a just and permanent peace, would find it to their interest to call to their aid two groups of experts, for in this way all danger of technical mistakes would be avoided.

1st. It would be necessary to pay the greatest attention to the advice of experts in foreign politics to be found among the Allies, whose

worth has been proved by the course of events.

For example, in France Messrs. Louis Leger, Ernest Denis, Haumant, and Auguste Gauvain; in England Messrs. Wickham Steed, Seton-Watson, and Sir Arthur Evans are almost the only men who have seriously studied for a long time, prior to the war, the difficult problems of central Europe, the right solution of which will form the firmest foundations of peace. These men should be called in as technical advisers of the Inter-Allied commissions charged to apply practically the peace programme.

2d. There is a second group of experts whose help would be valuable—even indispensable; I mean the authorized representatives of the Poles, the Czechs, the Jugo-Slavs, the Roumanians, the Armenians, the Jews, etc., that is, of all the peoples who are to be liberated from the yoke of Germany and her allies.

Representatives of these peoples—such men as Professor Masaryk, Dr. Kramarsh for the Czecho-Slovaks; Paderewsky, Roman Dmovsky for the Poles; Trumbich, Savic for the Jugo-Slavs; Take Jonesco for the Roumanians; Boghos Nubar Pacha for the Armenians, etc.—ought they not also to be added to the

peace commission as technical advisers to aid in the creation of a new Europe? This co-operation is absolutely necessary.

We ought clearly to understand that the entire liberation of oppressed peoples is in reality the first condition of a durable victory of the Allies, for, unless the freedom of these races is firmly established, we cannot build up in central Europe the strong barrier which will protect us against the aggressive spirit of the Teutons.

Fifth Condition.

To realize a concrete programme of peace conditions having for its object:

1st. To prevent a further outbreak of the war.

2d. To repair as far as possible the deep injuries caused by German aggression.

A detailed technical programme for peace cannot, in fact, be completely given until the Allied forces occupy central Europe and the Allied leaders have been able thus to secure at its very source the exact and indispensable information which is certainly even now lacking. In any case, it is necessary that from now

on public opinion should see clearly, at least in its large outline, what should be the minimum concrete programme. I shall therefore attempt to make such a sketch; not that I feel myself safe from error, but I can say that for twenty-five years I have thought on the questions which peace now brings before us, and that there is not one of them which I have not studied on the spot, unprejudicedly and carefully consulting those best qualified to aid me in their comprehension.

This concrete peace programme of the Allies ought, as a whole, to turn into a reality the excellent formula long ago thought out by Mr. Lloyd George—guarantees, reparations, retributions.

This programme ought to be composed of very different elements brought together, and each part studied so that they all may harmoniously combine their effects in such a way as to reach the desired result.

These realizations fall, then, into five groups, each one indispensable, and consequently all of them together constitute the minimum terms to be imposed.

1st. Territorial reorganizations in Europe.

2d. Social reforms which will overthrow the foundations of German militarism.

3d. The practical measures necessary to prevent the rearmament of Germany.

4th. Measures of reparation for the injuries caused by the war.

5th. The just restitutions dictated by the idea of modern law and the moral sense of the world.

I. Territorial reorganization of Europe.

Colonel Roosevelt and Senator Lodge have given a programme for the reconstruction of Europe which is, in my opinion, excellent, and to which I subscribe. This programme makes an application, perfectly well understood, of the high principle which unites the Allies: the right of self-determination of peoples—a principle which has been so eloquently and often declared by President Wilson.

On the whole, these changes in European territory ought to be undertaken so as to produce a two-fold result.

1st. To make it forever impossible to reconstitute Pangermany.

2d. To assure the free development of the peoples oppressed by Germany and her allies.

The Ottoman Empire, which forms an entirely arbitrary territory, ought to be abolished, for Turkish sovereignty ought only to exist in

really Turkish regions, that is, in Anatolia; all the other races, Armenians, Jews, and Arabs, should be made independent, as far as possible.

Constantinople being an essentially cosmopolitan city, where the Turks, contrary to what is the generally accepted idea, are only a minority (45 per cent), it should be internationalized, together with the straits. Its cosmopolitan character and its geographical position, in touch with three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa, through Egypt—make Constantinople the ideal place for the seat of the League of Nations when it shall be put into a practical shape.

The complete withdrawal of central Europe from all Pangerman influence will best be obtained—

First, by destroying all efforts of the Bulgars to attain the hegemony of the Balkans, by forcing them to give up the territory occupied by them in the course of the war.

Secondly, as a basic and unavoidable condition of their victory the Allies should overthrow the Empire of Austria, and the Kingdom of Hungary, states which are simply founded on a frightful injustice.

Thirdly, the Poles, Danes, and French who

are now held in subjection by the Germans should be liberated.

These three rearrangements would lead to the establishment of five new independent states, all absolutely essential to the new order in Europe:

1st. Poland, including Dantzic, as an opening on the Baltic.

2d. The state of the Czecho-Slovaks, or Bohemia, which must be understood to include also her strategic mountain frontiers on the north and west.

3d. A Magyar state democratized in the manner indicated below.

4th. A Jugo-Slav state, embracing the Jugo-Slav regions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro.

5th. Greater Roumania, comprising all the Roumanian districts in Bukovina, Transylvania, and Bessarabia.


These five states, whose interest will lie in agreement among themselves and being made up of anti-German elements only—as will appear later in the case of a democratic Magyar state—will form about 60 millions of inhabitants, between the Baltic and Greece.

They will thus provide a first great barrier which will make a revival of Pangermanism

impossible. Behind this barrier, and with the help of the Allies, can be organized federated Russia and the other states which Colonel Roosevelt and Senator Lodge mentioned in their programme.

As for Germany, when she has set free about 7 millions of Poles, Alsatians, Lorrainers, and Danes, she will still retain 61 millions of inhabitants. As Austria does not include more than about 7 millions of Germans, well grouped geographically, even if these 7 million Germans wished to unite themselves with Germany, they would together not amount to more than 68 millions of inhabitants—that is, the same population as before the war, but with this difference that Germany would have lost all the strategic regions (Poland and Alsace-Lorraine) which facilitated her aggressions, would have had to pay each year for a very long period an annual instalment of indemnity which would have prevented her from arming herself again, and would find herself surrounded by people vitally interested to prevent any revival of the former military system.

The annexed map does not pretend to show the solution of these problems in detail, but it gives a general view of the territorial modi-



fications absolutely required. This map has a history. My studies had long ago convinced me that the only way to defeat Pangermanism was to form the five new states above described.

At the end of 1916, I wished to publish this map in the Paris *Illustration*, but I found myself opposed by the veto of the French censor, who was much alarmed by my map. Even at this time Allied diplomatists viewed the independence of Poland with little confidence, and one could not speak of the Jugo-Slavs for fear of vexing the Italians, who then had designs on Dalmatia. As for the Czecho-Slovaks, their importance was very vaguely recognized, and the hope of Allied diplomacy was to make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary.

Finding my publication interdicted, I tried to get round the difficulty by saying to my censors:

“After all, Europe, as I depict it, is only the result of the principle declared by President Wilson: ‘I propose that every people shall be free to determine its own policy.’ So let me print my map with this text.”

This proposal overcame the scruples of my critics and at last my map—which was greatly in advance of the conceptions of Allied diplomats—was allowed to appear in the *Illustra-*

tion of February 24th, 1917. Since then public opinion has been strongly influenced by events, and the Entente has become more convinced that this plan gave a very reasonable idea of what ought to be the state of Europe after the peace.

I ought strongly to emphasize the fact that the claim apparently now being renewed by the Italians to establish themselves in the final ownership of a considerable part of the Dalmatian coast would very seriously imperil that organization of central Europe which is indispensable to the peace of the world. In reality, the Jugo-Slav problem can only be permanently solved with the aid of mutual and sincere concessions which the Italians and Jugo-Slavs should make to each other. Let the half of Istria, with Trieste and Pola, go to Italy, although the majority of the population of this territory is incontestably Slavic. Thus Italy will be assured of control over the Adriatic to a permissible extent. But to the east of the boundary-line of Istria let the Jugo-Slavs be assured of complete liberty. Fiume is a port indispensable not only to the Jugo-Slav state but to the democratized Magyar state and to Bohemia, the products of which would be able to freely reach the Adriatic

through a transport system which should be protected by guarantees. It is absolutely necessary that American public opinion shall understand at once how inadmissible are the Italian claims to Dalmatia and bring pressure to bear on the Jugo-Slavs and Italians to induce them to make as soon as possible the mutual concessions which both their own interest and that of peace in Europe really require.

II. Social reforms will lead to the destruction of the aristocratic foundations of German militarism.

A. By the abolition of the feudal property-system in Hungary.

In Hungary, as a matter of fact, the only real pro-Prussians imbued with imperialist ideas are the large landed proprietors among the Magyars, who enjoy feudal privileges, and in order to preserve them have a personal interest in making common cause with the Prussian Junkers.

The great Magyar landowners have been for many years actual monopolists. Two thousand only among them hold more than 7 millions of hectares, that is, more than a third of all the arable land in Hungary, and, saturated

to the bone as they are with ideas of aristocracy and autocracy, they not only oppress the 10 millions of Slavs and Latins, who are unwilling Hungarian subjects, but also 8 millions of Magyars, industrial but chiefly agricultural laborers.

If, then, the feudal privileges are abolished in Hungary, we shall at the same time destroy the only support of German militarism in south central Europe and make possible the liberation of 8 millions of Magyar proletarians.

It is, therefore, highly necessary for the Entente to include as soon as possible in its plans the expropriation of Magyar feudal landlords and the division of their estates for the benefit of the working classes organized into agricultural syndicates for purposes of cultivation.

These social reforms and changes, which indeed are beginning to be made spontaneously, so indispensable are they, will have great consequences; they will give political power in the Magyar districts of Hungary to the true Magyar people, who have up to now been entirely held down by the oppression of the feudal proprietors. The final result would be the creation of a democratic state, exclusively Magyar, of about 10 million inhabi-

tants, whose interest it would be, both political and economic, to ally themselves with their neighbors, Poland, Bohemia, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia, and also to form part of the great anti-German bulwark.

B. Destruction of Prussian Junkers.

These are at the very base of Prussian militarism, and as an injurious caste they ought to be completely abolished. This could be accomplished legally by employing the following method:

All the Junkers are at the same time large landed proprietors and officers in the German army; in the latter capacity each one of them has certainly been guilty during the war of criminal acts and orders, which by rights should be severely punished. After our victory, the Allies should set up legal commissions before which these crimes could be tried, their authors indicted, and proper punishment decreed. The landed property of the Junkers should be taken as indemnity and divided, according to the region, for the benefit of Prussian or Polish peasants.

III. The practical steps to be taken in order to prevent the rearmament of Germany.

Destruction in the whole German territory

of machinery specially designed for the manufacture of war material. (This, of course, would also apply to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.)

IV. Measures of reparation for injuries caused by the war.

1st. Returning by Germany and her allies to the proper owners of all furniture, machinery, and property of all kinds stolen from invaded countries.

2d. Giving to the legitimate owners of German furniture, machinery, and other property, as compensation for stolen goods which cannot be returned in kind.

3d. The determination and security of the annuities that Germany should furnish to the states attacked by her, as compensation for injuries of all sorts and expenses caused by the war.

The Germans have stripped the invaded countries of everything, and the war has been so much more costly to the Allies than to Germany that if the economic differences resulting from this state of things were to last the military success of the Allies would mean nothing, especially for France, for in a few years after the conclusion of peace Germany

would appear victorious, simply through the economic consequences of the war.

This overwhelming money question is of such extraordinary importance that if we wish to avoid terrible financial catastrophes sure to follow the conclusion of a peace we may consider satisfactory, but too hastily concluded, America's great business men ought to insist that money questions should be dealt with thoroughly by the Allies, studied without haste, and completely solved.

The attempt to see clearly in the interests of the future is all the more necessary because the extreme importance of the financial aspect of the situation is not as well understood as it ought to be by many of those who nevertheless are deeply interested.

This is the case for reasons which follow, and will be understood, taking France as an example.

Before the war 6 milliards only of bank bills were in circulation in France, while up to the present moment 30 milliards have been issued; also many people have made enormous profits in munitions of war, while workmen's wages have considerably increased. The effect of this apparently satisfactory situation is that many Frenchmen do not realize to what an

extraordinary extent the war has brought ruin to France.

The 30 milliards of paper which now circulate so easily produce an illusion of wealth, but this wealth is partly artificial, and partly conditional. In fact, the truth is that these 30 milliards of French bank bills are secured by the consequences of an absolute victory which will oblige Germany to repair progressively the immense losses of all kinds caused to France; this is also equally true of the other countries which have suffered under German aggression.

Germany is perfectly able to pay, certainly not all at once, but by annual amounts. If the credit of the German Empire fails under the final defeat, the material riches of Germany, which are considerable, will remain.

When the Allies are in a condition to study German revenues carefully and at leisure on the spot, when the possession of a fair share of these revenues is secured, by guarantees as solid and durable as may be necessary, then the German people can certainly pay annually a sum of at least 10 milliards of marks. Let us suppose that the share of each of the Allied states who are creditors of Germany is 2 milliards a year. These 2 milliards being guaranteed during a very long period, thanks to

modern financial combinations, will be sufficient to allow each Allied state to raise internal loans, relatively small, and therefore easy to float, which will enable it to draw in its budget, enormously increased by the war, saving its citizens from the taxes which would crush them to death, but which it would be impossible to avoid if the Germans were not made to fear, as far as possible, the burden of injuries which they have caused.

The annual sums to be paid by the Germans should not be too heavy; in order to make these payments absolutely certain, therefore, these annuities will be spread over a long period, probably at least fifty years, but, as the German people had prepared their attacks for more than forty years, what could be more natural and just than that they should have to bear the consequences for a nearly equal space of time?

As a further consideration, the reparations to be made by means of annual payments spread over a long period will be a powerful guarantee of peace, for it is certain that Germany could never keep up the immense material of war required by modern armies as long as she will be forced to pay the amount of her reparations.

V. The retributions required by justice.

The frightful massacres and tortures of the civil population which have been ordered during the war by the Turks, the Bulgars, the Austrians, the Magyars, and the Germans would bring disgrace on the Entente if left unpunished. But the mode of dealing out justice in these cases can only be settled after investigations on the spot by the Allies, which will make plain facts which are now only partially known.

Sixth Condition.

To understand that the presence of Allied soldiers in Germany and Austria-Hungary is absolutely indispensable to a thorough and permanent victory.

Let us face the truth. Without the presence of Allied troops in the above countries can it be seriously believed—

1st. That if the Germans are free to pursue their intrigues in central Europe, Poland, Bohemia, the democratized Magyar state, the Jugo-Slavia, and Greater Roumania could organize themselves on a solid basis, so as to assure a long peace?

2d. That the abolition of feudal landed property in Hungary could be accomplished as thoroughly as is necessary to deprive militarism of all support in these regions?

3d. That all the Prussian Junkers will be tried, and their land divided as it certainly should be?

4th. That the enormous amount of personal property stolen by the Germans from Allied citizens, and now scattered all over Germany can be actually restored to the owners?

5th. That throughout the Central Empires machinery specially intended for the manufacture of war material would be destroyed?

6th. That a long and difficult economic investigation will be undertaken by the Allies in every part of Germany, to decide on the amount to be paid every year as reparation during a very long period, for damage caused by her aggression?

7th. That courts of justice will be instituted as is most necessary, to try German officers and soldiers who have been guilty of particularly odious crimes during the war?

8th. That the annuities due from Germany will be regularly paid?

No fair-minded person can deny that the only really satisfactory way that can be imag-

ined to secure the enforcement of these eight points, each one an essential part of victory, would consist in the presence of Allied soldiers wherever they might be needed in Germany and Austria-Hungary.

All disposable Allied troops ought to be advanced at once from Belgrade and Fiume toward the north through Bohemia. Their presence on the soil of what has been Austria-Hungary will give a solid foundation to the new states carved from the fragments of the Hapsburg monarchy, and will serve in future as a rampart against Germanism.

Finally, these Allied troops will be in the right place to make at the proper time the entrance into Berlin; a satisfaction, also, which ought not to be refused to those splendid soldiers who have fought for four years with extraordinary tenacity, and through the depths of suffering have gained freedom for the world.

Seventh Condition.

To admit that to enable the Germans to repair the damage they have caused, they should not be placed under a general boycott.

Conditions of peace should be logical and coherent, and as it is of supreme importance

that the Germans should repair the injuries they have caused, as far as is humanly possible, they must have the means of payment.

It is plain to the meanest comprehension that if we prevented the Germans from working and making money, they could never pay their debts, and this would certainly be the result obtained if we followed the numerous plans published in the Allied press, and put them under a general boycott. In my opinion this conception should be abandoned, as directly contrary to the interests of the victims of German aggression. The Germans should be allowed to work and engage in commerce, but owing to the extraordinary circumstances arising out of this long war, it will be necessary that German commerce go on under the control of inter-Allied commissions. These commissions, however, must avoid vexatious measures, for the Boche debtor cannot earn the money to pay what he owes if he is constantly worried.

Eighth Condition.

To consider the League of Nations from a realistic and not a Utopian standpoint.

The Utopian conditions which obtained before the war in the states now in alliance,

greatly facilitated the preparations for the German aggression; and we ought carefully to avoid a repetition of such fatal blunders. It is, therefore, urgently necessary to form an idea of this much-talked-of League of Nations, which will conform to the interests of peace, our views on the subject being still vague.

According to the way you understand it, the League of Nations is either a beautiful conception to be applied progressively, or a dangerous absurdity; and the distinction between these two aspects of the same idea is easy to see.

It is not only right but necessary to resolve that after the war the actual alliance between the nations, which now unites three-quarters of the people on earth, should become a permanent league, with an essential object, to prevent any future war. Logically this League of Nations itself as soon as peace is concluded should undertake the following:

1st. The distribution of troops composed of detachments from Allied forces in disputed regions of Europe, and also the occupation of German territory wherever necessary.

2d. To form and decide on the functions of the inter-Allied commissions sent to study on the spot the resources of Germany, in order to fix the amount of the indemnity due to the

victims of her aggressions, and to insure its payment.

The League of Nations should also act in the larger interests of peace, as a kind of tribunal which would itself see to the execution of its decisions, and, thus understood, the league could not fail to receive the support of practically the whole world.

There are some incorrigible lunatics who propose, contrary to common sense, and to the most elementary ideas of justice, to admit Germany to the League of Nations as soon as peace is concluded. Would it not be absurd to say to the German people, "We will treat you as brothers," when they will be forced to pay an indemnity to the Allies during a long term of years?

There are millions of Allied soldiers, broken-hearted women who mourn husbands, fathers, and fiancés, Slavs and Latins from central Europe, the Balkans, and Russia, Greeks, and Armenians, who have all suffered in their tenderest affections to the extreme limits of human agony through the action of German people. Can we seriously ask of all these to say to the Germans whose hands are still stained with the blood of their crimes: "People of Germany, you are our brothers, come

and join with us in the League of Nations"? If a son was bereaved by a crime, could one say to the orphan: "Treat the murderer of your father as a brother"? None but a madman could have such a conception of the League of Nations. At the present time discussions as to the league are theoretic; the public generally does not understand clearly what is intended, but when it is known that the idea is from this time forth to treat the Boche assassins as equals and brothers, it will raise a furious storm of indignation. The upshot will be to discredit the plan for a League of Nations, even in its practical form, of which the effect would be lasting as well as attractive and desirable.

Ninth Condition.

To understand that the pacifists are as dangerous to the establishment of a durable peace as the Pangermanists.

For a quarter of a century the world has suffered from two great diseases—Pangermanism and pacifism. Both are follies, the second at least as dangerous as the first. At bottom the Pangerman plan was an insane dream, which should never have been allowed to be

realized. Nothing, in fact, was easier during twenty years than for the countries threatened by this monstrous plan to render impossible any attempt at its execution. That this did not happen was due to a coincidence, which history must explain. During this period the different countries of the Entente were ruled by pacifists, who taught the mass of the people that peace was assured, without considering the striking signification of the increasing armaments of Germany and the great spread of Pangermanist doctrines. This is the unanswerable reason why the pacifists of the Entente are themselves primarily responsible for the war, and they also are the cause of its extreme duration, with all the misery resulting therefrom.

It is a fact that, instead of wishing to prosecute the war with determination, the pacifists who were able to influence the course of the Entente, were constantly seeking for peace, where a strong offensive was needed, which would long ago have put a stop to the carnage by an Allied victory.

The pacifist influence is largely responsible for the fact that during four years, instead of pushing an offensive campaign against Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, which—as is now

strikingly proved—were the extreme weak points of the Central Empires, we persistently tried to negotiate with these countries separate peace treaties which were impossible of attainment. The result was that our whole military force, from the beginning of the war, has been concentrated on the western front, exactly the line where the Germans were strongest. As a consequence, the abortive peace negotiations with Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, which took place in the first years of the war, have cost millions of men to the Allies.

If these things have happened before and during the war, it is because the pacifist is an ideologist, which implies an extraordinary ignorance of the realities, things he does not even wish to understand.

The chief misfortune is that the public has not yet been enlightened as to the great danger that pacifism represents for the peace of the world, and thus naturally public opinion extends an undeserved consideration toward many pacifists. As an instance of this, Sir Edward Grey is almost unanimously held to be an idealist who made every imaginable effort before 1914 to avert war. The truth, however, is exactly the contrary, not that Sir Edward Grey lacked good-will, but because he

did not understand the situation; he is, no doubt, an excellent trout-fisher, but he is an Englishman with very incomplete ideas on European questions, in spite of the fact that he was at the head of the Foreign Office for a long time.

In 1912-13, as we learn by Prince Lichnowsky's memoirs, Sir Edward ceded all Mesopotamia to Germany as a sphere of influence, something which he had no sort of right to do, and, though he did not suspect it, this action made Germany wish to realize at once the rest of the Pangerman plan in the Balkans and central Europe—a plan which was entirely unknown to Sir Edward Grey. It is true that, if you give up 20 per cent voluntarily to a German, he will at once try to take the rest away from you, but, in his quality of inveterate pacifist, Sir Edward entirely ignored German psychology.

For this very reason when, before declaring war, Germany asked if England would take part in the struggle, Sir Edward Grey made no answer, but, if he had understood the Germans, he would have replied, "Yes," and this word, resolutely uttered at that moment, might have moved Germany to give up her aggression.

Let me add something still more extraordinary which is unknown to the general public. In September, 1915, the Bulgars were preparing to invade Serbia, when the Serbian representatives in London said to Sir Edward Grey: "We shall attack Bulgaria, before her concentration is complete, as the only way to prevent an invasion of our country." To which Sir Edward replied, forbidding absolutely an attack on the Bulgars, for he thought that they were mobilizing to join the Entente.

This colossal mistake on the part of Sir Edward Grey allowed Serbia to be invaded, and enabled Germany to effect that junction with the east which so greatly lengthened the war. It seems evident that since his reply led to such consequences, a very heavy responsibility for the millions of deaths that resulted rests upon Sir Edward Grey. When the reckoning is made after the war it is highly possible that the pacifists will be found to have massacred more men than even the Pangermans.

To sum up, a pacifist is an ideologist, entirely indifferent to facts, which he refuses to understand—an attitude which gives a criminal character to his ignorance. A pacifist is always talking about peace, but he is as inca-

pable of maintaining peace as he is of making war with resolution and competence, so that it may be short, and therefore less sanguinary.

A pacifist, then, is entirely unable to grasp the conditions necessary to a lasting peace with the Boches, who generally deceive him like a child.

It is in the highest degree important, therefore, to prevent the pacifists—as dangerous ideologists—from exerting their influence on the conclusion of peace. They would certainly allow causes of war to remain, which those who have real knowledge of European conditions would undoubtedly suppress.

Tenth Condition.

Not to allow ourselves to be deceived as to the character of the Bolshevik danger.

Those, unfortunately so few, who are really acquainted with the German character, believe that Bolshevism in Germany is not of the same character as in Russia.

In fact, Bolshevism, which served the German Great General Staff as a means for destroying Russia, is at present a weapon very well managed by the Boche Social Democrats,

which, if care is not taken, will permit them to destroy the solidarity of the Entente countries during the armistice, and so finally save Germany from real defeat under cover of the general confusion.

To appreciate the whole extent of this danger one has only to note the results gained from the Entente by the Bolshevik blackmail from the 10th of November, 1918, the date of the signature of the armistice, to the 15th of November only.

In this very short space of time the Boches said, on the 12th of November: "We need definitive peace as soon as possible. If not, all Germany will be the prey of Bolshevism." And the Allies visibly appeared to hurry forward the peace conference.

Then, on the 14th of November, the Boches, men and women, put in their word: "The terms of the armistice must be softened and the German people must be fed, for, unless this is done, Bolshevism," etc., etc. And though this last demand has not been accepted at the moment when I write these lines, it is at least being taken into consideration. But we must choose. America clearly cannot feed everybody in Europe. It is certain that the winter of 1918-19 will be a terrible one. Therefore,

if the Germans are to be fed, we condemn to death millions of Slavs and Latins of central Europe who are Allies of the Entente, who have strongly contributed to its victory, who are necessary to form a powerful barrier against any renewed offensive of Pangermanism, and who for four years have been systematically reduced to famine by these very Boches. Has there ever been anything like this in history?

The best course for the Allies to pursue to secure themselves against the Bolshevik danger, which is only too real, is to act not according to the advice of the Boches, but according to our own good sense. Let us send the Allied soldiers into Austria-Hungary to organize order there, to secure the feeding first of all of those peoples who have been our faithful allies, and then, if there is anything left, the Boches themselves. Let us try this way and we shall see that the Bolshevik peril will disappear in regions where the Allies are able to act directly.

* * *

Such are the different conditions which the Allies must realize if they are really seeking the end of militarism to the fullest extent possible.

As the German propaganda, aided by all those in the Entente nations who are working to save Germany by leading us into incomplete and hastily made decisions, threatens during the period of the armistice to seriously compromise the victory of the Allies, it is particularly necessary, in order to neutralize this dangerous effort, that American public opinion shall declare itself clearly, without delay and with the greatest emphasis, for the following measures:

1. The presence of Allied soldiers in central Europe during the reorganization.

2. The rejection of every form of generosity in material matters which can only be shown to the Germans at the expense of the Allies.

3. Reparation by the German people, strictly held responsible for all the damage which they have caused—and this to the greatest extent possible.

4. A sufficiently exhaustive examination by the Peace Conference of the immense problems which it has to solve.

The carrying out of this programme of action only requires from public opinion about six months of effort, clear vision, and persistence; but it is such that it will avoid the very great dangers of the armistice period and

will secure to the Allies real, complete, and permanent victory. In my opinion, this exertion of vigilance is absolutely necessary in order that history may say with certainty: America saved Europe.





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